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Abstract 
 
The thesis considers the scope of trade mark protection against the 
context of paid search marketing.  
The hypothesis is that ‘fair and efficient competition’ is at the heart of the 
balance between interested parties and between trade mark protection and free 
speech. This introduces the concept of ‘a virtuous cycle in the application of trade 
mark law.’  
The thesis suggests that ‘fair and efficient competition’ should be the 
ultimate purpose of trade mark law. The concept can be furthered by protecting 
pro-competitive trade mark functions: the intra-trade mark information function 
and the inter-trade mark differentiation function. Thus, only where third party use 
is likely to harm the information and differentiation functions of owners’ trade 
marks, users could be liable. 
In a democratic society, there is an additional consideration: the balance 
between trade mark protection and free speech. Where third parties use trade 
marks in non-commercial contexts, likelihood of confusion or dilution should be 
the result of actual malice or calculated falsehood. 
These two considerations are tested against the real world context of paid 
search marketing. Based on the protection of pro-competitive trade mark 
functions and speech restriction standards, and the relevance of actual and direct 
context and circumstances of paid search marketing, advertisers can be liable for 
their use of trade marks even when they do not include trade marks in their 
advertisements. Search engines, however, are not responsible for their use ‘under 
current practices,’ whether or not trade marks are included in advertisements. 
The thesis supports that trade mark law and jurisprudence should 
transform the cycle that starts with the balance of interests and end with fair and 
efficient competition into a virtuous spiral where one feeds the other; the two are 
inextricably linked. 
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Part I. Introduction and Basic Questions 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1. Aim and Scope  
 
The thesis will consider the scope of trade mark protection and propose 
‘a virtuous cycle in the application of trade mark law.’ This will be tested against 
the context of paid search marketing. Paid search marketing is the appropriate 
testing ground because of the global challenges it introduces to the fundamentals 
of trade mark protection. 
 The thesis seeks to delineate the proper scope of trade mark protection; 
this requires a balance between trade mark owners, third party users, and 
consumers, on the one hand, and between trade mark protection and free speech 
values, on the other. The main hypothesis is that ‘fair and efficient competition’ 
plays a core role in finding a balance that can be reached through a virtuous cycle 
in the application of trade mark law.  
The starting point, which functions as a catalyst throughout the thesis, is 
that the ultimate purpose of trade mark protection should be ‘fair and efficient 
competition.’ This leads to the distinction between non-protectable and 
protectable trade mark functions because only pro-competitive trade mark 
functions, which are worthy of protection under ‘fair and efficient competition,’ 
should be protected by trade mark law. At this step in the cycle, liability needs to 
be based on pro-competitive trade mark functions. Focused on competition in 
product markets on the one hand and including brand image protection on the 
other, the protection of these functions provides balancing and counterbalancing 
mechanisms in determining liability. 
Turning to free speech, trade mark protection, aiming at the furtherance 
of fair and efficient competition by way of protecting pro-competitive trade mark 
functions, can coexist with free speech values. From the standpoint of standards 
for restricting free speech, the purpose of trade mark protection could be 
substantial or compelling, depending on the degree of harm to pro-competitive 
trade mark functions: substantial if there is a likelihood of harm and compelling if 
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there is an evident likelihood of harm. Here, standards for restricting free speech 
directly influence the interpretation of requirements for trade mark liability that 
hinges on whether use of trade marks is commercial or non-commercial. 
Finally, the virtuous cycle could close at the point where the 
interpretation of requirements for and exceptions from trade mark liability, based 
on both pro-competitive functions and standards for limiting free speech, is 
applied to a specific context. Against this context, trade mark protection could 
promote fair and efficient competition. At the same time, it could reach a balance 
first between trade mark owners, third party users, and consumers and second 
between trade mark protection and free speech values. Attempts to advance fair 
and efficient competition in different contexts will initiate another iteration of the 
virtuous cycle, transforming the cycle into a spiral. 
In this thesis, only the areas relevant to direct trade mark liability in paid 
search marketing provide the necessary contextual background against which the 
newly introduced concepts are tested. For example, post-sale confusion will not 
be discussed despite its importance in delineating trade mark protection. 
Moreover, this thesis will not deal with the indirect trade mark liability of 
advertisers and search engines and the liability under laws other than trade mark 
law. A broader analysis appeared fascinating at the start of my journey, but soon it 
became clear that it would be a huge challenge to try and fit it within the word 
limits of a PhD thesis.  
 
2. Global Challenges of Paid Search Marketing  
 
Paid search marketing such as Google Adwords is an online marketing 
method by which advertisers, who purchase keywords from search engines, can 
have their advertisements displayed on search engine result pages (“SERPs”) in 
response to search engine users’ input of the keywords into search boxes. These 
advertisements typically appear at the top of, or on the right side of, SERPs and 
are ranked by the maximum bid amounts that advertisers are willing to pay for 
keywords and other factors such as advertisement quality. This marketing is more 
cost-effective for advertisers to reach consumers than any other marketing. 
Advertisers make the most of this marketing by combining it with brand 
12 
 
marketing; they select and purchase trade marks as keywords that trigger their 
own brand marketing. 
From the perspective of trade mark law, use of trade marks in paid search 
marketing raised tensions between trade mark proprietors, advertisers, search 
engines, and consumers in many directions. Trade mark proprietors, who had to 
pay search engines to ensure that their advertisements would appear at the top of 
paid search results like other advertisers, claimed confusion or dilution-based 
liability for advertisers’ or search engines’ use. Moreover, these tensions have 
spread across the world because of the global effect of the Internet. Paid search 
marketing cases have been before courts not only on both sides of the Atlantic but 
also in Asia.  
These global tensions challenge the fundamentals of trade mark 
protection. Against trade mark owners’ claims for protection, advertisers and 
search engines argue for their competitive interests in product markets, their 
contribution to consumers, or free speech values.  
Courts in different jurisdictions, however, have delivered various 
opinions as to the scope of protection in paid search marketing mainly because of 
specific factual contexts, their evaluation, and related legal interpretation. First, 
courts’ evaluation of similar facts has differed. Second and more importantly, 
different interpretations of essentially very similar legal provisions have led to 
disparate conclusions. For example, in the USA where there is no relevant 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, federal courts have diverse approaches in 
applying the same trade mark law to use of trade marks as keywords.  
Scholars also follow diverse interpretative paths. The pendulum of trade 
mark law sways from trade mark owners to competitors in some markets or third 
party users in others; there is no equilibrium position. Locating the equilibrium 
becomes trickier if free speech interests are additionally considered in 
determining liability of advertisers and search engines. 
This thesis assumes that inconsistent legal interpretations are the result of 
three factors: currently accepted goals of trade mark protection have not served 
well as a guide; trade mark functions have not been classified as protectable and 
non-protectable; and standards for limiting free speech have not played a key role 
in giving sufficient direction as to the interpretation of trade mark law. If trade 
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mark protection in paid search marketing is analysed through ‘a virtuous cycle in 
the application of trade mark law,’ it could contribute to fair and efficient 
competition and reach a balance between trade mark owners, advertisers, search 
engines, and consumers. 
 
3. Outline  
 
This thesis consists of four parts: introduction and basic questions (part I), 
direct trade mark liability (part II), freedom of expression (part III), and 
conclusion (part IV). Chapters 1, 2, and 3 belong to part I, and chapters 4 and 5 
are included in part II. Part III has chapters 6 and 7. 
After this introduction, chapter 2 elaborates on the mechanics and 
characteristics of paid search marketing. This will show that court decisions on 
similar online marketing cases and the analogy of paid search marketing to 
bricks-and-mortar marketing could play only a limited role in determining 
liability of advertisers and search engines because of the peculiarities of use of 
trade marks in paid search marketing, and thus suggest an analysis through a 
virtuous cycle in the application of trade mark law.  
The ‘virtuous cycle’ concept is introduced in chapter 3. There the goals 
are first to show why fair and efficient competition should be the ultimate 
purpose of trade mark protection and second to propose the information and 
differentiation functions as protectable functions from the perspective of fair and 
efficient competition.  
Part II discusses direct trade mark liability in paid search marketing on 
the basis of protectable trade mark functions in chapter 5, after examining 
relevant decisions of US federal courts, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), 
and Korean courts in chapter 4. Chapter 5 seeks to interpret requirements for and 
exceptions from trade mark liability from the perspective of the protection of pro-
competitive functions. Then, based on this interpretation, it analyses the direct 
liability of advertisers and search engines, taking account of the characteristics of 
use of trade marks in paid search marketing. 
Chapter 4 aims to show that courts have not given sufficient answers to 
questions about currently accepted fundamentals of trade mark protection raised 
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by use of trade marks in paid search marketing. Chapter 5 suggests that direct 
trade mark liability based on confusion or dilution should be limited to the case 
where the pro-competitive functions of trade marks are likely to be harmed, 
arguing against a trade mark use theory. It is submitted in this chapter that 
likelihood of confusion can arise only where consumers are misled into believing 
that trade mark owners control the quality or brand image of users’ products. 
Likelihood of dilution can occur only where third party use of famous marks 
could lead consumers to associate famous marks with inconsistent or negative 
product quality or brand images. Exceptions, such as fair use, should be decided 
separately from requirements, such as likelihood of confusion. 
Part III concerns the analysis of freedom of expression in paid search 
marketing. Against arguments for trade mark liability, advertisers and search 
engines maintain that their use of trade marks should be protected under free 
speech. Chapter 6 examines the protection of commercial expression under free 
speech, the distinction between commercial and non-commercial expression, 
different standards for restricting free speech, and the relationship between trade 
mark law and free speech. On the basis of the analysis in chapter 6, chapter 7 
evaluates my interpretation in chapter 5 and additionally suggests an 
interpretation in the case where trade marks are used in non-commercial contexts. 
Then, it analyses the direct liability of advertisers and search engines, using these 
interpretations. 
In chapter 6, I submit that bans on unauthorised use by trade mark law 
can be in conformity with the standards for restricting free speech insofar as the 
purpose of trade mark protection is interpreted as fostering fair and efficient 
competition by way of protecting pro-competitive trade mark functions. Chapter 
7 suggests that where trade marks are used in non-commercial contexts, and thus 
use of marks is considered to be non-commercial, likelihood of confusion and 
dilution should be interpreted as meaning explicit likelihood of confusion and 
dilution for third party use to be banned.  
Part IV offers an overall conclusion and brings together a number of 
specific recommendations. 
 
4. Methodology 
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 The thesis relies heavily on a jurisprudential analysis, conducting a 
comparative study of court decisions in three jurisdictions, taken prior to July 
2013: the USA, the EU, and Korea.  
The USA offers an abundance of trade mark jurisprudence and diverging 
approaches. Many cases about use of trade marks in paid search marketing have 
been brought before federal courts that have shown diverse attitudes towards 
liability of advertisers and search engines. Moreover, the US Supreme Court has 
generated an enlightening discussion on free speech doctrines.
1
  
In the EU, the convergence and unification of trade mark law has been 
emerging through the two pillars: the EU Trade Mark Directive and the 
Community Trade Mark Regulation. The Directive aimed at the convergence of 
EU trade mark law, and the Regulation superimposed a unified trade mark system 
on the national trade mark systems of member states. Against this, the ECJ has 
developed significant jurisprudence on trade marks and paid search marketing.  
Korea is a particularly interesting jurisdiction because it offers a marriage 
between diverse legal traditions and a rapprochement in terms of policy approach. 
Some parts of the trade mark system are akin to the Lanham Act while others to 
EU law. For example, anti-dilution provisions in the Korean Unfair Competition 
Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (“Korean Unfair Competition Act”) 
are similar to those in the Lanham Act. By contrast, in the Korean Trade Mark 
Act, as in EU trade mark law, the taking of unfair advantage constitutes ‘a ground 
for refusal and invalidation.’ Under this system, the Supreme Court of Korea 
made a decision on a paid search marketing case recently. Given the high 
broadband penetration in Korea,
2
 there will be more cases. A comparative study 
could suggest the direction in which Korean courts should determine the scope of 
trade mark protection in paid search marketing. 
Following a comparative analysis approach, in chapter 2, I attempt to 
show the peculiarities of use of trade marks in paid search marketing by 
                                         
1
 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 55 
2
 OECD Broadband Statistics Update <http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/broadband-statistics-
update.htm> accessed 2 August 2013 (“The total number of wireless broadband subscriptions in 
the OECD area is just above 780 million. Finland (106.5), Sweden (104.8), Australia (103.4) and 
Korea (103.0) have over one subscriber per capita.”) 
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comparing it with use in similar online marketing and examining the analogy to 
product placement, the sale of embroidered logos, and newspaper advertising. 
Chapter 3 examines the limit of currently accepted purposes of trade mark 
protection, the nature of trade mark law, pro-competitive characteristics of trade 
mark protection, and the internalisation of competition in trade mark law in three 
jurisdictions. Then, it explores protectable trade mark functions from the 
perspective of ‘fair and efficient competition.’  
In part II, having provided a comprehensive comparison of court 
decisions on use of trade marks in paid search marketing in three jurisdictions, I 
draw my interpretation of requirements for and exceptions from trade mark 
liability based on the analysis in chapter 3 and test it against the context of paid 
search marketing. In chapter 4, the comparison is made according to the liability 
of advertisers or search engines. In the case of the USA, decisions of US federal 
courts are examined in the absence of relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence. In 
chapter 5, I explore trade mark theories relevant to paid search marketing cases to 
reach an interpretation that can be justified by ‘fair and efficient competition 
through the protection of pro-competitive trade mark functions.’ Based on this 
interpretation, the direct liability of advertisers and search engines in the context 
of paid search marketing is analysed.  
 In Part III, having deduced standards for limiting expression, I apply 
them to paid search marketing cases for achieving a balance between trade mark 
protection and freedom of expression. Chapter 6 makes a comparative analysis of 
court decisions to suggest standards for restricting commercial and non-
commercial expression; for this, decisions of the US Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court of Korea
3
 are examined. In the EU, there is convergence in 
the interpretation of freedom of expression, despite the existence of each EU 
member state’s own legal order regarding freedom of expression. Thus, I explore 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), which is the 
highest court in Europe in terms of human rights, including freedom of 
                                         
3
 The Constitutional Court of Korea was established in 1988 by the current Constitution as a 
result of the people’s movement for democracy in 1987. It is an independent specialised court for 
constitutional issues in order to fully protect fundamental rights and effectively check 
governmental powers. Because of the existence of the Constitutional Court separated from the 
Supreme Court, various constitutional issues have been dealt in this court. There are nine Justices 
who serve a six-year renewable term. <http://english.ccourt.go.kr> accessed 23 March 2011 
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expression,
4
 and the ECJ, which is the highest quasi-federal court concerning EU 
trade mark law,
5
 rather than national courts in each EU member state in order to 
extract jurisprudential commonalities. Then, the general relationship between 
trade mark law and free speech is analysed through the application of speech 
restriction standards to trade mark law. 
 In chapter 7, I review the interpretation of requirements for and 
exceptions from trade mark liability from the perspective of speech restriction 
standards. The direct trade mark liability of advertisers and search engines is also 
assessed again in the light of speech restriction standards. 
 
  
                                         
4
 The European Court of Human Rights is an international court established by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The EU itself is able to join the ECHR as a result of the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty (1 December 2009) and the Protocol No.14 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1 June 2010). 
5
 The ECJ has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of EU law 
including the EU Trade Mark Directive when national courts of EU member states refer to the 
ECJ about the interpretation. The ECJ’s judgment binds both referring courts and other national 
courts which have similar issues. The ECJ also has jurisdiction to decide appeals on points of law 
against the General Court’s judgment on appeals against the Boards of Appeal’s decisions relating 
to Community Trade Marks. 
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Chapter 2: Mechanics and Characteristics of Paid Search Marketing 
 
 This chapter examines how paid search marketing operates and what 
makes this marketing salient. It also explores how trade marks are employed in 
paid search marketing and compares use of trade marks in this context with that 
in bricks-and-mortar marketing. By linking paid search marketing with brand 
marketing, use of trade marks as keywords to trigger paid search results generates 
complicated trade mark issues. 
 
1. Mechanics 
 
 Normally, information on the World Wide Web, stored in the form of web 
pages, can be accessed through internet browsers.
6
 By putting in internet 
browsers websites’ Internet Protocol addresses (“IP addresses”) or domain names, 
internet users can reach the sites and garner information with ease. Particularly 
for established brands, more than half of website visitors directly arrive at 
websites through inputting web addresses or following bookmarks.
7
 
 Users, however, cannot have access to information where they do not 
know the relevant IP addresses or domain names. A search engine enables 
searchers to find information in this situation. It is a computer programme
8
 
designed to search the World Wide Web for information by only entering 
keywords into a search box of the engine and clicking on a ‘search’ button. In 
response to the entry, a search engine ordinarily returns two types of relevant 
information on a search results page (“SERP”): natural and paid results. 
 Natural results, also called organic or algorithmic results, are displayed 
“in order of relevance and popularity according to [search engines’] complex 
algorithms.” 9  Relevance means “the degree to which the content of the 
documents returned in a search matches the user’s intention and terms” and can 
rise if queried terms “[occur] multiple times and [show] up in the title of the work 
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or in important headlines or subheads, or if links to the page come from relevant 
pages and use relevant anchor text.” 10  Popularity relates to “the relative 
importance, measured via citation of a given document that matches the user’s 
query” and can increase if the document that matches the user’s terms is 
referenced by other documents.
11
 Search engines’ algorithms decide this 
relevance and popularity automatically.  
Along with natural results, paid results or sponsored results appear at the 
top of or on the right side of SERPs. Like natural results, paid results are 
displayed when users of search engines enter search terms into search boxes.
12
 
Nevertheless, advertisers pay search engines just for paid results; advertisers’ 
maximum bid amounts and other factors such as advertisement quality rank a list 
of paid results that appear on screens. 
Paid search marketing is a type of search engine marketing which relates 
to paid results. It is preferred because advertisers can promote their products to 
customers looking for relevant products or information. Compared to traditional 
advertising, advertisers can target advertising at interested consumers since 
advertisements are displayed only when users enter relevant keywords into search 
boxes.
13
  
 In paid search marketing or pay-per-click marketing such as Google 
Adwords, Yahoo! Search Marketing, Bing Search Advertising, and Naver
14
 
Click Choice, search engines sell advertisers keywords that trigger the display of 
advertisements, and advertisers purchase keywords and the right to have their 
advertisements displayed in response to search engine users’ input of keywords.15 
Moreover, search engines sell and advertisers buy the positions of advertisements 
in a list of paid results which correspond to advertisers’ maximum bid prices and 
other relevant factors.
16
 Some search engines recommend keywords to 
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advertisers via their suggestion tools. Advertisers pay search engines whenever 
users click on paid advertisements.
17
 Even though users click on natural results 
more than paid results, many users also click on paid results and search engines 
earn their profits mainly through the sale of keywords.
18
  
 Advertisers who want to use paid search marketing usually need three 
main steps. The first is to select keywords by referring to keyword suggestions 
made by search engines. The second step requires them to decide a daily budget 
and the maximum amount of money that they are willing to pay each time the 
hyperlinks in their advertisements are clicked on. Search engines such as Google 
and Yahoo also enable advertisers to choose the region that they wish to have 
their advertisements displayed. The third step is to create advertisements 
consisting of a heading, a promotional message, and the URL of an advertiser’s 
website. 
 Keywords, when typed in by search engine users, trigger relevant paid 
results to appear above or to the right of organic results under the title of 
‘sponsored results,’ ‘sponsored links,’ or ‘ads’. Some search engines also display 
them below or in the middle of natural results. While paid search results are 
separated from natural results by, for example, a light-coloured rectangular 
background together with the title, they are displayed in a colour, typeface, and 
font size similar to those of organic results.
19
 The colour of rectangular 
background is not clear enough to be distinguished from a white background of 
organic results, and the title is small.  
Paid results themselves do not always show their exact relationship with 
keywords. On the other hand, keywords, which were entered into search boxes 
and still remain there when paid results appear, imply that all paid results are 
linked to them. Moreover, some search engines indicate at the top of paid results 
that advertisements are ‘ads related to’ keywords. 
In paid search marketing, the search engines’ aim does not always 
correspond to the advertisers’ aim. Search engines can earn more by selling 
keywords and increasing chances that searchers click on advertisements. Thus, 
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they need to attract more search engine users by enabling users to find the most 
relevant information on their websites much quicker and easier than on other 
search engines’ websites.20 This would result in search engines’ investment in 
natural as well as paid results. On the other hand, an advertiser can boost profits 
when more users click on ‘its’ advertisement. The advertiser would seek to 
include whatever is necessary to draw consumer attention in its advertisement.
21
 
 
2. Characteristics 
 
 Compared to domain names, metatags, and pop-up and banner 
advertisements, paid search marketing has its unique characteristics that should 
be considered when analysing trade mark use in this context. Thus, a distinct 
reasoning should be provided in assessing liability of advertisers and search 
engines in paid search marketing.  
  
1) Paid Search Marketing and Domain Names 
 
 Domain names are significant for the purpose of online marketing. Good 
domain names can attract consumers by concisely and easily delivering 
information about sellers and products. By simply entering domain names into an 
address bar of an internet browser, internet users can easily access websites 
containing information that they look for. 
 Domain names appear to be very similar to keywords used in paid search 
marketing. First, advertisers can ‘purchase’ domain names and keywords. Second, 
relevant information is triggered in response to the entry of them in an address bar 
of a browser or in a search box of a search engine. Third, advertisers create both 
the content of websites triggered by domain names and advertisements generated 
by keywords. Fourth, trade marks can be used in both of them.  
 Nevertheless, there are also significant differences. First, while identical 
domain names cannot be owned by different entities, identical keywords can be 
sold to more than one advertiser. As a result, many advertisements of different 
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advertisers can be displayed on the same screen when users input the same 
keywords. Second, in contrast to advertisers’ websites caused by domain names, 
search results pages are composed of various expressions belonging to different 
individuals or legal entities. Third, whereas domain names directly take users to 
advertisers’ websites, keywords do not trigger these websites. They just cause 
advertisements to appear. Thus, the content of advertisers’ websites is not directly 
connected to keywords. 
 
2) Paid Search Marketing and Metatags 
 
 Metatags are invisible codes consisting of words or phrases intended to 
describe the content of websites.
22
 Most important amongst them are description 
and keyword metatags.
23
 Description metatags indicate information about the 
content of websites and are often used by search engines as a description for web 
pages in search results.
24
 Keyword metatags are used to encapsulate the content 
of websites in several keywords
25
 or to include a list of keywords that website 
owners want to connect with their websites.
26
 
Use of keywords in paid search marketing is akin to use of metatags 
insofar as metatags trigger natural results. When internet users input search terms 
into search boxes, corresponding keywords trigger paid results and corresponding 
metatags cause natural results to appear. The font, size, and colour of natural 
results are almost identical with those of paid results. In contrast to domain names, 
both metatags and keywords do not generate advertisers’ websites. Websites can 
be reached only when users click on links in natural or paid results. 
This, however, is not always the case. Search engines such as Google do 
not use keyword metatags as a factor for ranking, and description metatags also 
do not have any influence on the ranking of natural results.
27
 In this sense, 
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metatags are very different from keywords. Metatags are regarded as affecting the 
order of the display of advertisements much less than keywords.
28
 
 Moreover, search engines are not involved in advertisers’ use of metatags 
which is aimed at improving the positioning of their advertisements in natural 
results.
29
 They do not sell metatags to advertisers, and advertisers do not pay any 
money to them for metatags. Advertisers that wish to enhance the positioning of 
their natural results would pay search engine optimisation service companies for 
optimisation process including use of metatags. Search engines, though, seek to 
return the most relevant information to their users without being influenced by 
metatags irrelevant to the content of websites. Their failure to provide relevant 
information quickly and easily can result in a lower number of their users
30
 and 
hence a decrease in their profits through selling keywords. 
  
3) Paid Search Marketing and Pop-up and Banner Advertisements 
 
The mechanics of pop-up and banner advertising are very similar to those 
of paid search marketing. In pop-up and banner advertising, the appearance of 
advertisements is typically the result of the entry of keywords, and advertisers 
pay search engine providers for the display.  
There exist differences between them too. First, in some cases, search 
engines do not sell specified keywords to pop-up or banner advertisers,
31
 and 
pop-up or banner advertisements are displayed randomly or in response to the 
category of products that computer users search for. Advertisers sometimes pay 
for space for their pop-up or banner advertisements, not for keywords, and 
sometimes purchase a package of keywords.
32
 
Second, pop-up and banner advertisements can be more readily identified 
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by consumers as such than paid results. Pop-up advertisements usually emerge on 
another SERP in the middle of the screen, blocking the display of the website that 
users visit. Banner advertisements, despite their appearance on the same SERP, 
are typically displayed in a font, size, and colour different from those of search 
results and involve images or animations.
33
 
Pop-up advertisements are more likely to cause confusion or dilution than 
paid results because they block others’ display. They are more intrusive than paid 
results in that they concern “aggressive overlaying of an advertisement on top of 
a trademark owner’s webpage.”34 They can hinder internet users from reading 
information on computer screens and trade mark owners from displaying their 
advertisements. Thus, for example, if a pop-up advertisement replaces a trade 
mark owner’s advertisement and is perceived as the owner’s advertisement, this 
could result in likelihood of confusion. 
 
3. Employing Trade Marks in Paid Search Marketing 
 
1) Advertisers’ Marketing and Search Engines’ Trade Mark Policies 
  
(1) Brand Marketing Benefits and Search Engines’ Policies  
 
 Advertisers are eager to use trade marks in paid search marketing to 
benefit from both online marketing and brand marketing; they can make the most 
of paid search marketing by combining it with the ways trade marks function. 
Some may argue that trade marks are used in this marketing only as an 
informational tool to establish a link between advertisers and potential 
customers.
35
 Trade marked keywords, however, also create an association in the 
mind of the consumer between trade marks and advertisements. More specifically, 
keywords enable consumers to connect trade marks with advertisers’ products or 
trade marks mentioned in the advertisements. The strength of the connection 
depends on the text of the advertisements. In this vein, some marketing scholars 
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regard branding as one advantage of paid search marketing, arguing that paid 
search marketing has a branding effect even where search engine users do not 
click on advertisements.
36
 
Meanwhile, search engines would come to allow use of trade marks as 
keywords unless courts find it illegal. Without displaying advertisements relevant 
to trade marks, they would be unable to satisfy their users who look for certain 
trade marks but have no idea about the corresponding IP addresses or domain 
names. In addition, they would be unable to sift out of the Internet the illegal use 
of trade marks before advertisements are displayed. Leaving aside the lack of 
authority, the budgetary requirements would be prohibitive. 
In sum, search engines’ trade mark policies along with advertisers’ 
marketing benefits enable advertisers to use trade marks as keywords. 
 
(2) Changes in Search Engines’ Policies 
 
Search engines hold their own trade mark policies as to whether trade 
marks can be purchased as keywords or whether they can be included in the text 
of advertisements. These policies differ from one jurisdiction to another and 
develop in line with court decisions or market changes.  
 Before 2004, Google prevented advertisers from bidding on trade marks 
as keywords for paid results and from using them in advertisements upon request 
of trade mark proprietors.
37
 In 2004, Google made its trade mark policy in the 
USA and Canada less strict by allowing advertisers’ purchase of trade marks as 
keywords.
38
 Since then, Google has gradually aligned its policy for other 
countries with this: the UK and Ireland in 2008,
39
 other European countries in 
2010,
40
 and Korea in 2013.
41
 Meanwhile, in 2009, Google adjusted its policy for 
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the USA again to enable advertisers to use trade marks as part of advertisements 
under certain conditions
42
 and then extended the same policy to Canada, the UK, 
and Ireland in 2010.
43
  
Under Google’s current policy, a third party’s advertisement can include 
a trade marked term in its text if “the ad text uses the term descriptively in its 
ordinary meaning” or “the ad is not in reference to the goods or services 
corresponding to the trademarked term.”44 In the USA, Canada, the UK, and 
Ireland, if advertisers i) resell genuine trade marked products, ii) sell components, 
replacement parts, and compatible products, or iii) provide information about 
trade marked products on landing pages of advertisements, they can also use trade 
marks in their advertisements.
45
 According to Google’s EU and EFTA policy, 
advertisers can use trade marks even in their advertisements for competing 
products unless the combination of keywords and advertising text is not 
confusing.
46
 
 Google’s notice and takedown system, which it regards “as a courtesy,”47 
corresponds to this policy. In most countries including the USA and Korea, it 
investigates use of trade marks only in the text of advertisements in response to 
complaints of trade mark owners.
48
 Following the investigation, it “may restrict 
the use of a trademark within ad text.”49 In EU and EFTA regions, however, 
Google, to a limited extent, examines whether keywords in combination with 
advertising text cause confusion as to the origin of advertised products.
50
 
 Yahoo and Bing have also adjusted their trade mark policies. In March 
2011, they changed their trade mark policies in the USA and Canada to 
investigate following complaints only about use of trade marks in advertising 
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text,
51
 albeit stressing that “[a]dvertisers are responsible for ensuring that their 
ads do not violate the trademark or other intellectual property rights of others.”52 
Their modified trade mark policies allow fair use of trade marks in advertising 
text: use by the reseller of genuine products, use in informational websites as to 
trade marked products, use in a dictionary context, and use in comparative 
advertising supported by independent research.
53
  
On the other hand, in the UK, Ireland, France, and Italy, advertisers 
cannot purchase trade marks as keywords, or use them in advertisements if the 
purchase or use would “infringe the trademark of any third party or otherwise be 
unlawful or in violation of the rights of any third party.”54 Truthful and lawful 
use of trade marks can be permitted.
55
 In these countries, Yahoo and Bing 
investigate a complaint not only about use in advertising text but also about the 
selection of trade marks as keywords.
56
  
 Unlike Google, Yahoo, and Bing, Naver, a Korean leading search engine, 
offers basic guidelines as to use of trade marks in paid search marketing. 
According to its guidelines, Naver prohibits advertisers from advertising websites 
that cause confusion as a result of using signs similar to another person’s trade 
mark widely known in Korea.
57
 It can also restrict use of trade marks in a 
heading of an advertisement at the request of trade mark owners.
58
  
 Trade mark policies of search engines suggest their views as to trade 
mark liability in paid search marketing.  
First, search engines emphasise that ‘advertisers’ are liable for use of 
trade marks as keywords or in advertisements. They recommend that trade mark 
owners should contact advertisers directly. They do not think that they are also 
responsible for the use. 
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Second, ‘the content of advertisers’ websites’ plays a key role in search 
engines’ determination on whether use of trade marks is fair or not. They do not 
judge it based solely on trade marks used in advertisements. Where the landing 
pages of advertisements, for example, are about the resale of genuine products in 
the USA, Google allows use of trade marks in advertising text.
59
 Yahoo and Bing 
take a similar position.
60
  
Third, search engines’ policies are directly related to court positions in 
different jurisdictions. This also indicates how diverse national court attitudes are.  
 
2) Evaluation of Analogies  
 
(1) Product Placement 
 
Trade mark use in pop-up advertisements or paid search marketing has 
often been compared to product placement in bricks-and-mortar businesses. Some 
scholars consider that search engines’ use of trade marks in pop-up 
advertisements is similar to ‘supermarket managers who place competitive 
products on the same or adjacent shelves.’61 Some others liken ‘advertisers’ use 
of trade marks as keywords’ to ‘generic drug producers’ placement of their drugs 
next to their brand-name equivalents on shelves’ and ‘search engines’ use’ to 
‘drug stores’ acceptance of the placement.’62 US courts also analogised pop-up 
advertisements and paid search marketing to product placement. In 1-800 
Contacts, the US Second Circuit used a drug store analogy for search engines’ use 
of trade marks in pop-up advertisements.
63
 In Rescuecom, the Second Circuit 
compared paid search marketing to product placement, stressing that Google’s 
use could not be likened to “benign product placement” that did not cause 
likelihood of consumer confusion.
64
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The analogy is obvious since the characteristic features of paid search 
marketing are similar to those of product placement. First, just as relevant 
products are grouped together according to layout plans in real world businesses, 
all paid search results are relevant to trade marked terms entered by users. Second, 
just as generic products placed near products bearing famous marks can benefit 
from the reputation of the marks, paid advertisements triggered by famous marks 
used as keywords can attract the attention of internet users who search for 
products with the marks. Third, both product placement and paid search 
marketing can provide consumers with alternatives to products bearing famous 
marks. Consumers can obtain information about the products that are of the same 
kind but have different trade marks and are cheaper than their famous equivalents. 
Nevertheless, the analogy of product placement cannot necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that advertisements triggered by trade marked keywords are 
always tolerable. This conclusion ignores not only the possible variety in product 
placement but also the peculiarities of trade mark use in paid search marketing.
65
  
First, not every product placement is legal. In some cases where adjacent 
products are not clearly labelled, consumers could be misled into thinking that the 
products originate from trade mark owners. For example, generic analgesics with 
no trade marks, which are put right next to trade marked analgesics, could cause 
consumer confusion as to origin. In Rescuecom, the Second Circuit also held that 
“if a retail seller were to be paid by an off-brand purveyor to arrange product 
display and delivery in such a way that customers seeking to purchase a famous 
brand would receive the off-brand, believing they had gotten the brand they were 
seeking, we see no reason to believe the practice would escape liability merely 
because it could claim the mantle of product placement.”66   
Second, while the distance between competing products and brand-name 
products is important in attracting consumer attention in product placement, the 
main attention drawing factor in paid search marketing is the ranking of 
advertisements in a list of paid results. Moreover, paid search marketing does not 
ensure that proprietors’ advertisements always appear above other advertisements 
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on SERPs since the ranking of proprietors’ advertisements are also affected by 
maximum bid amounts.
67
  
Third, context and circumstances in product placement are less likely to 
show a close relationship between third parties’ products and trade marks than 
those in paid search marketing. In supermarkets or drug stores where products are 
not displayed according to a trade mark relevance order, consumers would not 
normally believe that there is some kind of relationship between adjacent 
products or their trade marks, on the one hand, and famous marks, on the other. In 
paid search marketing, however, context and circumstances can be interpreted as 
suggesting that there is a link between advertisers’ products or trade marks and 
trade marked keywords. It is search engine users that enter trade marked terms in 
search boxes to find relevant information. Natural results appear below, above, or 
to the left of paid results on SERPs according to their relevance to the trade 
marked terms that trigger paid search results. The trade marked terms still stay in 
the search boxes after search results are displayed. Despite the title of paid results 
and their background in a little different colour, the format of paid results is very 
similar to that of organic results. 
Fourth, an analogy to product placement mainly concerns ‘search engines’ 
use’ of trade marks as keywords. It does not sufficiently consider the fact that 
disputes in paid search marketing also occur between trade mark proprietors and 
advertisers in that the analogy does not deal with whether adjacent products bear 
trade marks or whether these products have advertisements that could cause 
consumer confusion. Thus, advertisers’ use of trade marks cannot be explained 
sufficiently by product placement. There is something more in advertisers’ use of 
trade marks as keywords; they purchase trade marks as keywords to trigger their 
advertisements on SERPs and create advertising text that may result in consumer 
confusion. 
 
(2) Sale of Embroidered Logos 
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 Search engines’ sale of trade marks as keywords may be analogised to the 
sale of embroidered logos which replicate other parties’ trade marks. Both can 
give the impression that sellers already acquired trade mark owners’ permission 
about their sales. Moreover, in both cases, sellers can expect that purchasers 
would make use of keywords or logos even though they are not able to know how 
purchasers would use them. 
 This could lead to the conclusion that search engines are liable for trade 
mark infringement by reason of the sale of trade marked keywords as the sale of 
logos infringes on trade mark rights. If consumer confusion is interpreted as 
including confusion as to trade mark owners’ permission or the misappropriation 
of the owners’ goodwill, then the sale of embroidered logos would result in sellers’ 
trade mark liability. Likewise, it can be understood that search engines’ sale of 
keywords causes consumer confusion, and thus search engines are found liable.  
 Search engines, however, do not sell the image files of trade marks that 
can be immediately used in advertisements. They actually sell i) advertising space, 
ii) the ranking of advertisements in a list of paid results, and iii) a link between 
trade marked keywords and advertisements. Moreover, they link identical 
keywords to various advertisements for different products by selling them to 
more than one advertiser. Therefore, whereas sellers of embroidered logos can 
expect purchasers to use them, for example, on hats or clothing, search engines 
can hardly expect whether and how advertisers use trade marks on or in 
connection with owners’ products. 
 
(3) Newspaper Advertising 
 
 Paid search marketing is perhaps more similar to newspaper advertising. 
First, the key role of search engines and newspaper companies is to provide users 
or readers with information. Newspapers contain news, current events 
commentary, and other information, displaying the most important information on 
their front page. Search engines display natural results on SERPs in the order of 
relevance to search terms that users seek according to their algorithms. It is not 
advertisements but information or natural results that attract the attention of users 
32 
 
of newspapers or search engine services. Thus, newspaper companies and search 
engines would endeavour to enhance the quality of information or natural results.  
Second, the positioning of advertisements corresponds to how much 
advertisers pay or intend to pay for advertising. Newspaper companies charge 
more for easily accessible and perceptible advertisements. If advertisers pay more, 
their advertisements can be bigger in size or placed in more conspicuous locations 
such as a front page. Likewise, in paid search marketing, higher positions in a list 
of paid results require higher maximum bid amounts. By raising them, advertisers 
can make their advertisements more noticeable to consumers. 
Third, it is normally advertisers that create the text of advertisements in 
both newspaper advertising and paid search marketing. Newspaper companies 
and search engines themselves do not write advertisements. They do not sell the 
text of advertisements. Thus, as far as advertising text is concerned, neither 
newspaper companies nor search engines are responsible for them.  
Fourth, free speech can also be an issue in both types of advertising. 
Advertisers are able to claim that their advertisements are protected by freedom 
of expression. Newspaper companies and search engines can also insist freedom 
of expression about their advertising layouts. 
 Despite all the similarities, paid search marketing has unique contexts 
that cannot be found in newspaper advertising. First, only when internet users 
input search terms in search boxes, trade marked keywords trigger the display of 
advertisements. Second, natural and paid results appear on the same SERPs in 
response to the entry of identical keywords. Third, search engines provide natural 
results free of charge; profits coming from paid search results can dictate search 
engines’ success. This could drive search engines to focus also on how to design a 
paid search marketing system. Unless the obvious distinction between natural 
results and paid results is more conducive to their revenue, search engines would 
not seek to help users to distinguish between them by displaying advertisements, 
for example, in clearly different colours. 
 
All in all, analogies should only be used to help understand complex 
situations in paid search marketing. The fact that paid search marketing has a lot 
in common with product placement should not lead to the conclusion that both 
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advertisers and search engines are not liable in both contexts. Conversely, the 
similarities between the sale of trade marks as keywords and the sale of 
embroidered logos should not automatically lead to search engines’ trade mark 
liability. Court decision as to newspaper advertising cannot be the same as that as 
to paid search marketing. 
 
3) Peculiarities of Use of Trade Marks in Paid Search Marketing  
 
Since paid search marketing itself has its unique mechanics differentiated 
from those of other online marketing, use of trade marks in paid search marketing 
holds its own peculiarities. Moreover, the combination of brand marketing and 
keyword marketing generates a complicated context of trade mark use.  
First of all, search engines do not really sell or license trade marks to 
advertisers. What they sell or what advertisers purchase is i) advertising space, ii) 
the ranking of advertisements in a list of paid results, and iii) a link between trade 
marked keywords and advertisements. Trade marked keywords as such are not 
aimed to indicate the source or sponsorship of products. Thus, search engines’ 
sale of trade marks as keywords to advertisers cannot be interpreted as allowing 
or justifying advertisers’ use of trade marks in paid search marketing that causes 
likelihood of confusion or dilution. Moreover, this on its own cannot lead to the 
conclusion that search engines know or have reasons to know that advertisers 
would use trade marks in a way that is likely to confuse consumers or dilute trade 
marks. 
Second, trade marks used as keywords or in advertising text are not the 
only trade marks employed in the context of paid search marketing. The same 
marks are displayed elsewhere on SERPs, and other marks also appear on SERPs. 
There are trade marks which were entered by computer users into search boxes 
and remain there. Other marks include service marks of search engines used to 
indicate the source of their services. Other marks such as advertisers’ marks may 
be included in advertisements displayed on the SERPs.   
Third, trade marks are employed at different stages of paid search 
marketing. At the stage of the sale and purchase of trade marked keywords, some 
search engines recommend trade marks as keywords through their keyword 
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suggestion tools. Considering this recommendation, advertisers select and 
purchase trade marks as keywords from search engines. Search engines sell trade 
marked keywords. As a result of the sale and purchase, trade marks are 
incorporated in software programmes of search engines. At the stage when search 
engine users input trade marks as search terms, internalised trade marks trigger 
relevant advertisements to appear on SERPs. Trade marks may or may not be 
included in the text of the advertisements, but trade marks entered by users still 
remain in search boxes. Search engines’ service marks also appear at this stage. 
Fourth, trade marks employed in paid search marketing can be 
categorised into what internet users can and cannot perceive. The utility of this 
categorisation is that only perceptible trade marks can have an influence on users. 
Since internet users are not involved in the sale and purchase, they cannot 
perceive that trade marked keywords are traded between search engines and 
advertisers. On the other hand, trade marks which remain in search boxes and 
search engines’ service marks are visible and perceptible to consumers. Trade 
marks, which may be included in advertisements, are also perceptible. Internal 
use of trade marks as keywords, despite its invisibility, can be classified as 
perceptible use because users can recognise it based on the fact that trade marked 
terms trigger advertisements.  
Fifth, some expressions and contexts are ascribed to advertisers while 
others to search engines. The purchase of trade marked keywords and advertising 
text are made or written by advertisers; it is advertisers that create a link between 
trade marked keywords and advertising text. On the other hand, the 
recommendation of trade marked keywords by suggestion tools, the sale of 
keywords, and the title, location, font, size, and colour of paid results belong to 
search engines. Both advertisers and search engines make internal use of trade 
marks and create a link between trade marks and the display of advertisements. 
Sixth, the results triggered by trade marked keywords are not the 
advertisers’ websites but their advertisements; links to the websites are only 
included in advertisements. Users cannot see the content of websites until they 
click on the links.  
Finally, search engines’ efforts arguably do not appear to be enough to 
separate paid from organic results. Search engines can distinguish between them 
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more clearly by, for example, highlighting paid results with different fonts, sizes, 
and colours. Although insufficient separation in itself does not mislead consumers 
as to origin, it could cause consumers to misbelieve that the relevance to trade 
marks corresponds to the order of paid results.  
Whether these context and circumstances have direct influence on 
determination as to trade mark liability or indirectly contribute to it, they should 
not be overlooked. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 Keywords used in paid search marketing are different from domain 
names and metatags, which also enable internet users to efficiently access online 
information. Thus, court decisions on use of trade marks in domain names or as 
metatags cannot determine trade mark liability of advertisers or search engines in 
paid search marketing. They are no more than references. This is also the case 
with court decisions as to pop-up or banner advertising. 
 Moreover, changes in search engines’ trade mark policies have not 
caused trade mark disputes. In fact, search engines have adapted trade mark 
policies to court decisions or market changes. Therefore, their trade mark polices 
are unlikely to lead to search engines’ trade mark liability. 
 Furthermore, use of trade marks as keywords is or can be analogised to 
product placement, the sale of embroidered logos, or newspaper advertising. 
These analogies may suggest possible solutions or help understand use of trade 
marked keywords. Nevertheless, applying the same reasoning to use of trade 
marks as keywords could ignore the characteristic features of paid search 
marketing. 
 Use of trade marks in paid search marketing has its unique context and 
circumstances. i) Search engines and advertisers do not actually sell and purchase 
trade marks. ii) More than one mark is employed at different stages, and certain 
use of marks cannot be perceived by internet users. iii) Some expressions and 
contexts belong to advertisers, whereas others to search engines. iv) Not all 
context and circumstances shall be considered in determining trade mark liability 
in paid search marketing. v) There are contexts that can mislead users into 
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believing a strong link between trade marked keywords and advertisements. 
Because of these peculiarities, it is not easy to find the proper scope of 
trade mark protection in paid search marketing. Nevertheless, this thesis 
hypothesises that the assessment of direct liability in paid search marketing 
through a virtuous cycle in the application of trade mark law can delineate the 
proper scope of protection. It can reach a balance between trade mark owners, 
advertisers, search engines, and consumers and between trade mark protection 
and free speech values.   
37 
 
Chapter 3: The Purpose of Trade Mark Law and Trade Mark Functions 
 
As a catalyst for finding a balance between all relevant parties and 
between trade mark protection and free speech, this chapter seeks a purpose of 
trade mark law that can both justify and delimit trade mark protection. First, it 
explores current limits of trade mark law and suggests fair and efficient 
competition as the ultimate aim. Then, it discusses the concept and protection of 
pro-competitive trade mark functions, exploring the means to accomplish this aim. 
These two approaches form the basis of the evaluation of direct trade mark 
liability in paid search marketing. They also relate to the restriction of free speech 
by trade mark law in this marketing. 
 
1. The Purpose of Trade Mark Law 
 
1) Proactive Approach of Trade Mark Law and Competition 
 
 Whether trade mark law should “protect whatever consumer 
understandings or producer goodwill develops” or whether it should “seek to 
shape the ways in which consumers shop and producers sell or seek to acquire 
rights, thus shaping how the economy functions” relates to a reactive or proactive 
perspective on trade mark law.
68
 If the former approach is taken, it appears to be 
enough to consider the prevention of consumer confusion and/or the protection of 
goodwill as the goals of trade mark law without considering the interests of 
competitors or the markets themselves. In contrast, a proactive approach requires 
that trade mark law has to show ‘for what trade marks are protected.’ 
 It is suggested here that trade mark law should be proactive. Trade mark 
law neither prevents all types of consumer confusion nor protects all types of 
producer goodwill. Even if there is a likelihood of confusion, third party use does 
not constitute trade mark infringement if it is fair. The same principle applies to 
trade mark dilution. In this sense, trade mark law has served to build a system in 
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which trade mark owners and competitors can properly use trade marks and 
consumers can benefit from these uses. This should be continued; further, trade 
mark law should be able to indicate the direction it should follow in its 
application and development.
69
 This should also be the function of courts in 
applying trade mark law to specific cases.
70
 
 Historically in the USA, when the protection of trade marks was limited 
to directly competing uses, trade mark law and court decisions played the role of 
a guiding light. The aim was to protect producers from illegitimate diversion of 
business, and trade mark law was seen as part of unfair competition law.
71
 This 
goal maintained a balance between the interests of all concerned parties. For 
example, in Borden Ice Cream Co., the US Seventh Circuit concluded that 
Borden’s Condensed Milk Company could not prevent the Borden Ice Cream 
Company from using the word ‘Borden’ in its corporate name where the two 
companies were not in any competitive relationship. This decision is regarded as 
support of the argument that trade mark law traditionally intended to protect 
producers rather than consumers.
72
 However, I suggest here that the decision also 
shows that the purpose of trade mark law itself could delimit the scope of trade 
mark protection.  
 Even the purpose of trade mark law based on a natural property rights 
theory could balance the interests of trade mark owners, consumers, and 
competitors where trade marks were protected only in the context of competing 
product markets. For the compatibility with ‘geographic and product market 
limitations’ of trade mark protection, the property protected as a right under the 
natural rights theory shifted from the trade mark itself to the goodwill that the 
mark symbolised.
73
 Thus, the goal of trade mark law—the protection of 
goodwill—not only presented the logical basis for trade mark protection but also 
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offered the rationale for its limitation. In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, a 
conflict between a producer of Tea Rose flour and a merchant selling competing 
Tea Rose flour in the same market, and Allen & Wheeler Co. v. Hanover Star 
Milling Co., a case between producers of flour sold in separate geographic 
markets, the US Supreme Court accepted an injunction in the first case and 
denied it in the second. The Court reasoned that “the trademark is treated as 
merely a protection for the good will, and not the subject of property except in 
connection with an existing business” and that “the mark, of itself, cannot travel 
to markets where there is no article to wear the badge and no trader to offer the 
article.”74 
  As trade mark protection gradually expanded beyond competing product 
markets to related product markets and, then, even further to distant product 
markets, the focus of the prevention of unfair competition shifted from 
‘competition’ to the concept of ‘unfairness.’75 The concept of ‘goodwill’ and 
‘likelihood of confusion,’ originally anchored in competing markets, began to 
expand to embrace more meanings.
76
 Competition, which once set the boundary 
of trade mark protection, could not play the same role as it did before.  
The 1905 US Federal Trademark Act
77
 provided protection against use 
of marks on non-competing goods of “substantially the same descriptive 
properties” as those of the goods covered by the marks. On the ground of this 
provision, the Third Circuit held in Rosenberg that men’s hats and caps have the 
same descriptive properties as those of men’s suits and overcoats.78  
In spite of the Act of 1905, some courts accepted a ‘related goods theory,’ 
under which trade marks were afforded protection against use on related, non-
competing goods. In Aunt Jemima, the Second Circuit found that use of a trade 
mark on syrup infringed the Aunt Jemima Mills Company’s trade mark on 
pancake batter on the grounds of likelihood of confusion as to source and the 
possibility that the user took the benefit of the Company’s reputation and 
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advertisements.
79
  
Moreover, the introduction of sponsorship confusion and dilution further 
diminished the role of competition in trade mark law. With the passage of the 
Lanham Act of 1946, likelihood of confusion in relation to products of different 
descriptive properties could lead to trade mark infringement, but sponsorship 
confusion was not supported by all courts.
80
 With the 1962 amendments, 
however, legislature deleted the requirement that there should be a likelihood of 
confusion of “purchasers as to the source or origin of such goods or services” 
from Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act,
81
 and the 1989 amendments included 
sponsorship confusion in 43(a)(1)(A) of the Act.
82
 As a result, use of trade marks 
in non-competing product markets that is likely to cause confusion as to source, 
sponsorship, or affiliation can constitute infringement. Anti-dilution statutes in 
the US states, starting with Massachusetts in 1947, and the federal anti-dilution 
law also prohibit use of trade marks in non-competing product markets even 
where there is no likelihood of confusion.  
The broad concept of likelihood of confusion and trade mark dilution are 
also recognised in the EU. The EU Trade Mark Directive and the Community 
Trade Mark Regulation provide that ‘likelihood of confusion’ includes 
‘likelihood of association’ between a sign and a trade mark.83 Trade mark 
dilution constitutes infringement and a ground for refusal and invalidity. Even the 
taking of unfair advantage is accepted by the Directive and the Regulation as one 
type of dilution. 
Korean law also accepts the expanded concept of likelihood of 
confusion
84
 and trade mark dilution. Unlike the Lanham Act, the Directive, and 
the Regulation, the Korean Trade Mark Act does not clearly state that ‘likelihood 
of association’ is embraced in the concept of ‘likelihood of confusion,’ but the 
Supreme Court of Korea accepts this type of confusion. In a case concerning a 
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service mark for banking, the Supreme Court construed likelihood of confusion as 
including ‘likelihood of confusion as to the existence of economic relation which 
can lead to a free ride on the coat-tails of the reputation of a famous mark and 
accordingly the attraction of consumers.’85 The regulation of dilution in Korea is 
also differentiated from that in the Lanham Act, the Directive, and the Regulation. 
Dilution as a ground for refusal, opposition, and invalidation includes the taking 
of unfair advantage and does not require that trade marks have to be famous in 
Korea. Article 7(1)(xii) of the Korean Trade Mark Act provides that where trade 
marks are identical with, or similar to, a trade mark that consumers inside or 
outside Korea easily recognise as indicating the products of a particular person 
and are used for the unjust purpose of obtaining unfair advantage or damaging 
that person, these marks cannot be registered. This provision is considered to be 
the anti-dilution regulation in the Korean Trade Mark Act.
86
 Articles 23(1)(i), 
25(1), and 71(1)(i) state that these trade marks constitute a ground for refusal, 
opposition, and invalidation. By contrast, only dilution by blurring and 
tarnishment is prevented by the Korean Unfair Competition Act; it constitutes an 
‘act of unfair competition.’  
 
2) Current Goals of Trade Mark Law and Their Limits 
 
(1) Goals of Trade Mark Protection in the USA, the EU, and Korea 
 
 With the extension of trade mark protection, the goals of the US trade 
mark law were considered to be twofold: to safeguard the goodwill of trade mark 
owners and to prevent the likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, or 
affiliation.
87
 In Inwood, where the primary issue was the contributory liability of 
generic drug manufacturers, the US Supreme Court stated in a footnote that the 
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Lanham Act protects the goodwill of trade mark owners on which they spent 
energy, time, and money as well as consumers’ ability of distinguishing among 
the products of competing producers.
88
 In Park ‘N Fly, the Supreme Court also 
asserted that “[t]he Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in 
order to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to 
protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.”89 
The Court made similar statements in Two Pesos, acknowledging that trade dress 
protection contributes to the Lanham Act’s purpose.90 
 Meanwhile, the economic analysis of trade mark protection introduced by 
the Chicago School has offered a more persuasive explanation for trade mark 
doctrines,
91
 and its search cost theory has dominated academic discourse.
92
 
According to the search cost theory, trade mark law has two directions with the 
focus on consumer perception. Trade mark protection enables consumers to 
economise on information costs, thereby enhancing ‘market efficiency.’ That is, 
producers, who have more information about the quality of products than 
consumers, impart this information via trade marks, and consumers spend less 
time and energy searching for the product that they want to purchase.
93
 To 
explain the decrease in search costs, the theory presupposes that producers of 
trade marked products maintain product quality.
94
 Consumers can then 
distinguish products from other products at lower costs, and trade mark 
proprietors have an incentive to invest money and efforts in developing strong 
marks.
95
   
Some US courts adopted the search cost theory in explaining the goals of 
the Lanham Act. In Qualitex, the US Supreme Court held that “trademark law …  
reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, for 
it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item-the item with this 
mark-is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she 
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liked (or disliked) in the past” and that “[a]t the same time, the law helps assure a 
producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, 
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product … [and] thereby 
encourage[s] the production of quality products.” 96 Similar statements were 
made in other US court cases such as Dastar
97
 and Ty.
98
  
In the EU, distinct national trade mark systems were harmonised by the 
Trade Mark Directive and a new community wide trade mark right was 
introduced by the Community Trade Mark Regulation. The Directive and the 
Regulation aim to provide a system that enables and supports a common market 
without national barriers. Nevertheless, there was no clear discussion of how and 
why trade marks should be protected. The system adopted the approach 
developed by the ECJ that trade mark law should safeguard trade mark functions.  
In Hag II,
99
 decided before the harmonisation process, the ECJ 
emphasised the importance of the essential function of indicating the origin of 
products in determining the scope of trade mark protection, reversing the previous 
decision in Hag I where the ECJ had given more weight to free circulation of 
goods.
100
 The ECJ held that trade mark rights amount to “an essential element of 
the system of undistorted competition” and that the essential function of a trade 
mark, “which is to give the consumer or final user a guarantee of the identity of 
the origin of the marked product by enabling him to distinguish, without any 
possible confusion, that product from others of a different provenance,” should be 
considered in establishing the effect of trade mark rights.
101
 After the entry into 
force of the Trade Mark Directive, in Philips, the ECJ found that the aim of trade 
mark protection is in particular to guarantee the trade mark as an indication of 
origin on the ground of the tenth recital.
102
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Functions of which the protection is the goal of trade mark law are not 
just limited to the essential function of indicating the origin of products, but also 
include other functions such as that of guaranteeing the quality of products or that 
of communication, investment, or advertising.
103
 As the ECJ mentioned in 
Interflora, “both the European Union legislature – by using the words ‘in 
particular’ in the tenth recital to Directive 89/104 and in the seventh recital to 
Regulation No 40/94 – and the Court – by using since its judgment in Arsenal 
Football Club the words ‘functions of the trade mark’ – have indicated that a 
trade mark’s function of indicating origin is not the only function of the mark that 
is worthy of protection against injury by third parties.”104  
In Korea, before the introduction of a purpose clause into the Trade Mark 
Act, there was a change in the position of the Supreme Court of Korea as to the 
objective of the trade mark system. In the MUGUNGHA case of 1960, the 
Supreme Court held that the similarity between products and between trade marks 
should be determined in the light of the purpose of the trade mark system, 
asserting that the system aims at staving off unfair competition and hence 
preventing unexpected damage to traders and consumers by keeping the link 
between goods and their trade marks.
105
 On the other hand, in the decision of 
1970, the protection of goodwill was added as another objective of trade mark 
law. The Court regarded ‘the prevention of unfair competition, the safeguard of 
the business reputation of trade mark owners, and the protection of traders and 
consumers of products by maintaining the relation between trade marks and 
products’ as the goals of trade mark law.106  
The purpose of the Korean Trade Mark Act became evident when the Act 
provided for it in the 1973 revision,
107
 embracing the interests of trade mark 
owners and excluding the prevention of unfair competition. It also incorporated 
‘the development of industry which results from the protection of trade mark 
users’ reputation’ into the purpose clause. According to article 1, the Act aims 
both to ensure the maintenance of the business reputation of trade mark users by 
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protecting trade marks, so as to contribute to the development of industry, and to 
protect the interest of consumers.
108
 Since then, the Supreme Court of Korea has 
not regarded ‘the prevention of unfair competition’ as the purpose of trade mark 
protection in most cases, stating that the trade mark system is intended to 
maintain the business reputation of trade mark users and to protect the interests of 
consumers.
109
 Still, in a few cases, it referred to ‘the prevention of unfair 
competition’110 or ‘the maintenance of distribution order’111 as an additional 
goal of the Trade Mark Act.  
 
(2) Inadequacy of the Current Goals of Trade Mark Law 
 
The twofold goals of trade mark law in the USA, protection of goodwill 
and prevention of consumer confusion, do not offer a sufficient justification for 
trade mark protection because in the real world the interests of proprietors and 
consumers do not always coincide.
112
 Proprietors seek to prevent any type of 
unauthorised use of their trade marks regardless of whether the use is made in 
competing or non-competing product markets. On the other hand, consumers 
would not feel harmed when they purchase products with logos, for example, just 
to show their preferences for the values the logos convey. In Boston Professional 
Hockey Association, a case about the sale of embroidered patches with hockey 
teams’ symbols through sporting goods stores, the prevention of confusion was 
not sufficient to prohibit third party use; the district court denied a likelihood of 
confusion because a sports fan would not be likely to regard the embroidered 
logos as those manufactured by the hockey league and member teams, or their 
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licensees.
113
 The US Fifth Circuit, however, found a likelihood of confusion, on 
the ground that the Dallas Cap company made exact copies of trade marks and 
sold them to the public, “knowing that the public would identify them as being 
the teams’ trademarks.” The Circuit, which could not find a likelihood of 
confusion in its traditional sense, drew its meaning from a proprietor’s interest by 
emphasising that confusion need not be as to “the source of the manufacturer of 
emblem itself” where the mark is “the triggering mechanism for the sale of the 
emblem.”114    
 Moreover, in dilution cases where a likelihood of confusion is not 
required, only the protection of goodwill can offer the rationale for anti-dilution. 
In Playboy, the Ninth Circuit suggested that if a cocoa producer made use of 
Rolls Royce for its hot chocolate, the producer would be capitalising on the 
investment the car company had made in its mark and consumer association of 
the mark with expensive cars.
115
 Thus, according to the court, the cocoa maker 
would harm the Rolls Royce Company by weakening “the ability of the mark to 
identify the mark holder’s product.”116 In Thane, the Ninth Circuit asserted that 
the purpose of trade mark infringement law is to ensure “that owners of 
trademarks can benefit from the goodwill associated with their marks and that 
consumers can distinguish among competing producers”117 while anti-dilution 
law is focused on “preventing junior users from appropriating or distorting the 
goodwill and positive associations that a famous mark has developed over the 
years.”118  
 Another drawback of the dual purposes is that they cannot determine the 
proper limits of protection because the concepts of ‘likelihood of confusion’ and 
‘goodwill’ are readily extensible unless they are restricted by other superior 
values. In some cases, the notion of confusion was interpreted as even 
corresponding to the misappropriation of goodwill. In University of Georgia 
Athletic Association, a defendant used school colours and a mark similar to the 
                                         
113
 Boston Professional Hockey Assoc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 
(5th Cir. 1975) 
114
 Id. 
115
 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir.2002) 
116
 Id. at 805-806 
117
 Thane International, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir.2002) 
118
 Id. at 909 
47 
 
University of Georgia’s bulldog mascot to sell “Battlin’ Bulldog Beer.” In this 
case, the US Eleventh Circuit found a likelihood of confusion based solely on the 
intent of the defendant and the similarity of design between the marks. It admitted 
that “the confusion stems not from the defendant’s unfair competition with the 
plaintiff’s products, but from the defendant’s misuse of the plaintiff’s reputation 
and good will as embodied in the plaintiff’s mark.”119 In Smack, the Fifth Circuit 
also concluded that Smack’s use of Universities’ colour schemes and other 
identifying indicia on T-shirts created a likelihood of confusion as to the source, 
affiliation, or sponsorship particularly on the ground of the overwhelming 
similarity of the marks and the defendant’s intent to profit from the Universities’ 
reputation.
120
 The notion of confusion is so wide that it cannot delimit the scope 
of trade mark protection. 
 The scope of protection of goodwill is also flexible and extensive. The 
conceptual flexibility of ‘goodwill’, combined with the notion of 
‘misappropriation’, creates the vast expanse of protection. 121  As Lord 
Macnaghten asserted in a UK case, Muller & Co’s Margarine, goodwill is “very 
easy to describe,” but it is “very difficult to define.”122 Some argue that goodwill 
is the tendency of consumers to return to a product or a producer and to repeat 
purchasing decisions,
123
 or consumer’s positive feelings towards a product.124 
Some define goodwill as favourable reputation or the value of a business.
125
 
Goodwill can be construed more broadly beyond the product for which trade 
marks are used. Bone calls ‘positive impressions towards a firm that sells a brand’ 
“firm goodwill,” and ‘positive connotation that attaches to the mark itself’ 
“inherent goodwill.”126  
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Moreover, ‘the protection’ of goodwill can also embrace two meanings: 
harm to goodwill and the misappropriation of goodwill.
127
 If the protection of 
goodwill is construed as the latter, the scope of trade mark protection can expand 
to encompass the prevention of the free ride on the coat-tails of goodwill itself 
regardless of actual or probable harm. In Promatek, the US Seventh Circuit 
underscored the misappropriation of goodwill to find initial interest confusion in 
the use of trade marks as metatags, holding that “[w]hat is important is not the 
duration of the confusion, it is the misappropriation of Promatek’s goodwill.”128 
Because of these various and pliable concepts, the limitation of trade mark 
protection cannot be given from the standpoint of protection of goodwill. 
 The search cost theory, on the other hand, can provide consistent 
justifications for safeguarding trade marks from third party use. Trade marks 
reduce consumers’ costs of finding the products they would like to purchase129 
and confusion as to the origin of products in competing product markets increases 
search costs. The theory also offers grounds for preventing confusion as to 
sponsorship or association and dilution. When use of trade marks misleads 
consumers into believing that trade mark owners sponsor users, search costs 
could increase and hence the use should be stopped.
130
 Dilution results in 
increasing search costs in that dilution by “blurring and tarnishment can make it 
somewhat more difficult for consumers to associate a famous mark with its 
owner,” or it “[leads] consumers to make more errors in matching brands to 
products and product attributes, and [increases] the time it [takes] to make correct 
matches.”131  
 Nevertheless, the search cost theory has its limits in appropriately 
demarcating the scope of trade mark protection because of its focus on consumer 
perception as to search costs
132
 and the quantitative nature of search costs. First 
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of all, trade mark protection depends on consumer perception as to whether 
search costs increase or not because it aims at search cost reduction made by trade 
marks ‘from the consumers’ perspective.’ This perception, however, can be 
influenced by court decisions. For example, where consumers believe that a 
manufacturer of T-shirts with the word Coca-Cola on them needs a license from a 
trade mark owner because of previous court decisions, but the manufacturer uses 
it without the consent of the company, the use of the word may cause an increase 
in search costs. On the contrary, where court decisions make consumers perceive 
Coca-Cola as a design of T-shirts, its use does not raise a search cost issue. 
Consumer perception as to search costs is influenced by court decisions, and 
depending on this perception, the scope of trade mark protection can fluctuate. 
 Moreover, although the search cost theory presupposes that producers 
maintain consistent product quality, it is not clear what type of consumer 
confusion or dilution can cause an increase in search costs. Given that search cost 
increase can include a tiny amount of time or energy, there is a high possibility 
that trade mark protection can expand disproportionally under the search cost 
theory. Just some seconds wasted for correctly linking a trade mark with its origin, 
the characteristics of products, or brand images appear to invoke trade mark 
liability since an aggregate cost increase might not be ignored. Only to ‘think 
harder’ may result in trade mark protection. In Ty, a case between the 
manufacturer of well-known beanbag stuffed animals Beanie Babies and the 
seller of second-hand beanbag stuffed animals including Ty’s Beanie Babies over 
the internet, Judge Posner stated that “[c]onsumers will have to think harder-incur 
as it were a higher imagination cost-to recognize the name as the name of the 
store” as a result of dilution by blurring.133 The theory, however, cannot explain 
why other trade mark uses, which can cause similar costs, such as uses of non-
famous trade marks are excluded from dilution based liability.
134
 The theory also 
does not consider third party users’ cost of abandoning trade marks in non-
competing product markets. As long as there is no consumer confusion as to 
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source or sponsorship, third party use reduces search costs in non-competing 
product markets. Thus, dilution based liability could lead to reduced costs in 
competing product markets which are less than increased search costs in non-
competing product markets. 
 The protection of trade mark functions which is regarded as the aim of 
trade mark protection in the EU also cannot set reasonable limits to the reach of 
protection. The meaning and scope of trade mark functions are not definite 
without taking into account competition as a superior purpose, and hence trade 
mark protection can readily expand to include uses that may affect other 
producers’ interests. The purpose of trade mark protection is an answer to the 
question of ‘for what trade marks are protected by trade mark law,’ while the 
functions of trade marks are responses to the question of ‘what trade marks 
perform.’  
The dual goals of the Korean Trade Mark Act also have difficulty in 
delimiting trade mark protection like those in the Lanham Act, but the Supreme 
Court of Korea seeks to demarcate trade mark protection by taking a position 
similar to that of the trade mark use doctrine. There still exists an issue about the 
scope of ‘use as a trade mark.’ In the twin crane design case, a dispute between 
the furniture manufacturer who had an exclusive license for the twin crane design 
mark and other furniture producers that made use of the same design on beds, the 
Patent Court of Korea held that the design was used as a trade mark. Its reasoning 
was that the use of the design was intended both to indicate the source of beds 
and to decorate beds, on the ground that the design was carved on headboards of 
beds which could readily attract the attention of traders and the public.
135
 The 
Supreme Court of Korea, however, remanded the decision of the Patent Court, 
deciding that the design was not used for the purpose of indicating the origin but 
for purely ornamental purposes. It reasoned that other furniture makers 
manufactured and sold beds bearing the same designs, and that cases where 
furniture manufacturers used a design as a trade mark were very rare and 
accordingly traders or the public would not recognise it as an indication of 
origin.
136
 By contrast, the Supreme Court of Korea concluded in the saucer case 
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that a design on a saucer was used to indicate the origin of a saucer, not to 
decorate it, and therefore the use constituted ‘use as a trade mark.’137  
 
3) The Purpose of Trade Mark Law and Competition 
 
(1) The Nature of Trade Mark Law 
 
As the US Supreme Court stated in Hanover Star Milling Co.,
138
 trade 
mark law is part of unfair competition law. Even after trade mark protection 
expanded to non-competing uses, trade mark law has been still regarded as a 
subset of unfair competition law, and trade mark infringement has been 
considered to be a species of unfair competition. Section 45 of the Lanham Act 
includes the protection of persons against unfair competition as part of the intent 
of the Act. US courts including the Supreme Court also deem trade mark 
infringement as a type of unfair competition.
139
 The Supreme Court of Korea 
decided in at least one case that one purpose of trade mark law is to prevent unfair 
competition.
140
  
The US Supreme Court has found that “the prohibitions against 
trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development, and are not 
motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.” 141  Nevertheless, it is 
suggested here that dilution can be regarded as a type of unfair competition. The 
ECJ appears to view the taking of unfair advantage, which is a third type of 
dilution that constitutes infringing use in the EU, as an act of unfair competition. 
In L'Oréal, the ECJ determined that where an advertiser’s products are indicated 
as imitations of L'Oréal’s products in comparative advertising, the advertiser’s 
advantage is ‘unfair’ because the advantage is the result of ‘unfair 
competition.’142 Moreover, in Korea, dilution by blurring and tarnishment is 
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stipulated as ‘acts of unfair competition’ in article 1(1)(iii) of the Korean Unfair 
Competition Act. 
 
(2) Pro-competitive Characteristics of Trade Mark Protection 
 
Some argue that trade mark protection is anti-competitive while others 
maintain that it is pro-competitive. It is also suggested that trade mark protection 
can “both advance and disserve the development of an efficient and desirably 
competitive market.” 143  This thesis suggests that trade mark protection is 
basically pro-competitive. Its anti-competitive action is not because trade marks 
are safeguarded but because they are too expansively protected. Too strong 
protection of trade marks can lead to an impediment to new entrants into product 
markets, which results in less consumer choice.  
A trade mark protection system advances competition in that it serves to 
meet the conditions of a perfectly competitive market. The belief that competition 
improves social welfare is premised on the assumption of an ideal model of 
perfect competition.
144
 Its conditions are i) there are many sellers and buyers in 
the market, ii) the products offered by sellers are largely identical, iii) no barriers 
to entry and exit exist, and iv) both sellers and buyers possess a high degree of 
information.
145
 A majority of real markets, however, do not satisfy one or more 
of the requirements for a perfectly competitive market.
146
 Producers try to 
differentiate their products from those of others to maximise profits.
147
 
Consumers do not have perfect information and the information between 
producers and consumers is asymmetric.
148
 In this setting, trade marks can foster 
efficient and fair competition by remedying asymmetric information problems, 
enabling sellers to compete with product quality and brand image, and promoting 
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free entry of newcomers into markets.
149
   
First of all, trade marks play a pivotal role in reducing information 
asymmetry between sellers and consumers by conveying information about the 
position of product quality and brand image and serving to differentiate among 
competitive products. Asymmetrical information leads to “markets for lemons” 
where poor quality products tend to drive out quality ones;
150
 bad quality 
products sell at the same price as good quality products because consumers 
cannot tell the difference between bad and good quality.
151
 Trade marks, however, 
enable consumers to acquire more accurate information about product quality
152
 
so that consumers can either punish sellers by not purchasing low product quality 
or reward them by repeat purchase. This makes it possible for sellers to compete 
fairly through use of their own marks. Moreover, as the search cost theory insists, 
consumers can obtain information at a lower cost. 
Second, trade mark protection offers sellers an incentive to compete 
efficiently on the basis of product quality and brand image since the sellers are 
able to embed information about them into trade marks. Without trade marks, it 
would be almost impossible to inform consumers of the position of product 
quality; if there are many sellers in a market, the sellers can hardly convey the 
relevant information. In this situation, there is no need for sellers to invest in 
product quality. With trade marks, sellers can also attach an additional value to 
their products. Although some argue that trade mark owners earn ‘higher rents’ by 
generating consumers’ “price-insensitive” brand loyalty by using “superior 
advertising techniques,”153 brand image can be regarded as newly added value to 
trade marked products resulting from trade mark owners’ investment and 
consumer perception, and consumers who purchase trade marked products can 
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enjoy the utility that both product quality and brand image provide.
154
 Trade 
marks also enable sellers to differentiate their products from other products ‘at a 
considerably low cost,’ indicating the level of product quality and brand image.  
Third, despite the argument that ‘artificial product differentiation’ created 
by trade marks divides one product market into several sub-markets where trade 
mark owners are price manipulators,
155
 trade mark protection does not hinder 
newcomers from entering ‘product’ markets and competing with established 
businesses. Only use of identical or similar trade marks for products is 
prevented.
156
 On the contrary, start-up companies can enter markets more readily 
by grasping the position of established companies’ product quality and brand 
image through established companies’ trade marks. Start-up companies can 
develop their marketing strategies based on the understanding of established 
businesses’ positions. They can strategically decide their positions of product 
quality in markets and the price in order for their products to be competitive. By 
use of their own trade marks, they can also efficiently convey information on 
their positions and differentiate their products from products of existing 
companies,
157
 and consumers can detect the emergence of new competitors more 
easily. Easier market access would lead to stronger price competition.
158
  
Some proponents of the search cost theory also argue that the ultimate 
purpose of trade mark law is not the reduction of search costs: it is “to facilitate 
the functioning of a competitive marketplace.”159 Trade mark law develops 
market competition by enabling consumers to locate products they want cheaply 
and quickly.
160
 They submit that consumers will make better purchasing 
decisions based on quality information and accordingly their utility will be 
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enhanced. Purchasing decisions of consumers will also incentivise manufacturers 
to produce better quality goods or services.
161
 
 
(3) Pro-competitive Characteristics of Trade Mark Protection in Case Law 
 
Many courts also asserted the pro-competitive characteristics of trade 
mark protection. The US Supreme Court asserted in Inwood that “trademark 
infringement inhibits competition”162 and reiterated in other cases that trade mark 
protection promotes competition. In Park ‘N Fly, the Supreme Court mentioned 
that “[b]ecause trademarks desirably promote competition and the maintenance of 
product quality, Congress determined that a sound public policy requires that 
trademarks should receive nationally the greatest protection that can be given 
them”163 and that “[n]ational protection of trademarks is desirable, Congress 
concluded, because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality 
by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.”164 In San Francisco 
Arts & Athletics and Two Pesos, the Supreme Court repeated that trade marks 
advance competition, citing the decision in Park ‘N Fly.165  
Also in the cases where the goals of trade mark law are based on the 
search cost theory, the Court asserted that trade mark protection enhances 
competition. In Qualitex, it stated that trade mark law seeks to promote 
competition,
166
 holding that a green-gold colour, which acquired secondary 
meaning on press pads, was protectable under the Lanham Act.
167
   
Some US federal courts specifically indicated that trade mark protection 
is a means to achieve effective competition because of the source identification 
function of trade marks. In Chanel, a case about the advertising of a fragrance 
called ‘Second Chance’ as a duplicate of ‘Chanel No. 5,’ the Ninth Circuit stated 
that “[w]ithout some such method of product identification, informed consumer 
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choice, and hence meaningful competition in quality, could not exist.”168 The 
court, however, warned that “protection of trade mark values other than source 
identification would create serious anti-competitive consequences with little 
compensating public benefit.”169 
The ECJ repeatedly stated that trade mark protection is a key factor of 
competition. In Hag II
170
 and Arsenal Football Club,
171
 the ECJ found that trade 
mark rights constitute an essential element of the undistorted competition system 
where companies should attract and maintain customers by the quality of 
products and can do this only by “distinctive signs allowing them to be identified.”  
Furthermore, the ECJ mentioned the undistorted competition system as 
justifications for trade mark protection and its limits. In Libertel, the ECJ ruled 
that trade mark rights and powers should be taken into account from the 
perspective of the system of undistorted competition.
172
 It also asserted in 
Interflora that although trade mark rights are an essential element in the 
undistorted competition system, trade mark protection does not aim to safeguard 
trade mark proprietors against practices inherent in competition.
173
 
The Supreme Court of Korea consistently concluded that where the 
exercise of trade mark rights deviates from the purpose or function of trade mark 
law and therefore disturbs fair competition and orderly trade, it constitutes an 
abuse of trade mark rights and hence cannot be accepted despite trade mark 
registration. In Sun Microsystems, the Court held that the defendant’s exercise of 
a trade mark right amounted to an abuse of rights, which impeded fair 
competition and orderly trade.
174
 Its first ground was that the defendant already 
knew that the plaintiff would use the trade mark on software programmes before 
its application for trade mark registration. The fact that the defendant had not 
operated and did not intend to do a business in relation to use of the trade mark 
was the second ground. The third one was that the defendant raised infringement 
issues when the plaintiff’s business became brisk in spite of its knowing the 
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plaintiff’s use of the same trade mark from the outset, requiring a considerable 
amount of money for the assignment of the trade mark right.
175
   
 
(4) Internalisation of Competition in Trade Mark Law 
 
As was discussed above, trade mark protection has a pro-competitive 
nature.
176
 Nevertheless, in order to prevent anti-competitive results which may 
stem from the abuse or malfunction of trade mark systems, it is necessary to 
delimit trade mark protection according to the concept of ‘competition.’ 
Competition can do this because it considers not only the interests of trade mark 
owners, but also those of competitors, consumers, and even markets themselves. 
This competition approach has already been incorporated into trade mark law.
177
 
 
a) Functionality and the Subject Matter of Trade Marks  
 
The functionality doctrine, which does not grant exclusive rights to 
functional features, is included in trade mark law and plays a significant role in 
delimiting trade mark protection from the perspective of competition.   
In the USA, even before functionality was introduced in the Lanham Act, 
it was regarded as a condition for protection by the US Supreme Court,
178
 and 
competition was considered in determining the existence and scope of trade mark 
protection. In Qualitex, the US Supreme Court stated that according to the 
functionality theory, “if [a product feature] is essential to the use or purpose of 
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article,” the protection of the 
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feature as a trade mark “would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage.”179 The Court further ruled that the use of a green-gold 
colour on press pads would be protected because the colour was not functional for 
press pads and the colour acted as a symbol and indicated the source of pads by 
acquiring the secondary meaning.
180
 On the other hand, in Traffix, the Court 
denied trade dress protection for sign stands with a dual spring design, on the 
ground that the dual design offered “a unique and useful mechanism to resist the 
force of the wind”181 and thus it was functional. According to the Court, although 
protection for trade dress fosters competition, “the exclusive use of [a functional 
feature] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.”182 Functionality was internalised into the Lanham Act in 1988 as 
a ground for ex parte rejection, a ground for opposition and cancellation of 
registration, and a statutory defence to an incontestably registered mark,
183
 
followed by a 1989 amendment to section 43(a) of the Act in which the burden of 
proving non-functionality was imposed on the plaintiff asserting unregistered 
trade dress protection.
184
 
In cases before the ECJ, the notion of functionality offers “a broader 
interpretive framework”185 on the basis of competition. It does not only relate to 
article 3(1)(e)(ii) of the EU Trade Mark Directive and article 7(1)(e)(ii) of the 
Community Trade Mark Regulation; it also has had an effect on the subject-
matter and the distinctiveness of trade marks.
186
 
As to functionality in article 3(1)(e)(ii), the ECJ determined the scope of 
protection of ‘shapes as trade marks’ in terms of competition. In Philips 
concerning a three-headed rotary electric shaver, the ECJ found that article 
3(1)(e)(ii) is intended to prevent the registration of shapes whose essential 
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characteristics perform a technical function for competitors to freely manufacture 
or sell products with the same technical solutions or characteristics.
187
 The ECJ 
additionally held that where the essential characteristics of a shape are regarded 
solely as technical, the existence of other shapes which can fulfil the same 
technical function does not matter in denying registration.
188
 In Lego, the ECJ 
also held that the purport of article 7(1)(e)(ii) of the Community Trade Mark 
Regulation is “to prevent trade mark law granting an undertaking a monopoly on 
technical solutions or functional characteristics of a product.”189  
 The notion of functionality contributes to determining whether a subject 
matter constitutes ‘a sign’ within the meaning of article 2 of the Directive. In 
Dyson, which relates to an application to register a transparent collecting bin of a 
bagless vacuum cleaner, the ECJ, unlike Advocate General Léger, did not state 
that the subject matter of a trade mark was a functional feature, but it ruled that 
the subject matter about all the conceivable shapes of a transparent bin or 
collection chamber was just “a mere property of the product concerned” and 
accordingly was not ‘a sign’ for the purpose of article 2.190 The reasoning was 
that, in contrast to the aim of article 2, the protection of such a non-specific 
subject matter as a trade mark would give the holder of the mark ‘an unfair 
competitive advantage’ by prohibiting competitors from selling vacuum cleaners 
with any kind of transparent collecting bin.
191
 
Functionality considerations also influenced the interpretation of the 
graphical representation requirement within the meaning of article 2 of the EU 
Trade Mark Directive.
192
 In Heidelberger concerning an application for the 
registration of the colours blue and yellow as a trade mark, the ECJ found that 
colours and combinations of colours, which are normally a mere property of the 
product used for attractive and ornamental purposes, may constitute a trade mark 
only if “it has been established that, in the context in which they are used, those 
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colours or combinations of colours in fact represent a sign,” and “the application 
for registration includes a systematic arrangement associating the colours 
concerned in a predetermined and uniform way.” 193 Without a precise and 
durable graphic representation, the function of a trade mark as an indication of 
origin would not be guaranteed.
194
 
Distinctiveness is also linked with functional features of trade marks. In 
KWS, a case about an application for the registration of the orange colour per se 
as a Community trade mark, the Court of First Instance stated that consumers do 
not perceive a colour per se immediately as an indication of origin.
195
 On this 
basis, the Court held regarding agricultural, horticultural, and forestry products 
that the orange colour was not distinctive because of the general use of colours 
for technical purposes in this sector.
196
 Moreover, with regard to treatment 
installations in classes 7 and 11, it found no distinctiveness in the orange colour 
since the relevant public would regard it as the finish of the machinery.
197
 The 
ECJ upheld the decision of the Court of First Instance.
198
 
The Korean Trade Mark Act also includes a provision about functionality. 
Article 7(1)(xiii) rejects the registration of trade marks that consist solely of 
three-dimensional shapes, colours, and combinations of colours that are essential 
for securing the functions of products or their packaging. According to the 
Korean Trade Mark Examination Guideline, examiner should consider 
‘competition’ in determining whether a sign constitutes trade marks for the 
purpose of this article. 
 
b) Distinctiveness  
 
Another example of the internalisation of competition in trade mark law 
concerns distinctiveness. US courts, the ECJ, and Korean courts have determined 
the distinctiveness of trade marks, taking account of competitive interests. The 
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US First Circuit stated in Boston Duck Tours that generic terms such as car or 
pizza cannot be accorded trade mark protection because protection may impair 
the interests of both competitors and consumers;
199
 competitors could not use 
generic terms to promote their products, and consumers would have to either 
purchase products from trade mark owners at a higher price or spend additional 
time and efforts finding other products.
200
 In a related vein, the US Seventh 
Circuit held in Ty that when trade marks become generic, the enforcement of 
trade mark rights would harm competition by preventing competitors from 
informing consumers that their products are the same as those of trade mark 
proprietors and “by rendering them in effect speechless.”201  
The ECJ decided in Libertel, a distinctiveness case, that “the general 
interest in not unduly restricting the availability of colours for the other traders” 
should be considered in evaluating the potential distinctiveness of a colour.
202
 
The Court added that the number of products to be registered under a mark relates 
to the assessment of both the distinctiveness of a colour and “whether its 
registration would run counter to the general interest in not unduly limiting the 
availability of colours for the other operators.”203 
The Supreme Court of Korea also mentioned the necessity of descriptive 
marks for every competitor in SANDUNIT, stating that descriptive marks cannot 
be registered as trade marks because everyone would need them or like to use 
them in distributing products.
204
  
Particularly in US courts, competition has determined whether a 
secondary meaning is required for the distinctiveness of trade dress. In Two Pesos, 
the US Supreme Court denied a secondary meaning requirement for a non-
descriptive trade dress based on competition, finding that this requirement would 
adversely affect the competitive position of ‘an originator of the trade dress.’205 
The Court reasoned that denying protection for the non-descriptive trade dress 
until it acquires a secondary meaning would permit other competitors to 
                                         
199
 Boston Duck Tours v. Super Duck Tours, 531 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2008) 
200
 Id. 
201
 Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 2002) 
202
 Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau (C-104/01) [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. 45, 1128 
203
 Id. at 1129 
204
 Judgment of 14 April 2006, Supreme Court, 2004 Hu 2246 
205
 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) 
62 
 
misappropriate the trade dress in other markets and hinder the originator’s 
expansion into and competition in these markets.
206
 On the other hand, the Court 
requires a secondary meaning for the protection of unregistered product design 
trade dress on the ground of competition in Wal-Mart, reasoning that product 
design almost always does not function as an indication of source, and that the 
plausible threat of a suit based on inherently distinctive design against new 
comers into the market would divest consumers of competitive interests “with 
regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily 
serves.”207 
 
c) Confusion 
 
In Anheuser-Busch,
208
 competition was the ground for a US court’s 
decision on likelihood of confusion. Venture Marketing manufactured T-shirts 
with a design, as a souvenir of Myrtle Beach, which imitated the non-verbal 
portion of the Budweiser label but had substantial verbal differences, and it 
marketed them through L & L Wings.
209
 Anheuser-Busch sued defendants for 
selling souvenir T-shirts, claiming trade mark infringement based on confusion. 
The company alleged that the T-shirt design was confusingly similar to the 
registered Budweiser beer trade mark which it had used on its own line of T-shirts 
and other apparel.
210
 The Fourth Circuit found no likelihood of confusion, 
reasoning that the finding of likely confusion based on external factors such as 
the strength of trade marks, the similarity of products, sales outlets, and 
advertising, despite the fact that “[trade marks] are readily distinguishable,” 
would deter competition by inhibiting the use of distinguishable trade marks for 
similar products.
211
 
Some US courts also consider competitive interests in determining the 
presence of initial interest confusion. In Gibson Guitar, Gibson, the owner of a 
trade mark for the shape of ‘Les Paul’ single cutaway guitar, brought trade mark 
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infringement action against Paul Reed Smith Guitars (‘PRS’), a manufacturer of 
guitars the shape of which was similar to Gibson’s two-dimensional trade 
mark.
212
 Gibson argued that consumers standing afar in a guitar store were likely 
to confuse PRS guitars with Gibson guitars because of their shapes and there was 
initial interest confusion.
213
 Against this argument, however, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that “where product shapes themselves are trademarked, such a theory 
would prevent competitors from producing even dissimilar products which might 
appear, from the far end of an aisle in a warehouse store, somewhat similar to a 
trademarked shape.”214 
Moreover, courts invoked competition to support their opinion about 
reverse confusion. In Banff, the US Second Circuit found reverse confusion 
actionable because, without trade mark protection based on reverse confusion, “a 
larger company could with impunity infringe the senior mark of a smaller one,” 
emphasising that the purpose of trade mark law is “to protect an owner’s interest 
in its trademark by keeping the public free from confusion as to the source of 
goods and ensuring fair competition.”215  
 
d) Dilution 
 
Competition contributed to the delimitation of trade mark protection in 
dilution cases. In Times Mirror Magazines, the Third Circuit held that the trade 
mark ‘The Sporting News’ was famous in a ‘niche market’ and was thus entitled 
to protection from dilution in that market.
216
 Judge Barry, however, delivering a 
dissenting opinion, argued that ‘the threshold fame requirement’ should be 
determined from the perspective of the maintenance of “an appropriate balance 
between free competition and property rights,” and that Times Mirror, a publisher 
of a weekly publication titled ‘The Sporting News,’ did not and could not prove 
that it was famous.
217
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In Interflora, the ECJ introduced ‘fair competition’ in the interpretation of 
‘due cause’ for the purposes of article 5(2) of the Trade Mark Directive and 
Article 9(1)(c) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation to curb the scope of 
‘the taking of unfair advantage,’ a third type of dilution in the EU. 218  It 
concluded that a keyword advertisement offering an alternative of trade mark 
owners’ products, without providing their mere imitation and causing either other 
types of dilution or adverse effects on trade mark functions, “falls, as a rule, 
within the ambit of fair competition” and “is thus not without due cause.”219 
 
e) Limitations of Trade Mark Rights 
 
Defences can also be interpreted as embracing competitive interests. With 
respect to a fair use defence, the Sixth Circuit asserted in both Herman Miller
220
 
and Hensley
221
 that descriptive trade marks can confer exclusive rights on trade 
mark owners only in “the secondary, new, trademark meaning of the word,” but 
others are always capable of using “the original, descriptive primary meaning” to 
describe their products “in the interest of free competition.” 
Nominative fair use was also construed to relate to competition. In Toyota, 
Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit stated that the nominative fair use doctrine is 
designed to prevent harm to free speech and competition.
222
 The “wholesale 
prohibition of nominative use in domain names” would prevent other merchants 
from communicating the nature of products to consumers and consumers from 
receiving information on products.
223
 It would enable only trade mark proprietors 
to have greater control over relevant markets, “to the detriment of competition 
and consumers.”224  
In Adidas II, the ECJ clarified that competition is a significant factor in 
decisions under article 6(1)(b) of the EU Trade Mark Directive, concluding that 
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the requirement of general availability, which is the general interest in not unduly 
restricting the availability of certain signs, cannot be considered in determining 
the scope of trade mark rights, “except in so far as the limitation of the effects of 
the trade mark defined in article 6(1)(b) of the Directive applies.”225  
 
f) The First Sale or Exhaustion Rule 
 
In Sebastian Intern, competition was suggested as a justification for the 
first sale rule. The Ninth Circuit asserted that the first sale doctrine “serves the 
legitimate purposes of trademark law” on the one hand and “preserves an area for 
competition by limiting the producer’s power to control the resale of its product” 
on the other.
226
 
In Viking Gas,
227
 the ECJ also considered competition in interpreting 
article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive. Kosan Gas, which was an exclusive 
licensee for a three-dimensional trade mark-a bottle, produced and sold bottled 
gas to customers in composite lightweight bottles.
228
 Viking Gas sold gas to 
independent dealers by way of refilling Kosan Gas’s composite bottles with its 
gas, so Kosan Gas brought an action for trade mark infringement against Viking 
Gas.
229
 The ECJ asserted that to prevent other merchants, on the basis of trade 
mark rights, from selling gas by means of refilling bottles would result in unduly 
reduced competition in the market for the refilling of gas and even close off that 
market.
230
 The ECJ also stated that the prevention would push consumers to 
abandon initial payment for bottles in order to maintain their free choice of gas 
suppliers.
231
 For these reasons, the ECJ held that the sale of bottles exhausted 
relevant trade mark rights and transferred the right to use the bottle freely to the 
purchaser.
232
 It also stated that regard should be paid to “the practices in that 
sector,” particularly “whether consumers are accustomed to the gas bottles being 
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filled by other dealers” in construing ‘legitimate reasons’ within the meaning of 
article 7(2) of the Directive.
233
 
 
4) The Purpose of Trade Mark Law: Fair and Efficient Competition  
 
 Given the limits of current goals of trade mark protection, trade mark law 
as part of unfair competition law, the pro-competitive characteristics of trade 
mark protection, and the internalisation of competition into trade mark law, this 
thesis here argues that the purpose of trade mark law should be fair and efficient 
competition. It also suggests that ‘competition,’ ‘fairness,’ and ‘efficiency’ should 
play different roles in trade mark protection: competition should delimit the scope 
of trade mark protection since ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’ are founded on 
competition.  
First, the justification for trade mark protection should be competition. 
From an economics perspective, competition means “a situation where there are 
rivals in production who allow the consumer to make a choice.”234 There is no 
competition in a monopoly where there is only one supplier because consumers 
have no choice.
235
 Where there is no competition, trade marks are not 
indispensable.
236
 
From this perspective, where third party use of trade marks unduly causes 
the malfunction of owners’ trade marks, it would distort or reduce rational 
consumer choice
237
 even if it does not actually reduce the number of rivals. 
Unless third party use is prohibited, trade mark owners can hardly identify the 
position of product quality and brand image, and consumers cannot choose these 
owners’ products on the basis of the information trade marks convey. Given the 
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fact that consumers “live by symbols” and “purchase goods by them,”238 this use 
unjustifiably decreases the number of properly distinguishable trade marks 
essential for consumer choice. Thus, this use that unduly reduces competition 
should be prevented by trade mark law.  
At the same time, competition should delimit the scope of trade mark 
protection: the application of trade mark law should not result in monopolies or 
oligopolies. The expansion of trade mark protection could preclude competitors 
from conveying information about the characteristics of their products. It could 
even lead to the de facto prevention of free entry of new comers into markets by 
making it almost impossible to promote their products. These are way beyond 
what trade mark law should protect.  
Second, trade mark protection should aim at fairness in the competition 
system; speaking more accurately, it should aim at ‘fair use of trade marks’ in 
competitive markets. By giving every seller an equal opportunity to develop and 
use its own trade mark, trade mark protection should enable sellers to compete on 
the basis of product quality and other values. Unless this fairness in use of trade 
marks is disturbed, consumers can efficiently distinguish and choose between 
products in a way that maximises their utility. Where, for example, the 
competitive positions of trade mark owners are weakened by competitors’ price, 
product quality, or other values, trade mark law should not intervene. Trade mark 
law should only prevent unfair use of trade marks. 
In relation to this, not all third party uses of trade marks that appear to 
harm the interests of trade mark owners also harm competition. For instance, use 
of trade marks in non-competing product markets, which causes consumer 
confusion as to some kind of relationship between trade mark owners and users, 
can be regarded as unfair and prevented. This use, however, strengthens the 
interests of users only against those of competitors in users’ markets which trade 
mark owners have never entered or planned to enter. Nevertheless, the use can 
hardly impair the competitiveness of trade mark owners in owners’ markets.        
Third, trade mark protection should be targeted at efficient competition. 
Basically, trade mark protection enables sellers to efficiently indicate the position 
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of product quality and brand image and differentiate their products from others. 
As the search cost theory suggests, consumers are also able to economise on their 
search costs for the products they want. In this sense, efficient competition can 
justify trade mark protection. 
Efficient competition can also delimit trade mark protection. If, for 
example, competitors cannot use generic terms as a result of trade mark 
protection, consumers could not find the products they want efficiently. This 
inefficiency in competing product markets should be avoided. 
Efficiency, however, should not mean just the reduction in trade mark 
owners’ costs or consumer search costs. It should be predicated on the 
competition system. Although one trade mark in one market or even in all 
markets is more efficient than numerous trade marks in terms of trade mark 
owners’ costs and consumer search costs, this is not the aim of trade mark 
protection. It is suggested here that only unfair use, which could cause material 
inefficiency and harm competition, should be prohibited. For instance, use of 
trade marks on non-competing products could reduce efficiency by raising the 
advertising costs of trade mark owners or making consumers spend more time 
matching products to the owners’ marks. In this case, however, there would be no 
need to prevent the use if consumers can still make rational choices based on the 
information that trade marks convey.  
Fair and efficient competition as the purpose of trade mark protection is 
closely related to trade mark functions. The close relationship between them is 
quite natural since this thesis suggests fair and efficient competition as the 
ultimate purpose of ‘trade mark’ protection. Splitting markets and cartels through 
private agreements may not be linked with trade marks. Unfair competitive 
behaviour that does not relate to use of trade marks is beyond the concern of trade 
mark law. Trade mark law interferes in disputes caused by ‘use of trade marks’ 
which impacts ‘the functions of owners’ trade marks.’ Nevertheless, it is not harm 
to all trade mark functions that can lead to trade mark protection. Protectable 
functions will be discussed in the next section. 
Moreover, fair and efficient competition relates to both trade mark 
owners’ and third party users’ markets. These markets can be identical, competing, 
non-competing but related, or non-competing and unrelated with each other. The 
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understanding of trade mark protection particularly against non-competing use 
depends on whether owners’ trade marks fulfil functions just in their markets or 
extend to non-competing product markets. In the next section, this will be also 
explored.   
 
2. Trade Mark Functions 
 
1) Fair and Efficient Competition and Trade Mark Functions 
 
 How trade mark protection promotes fair and efficient competition 
cannot be easily explained by the prevention of consumer confusion, the 
protection of goodwill, and the reduction of search costs. The prevention of 
consumer confusion cannot clarify the effect of trade mark protection on 
competition without the aid of other concepts since it relates to ‘fairness’ or 
‘proper business conduct’,239 rather than ‘competition’, and cannot explain anti-
dilution protection. While unfair use of trade marks causes consumer confusion, 
not all types of consumer confusion could harm fair and efficient competition. 
Consumer confusion as to some kind of relationship between trade mark owners 
and users could not affect the numbers of properly distinguishable trade marks, 
which are essential for consumer choice, in both trade mark owners’ and users’ 
markets. Moreover, the effect of anti-dilution protection on competition cannot be 
explicated by the prevention of consumer confusion since anti-dilution protection 
does not require confusion. 
 The protection of goodwill is also not suitable for elucidating the effect 
on competition because goodwill is a concept only about trade mark owners and 
‘the protection of goodwill’ can be construed as ‘the misappropriation of 
goodwill.’ Harm to goodwill or loss of control over goodwill cannot explain how 
it affects the interests of ‘competitors and consumers in owners’ markets.’ The 
misappropriation of goodwill is synonymous with unfair use and it does not 
always impair competition. The protection of goodwill is remote from the concept 
of competition. 
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 The search cost theory emphasises ‘efficiency by reducing consumer 
search costs’ rather than ‘competition,’ ‘fairness,’ and ‘efficiency in competition.’ 
From the perspective of the search cost theory, the most efficient market can be a 
monopolistic market since consumers can grasp product quality at a minimum 
cost.
240
 One trade mark in one market, however, is far from pro-competitive; 
there is no competition at all. Hence, the search cost theory has its limits in 
describing a link between search costs and competition. 
 On the other hand, trade mark functions can explain how third party use 
is likely or unlikely to affect fair and efficient competition because of their nature: 
like the concept of ‘fair and efficient competition,’ they not only relate to the 
interests of trade mark owners but also those of competitors and consumers. 
Trade mark functions enable existing competitors to decide their marketing 
strategies and new comers to determine whether they enter markets or not. They 
also help consumers to make choices on their preferences or purchases. Not all 
functions, however, can promote fair and efficient competition. 
 
2) The Current Debate 
 
(1) Source Indicating Function 
 
 It is unanimously maintained that trade marks have the role of indicating 
the source of products. As the US Supreme Court asserted in the early twentieth 
century, “the primary and proper function of a trademark is to identify the origin 
or ownership of the article to which it is fixed.”241 
 According to the traditional origin function, origin meant ‘actual and 
physical’ origin. In theory, assigning and licensing trade mark rights could not be 
permitted since they, without the transfer of the entire business of sellers or 
licensors, would allow use of trade marks by others who were not actual or 
physical source of products.
242
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With the change in commerce such as mass-production of products, the 
emergence of licensing, and the appearance of distributors, the concept of ‘origin’ 
came to have a meaning of ‘a single, though anonymous source.’243 According to 
the modified origin function, trade marks indicate that products originate from the 
same but possibly anonymous source or have reached consumers through the 
same channel as other goods bearing identical trade marks.
244
 “[W]ho 
manufactured or produced products” is not important at all.245  
 The source indicating function has been mentioned in many court 
decisions. In Smith, the Ninth Circuit held that courts have “generally confined 
legal protection to the trademark’s source identification function for reasons 
grounded in the public policy favoring a free, competitive economy.”246 In New 
Kids on the Block, the Ninth Circuit regarded the source identification function as 
“the purpose of trademark” in relation to nominative fair use,247 and other federal 
courts cited this decision.
248
  
The ECJ consistently emphasised that “to guarantee the identity of origin” 
constitutes the essential function of trade marks.
249
  
In Burberry, the Supreme Court of Korea also decided that even the 
active advertising or promotion of parallel imported products through use of trade 
marks did not constitute trade mark infringement unless there was a likelihood of 
confusion as to the origin or quality of products, considering that the main 
functions of the trade mark were those of indicating origin and guaranteeing the 
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quality of products.
250
 
 
(2) Source Distinguishing Function 
 
 Trade marks identify the source of products and distinguish that source 
from other sources.
251
 This function is sometimes explained as being included in 
the origin function in a broader sense. 
 The US Fourth Circuit stated in Retail Services that a mark cannot 
acquire trade mark protection unless the mark is distinctive, that is, unless it 
serves the traditional trade mark functions of distinguishing the applicant’s goods 
from those of others and identifying the source of the goods.
252
  
According to the ECJ, the function of guaranteeing the origin of products 
includes the function of distinguishing between sources. In Philips, the ECJ 
reiterated that “the essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity 
of the origin of the marked product to the consumer or end-user by enabling him, 
without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from 
others which have another origin.”253 The Philips Court based the essential 
function on “the wording and the structure of the various provisions of the 
Directive concerning the grounds for refusal of registration.”254  
The Supreme Court of Korea also considered the distinguishing function 
to be an important function of trade marks. It decided in the Black Coffee case 
that a title of a record could play a role as a distinctive sign as to the source of 
products, not just as an indication of the content of a creative work, when it 
enabled consumers to differentiate a work of an undertaking from others.
255
 
 
(3) Quality Guaranteeing Function 
 
 On the back of the origin function, a new concept of trade mark function 
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arose in 1930s.
256
 This function acknowledges that trade marks guarantee 
product quality. Schechter argued in his seminal thesis that “the true functions of 
the trademark” are “to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate 
further purchases by the consuming public.”257 This function is sometimes called 
‘the function of indicating quality’ since trade marks cannot guarantee any quality 
of products but can indicate the consistent level of product quality.
258
 Trade 
marks signify “at least that the goods are issued as vendible goods under the aegis 
of the proprietor of the trademark who thus assumes responsibility for them.”259  
 Courts have commonly recognised this function. In El Greco Leather 
Products, the US Second Circuit regarded “the right to control the quality of the 
goods manufactured and sold under the holder’s trade mark” as “one of the most 
valuable and important protections afforded by the Lanham Act.”260 In Nitro 
Leisure Products, Judge Newman stated in his dissenting opinion that “the source 
theory has been broadened to include not only manufacturing source but also the 
source of standards of quality of goods bearing the mark” and that “a mark 
primarily functions to indicate a single quality control source of the goods or 
services.”261  
The ECJ also stated in Emanuel that for the essential role of a trade mark 
in the system of undistorted competition, it should assure consumers that all the 
products bearing the mark have been produced or provided under the control of a 
single enterprise which takes responsibility for their quality.
262
  
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Korea stated in a resale case that trade 
mark law protects the quality assurance function. It decided that where a trade 
marked product is so processed or repaired that it cannot seem to keep its identity, 
the act of processing or repairing is akin to the production of a new product, and 
hence a use of the same trade mark on the product can impair the functions of 
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indicating origin and guaranteeing the quality of products.
263
 
 
(4) Advertising Function 
 
 The advertising function is the function as an advertising tool. Trade 
marks are regarded as the most effective tools for sellers to develop consumer 
loyalty because of their capability to stimulate consumers to choose what they 
want, or what they have been led to believe they want.
264
 Schechter recognised 
this function, asserting that “today the trademark is not merely a symbol of good 
will but often the most effective agent for the creation of good will.”265 Some 
called this function ‘the persuasion function’ in that trade marks play a role as “a 
bridge between advertising and purchase” or “the vehicle of persuasion.”266 This 
function can be seen as a cumulative result of the origin and quality connotations 
of trade marks.
267
 
Justice Frankfurter acknowledged this function in Mishawaka, stating 
that “[t]he protection of trade-marks is the law’s recognition of the psychological 
function of symbols” and that “[i]f another poaches upon the commercial 
magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.”268 
Many other US courts have recognised the advertising function, citing the 
decision in Mishawaka. The Ninth Circuit mentioned “the psychological function 
of symbols” in Avery Dennison Corp. in relation to dilution,269 while the Fifth 
Circuit used the same expression in Elvis Presley Enterprises in the context of 
likelihood of confusion.
270
 In Sport Supply Group, however, the Fifth Circuit 
expressed different views, holding that “under Texas law and federal law, a mark 
is protected by trade mark law to the extent that it serves to distinguish a 
particular product, not to the extent that it entices consumers to purchase the 
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product.”271 The reasoning was that “if trademark law viewed “advertising” as a 
trademark’s main function, a descriptive mark might receive more protection 
under trademark law than an arbitrary mark.”272  
Meanwhile, the ECJ articulated in L'Oréal that the advertising function is 
protected under article 5(1) of the EU Trade Mark Directive.
273
 The protection of 
the advertising function was also mentioned by the ECJ in Interflora. The ECJ 
stated that a trade mark is often used as “an instrument of commercial strategy 
used … for advertising purposes” and the trade mark performs the advertising 
function to this extent.
274
  
On the other hand, there is not yet a court decision about the advertising 
function in Korea. 
 
(5) Other Functions: the Investment and Communication Functions 
 
The investment function means the function of providing trade mark 
owners with the incentive to make investments in product quality because 
consumers can trace products to trade mark owners. This function is also labelled 
‘the quality encouragement function of trade marks.’275  
US courts asserted the investment function in many cases. The First 
Circuit stated in Boston Duck Tours that “[b]ecause consumers rely heavily on 
trademarks when making choices, businesses also have an incentive to maintain 
product quality, lest they lose disappointed consumers.”276 The ECJ also stated in 
Interflora that the investment function occurs when trade marks are used “to 
acquire or preserve a reputation capable of attracting consumers and retaining 
their loyalty.”277 In Korea, the investment function is just dealt with as one 
purpose of trade mark law. 
Trade marks can also be used as a communication tool and this function 
is called the communication function. The ECJ recognises both the investment 
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and communication functions. In L'Oréal, the ECJ concluded that protected trade 
mark functions embrace not only the essential function of a trade mark but also 
the functions of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services, communication, 
investment, and advertisement.
278
 The Court, however, admitted in Interflora that 
the investment function “may overlap with the advertising function.”279  
The relationship of the communication function with other functions is 
not clear. In L’Oréal, Advocate General Jääskinen cast a doubt on this relationship 
in a footnote, opining that there is no consensus with respect to “the conceptual 
relationships that exist between the various functions, especially whether some 
(or all) of the functions can actually be seen as included in the essential 
function.”280 He suggested that “the elements of [the communication] function 
are to a large extent covered by the distinguishing and origin function, advertising 
function and the investment function.”281 
 
3) Limits of Protected Trade Mark Functions in relation to Competition 
 
 Trade mark functions are pro-competitive only when their scope is 
demarcated by competition. From the perspective of fair and efficient competition 
that I suggest as the purpose of trade mark law, only these functions should be 
protected. Currently accepted functions, however, do not map exactly onto 
competition. 
First, the relationship between protected trade mark functions and 
competition is not certain. Courts in different jurisdictions have disparate 
understandings. US courts consider the source indicating and source 
distinguishing functions to be necessary for the enhancement of competition, but 
the advertising function to be anti-competitive in some cases. In Smith, the Ninth 
Circuit admitted the pro-competitive nature of the indication function, holding 
that protecting a trade mark “as a means of identifying” the trade mark owner’s 
products makes “effective competition” possible in a complex, impersonal 
marketplace by offering to consumers a tool for identifying the products that 
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satisfy them and incentivising producers with the repetition of purchases.
282
 It 
added that without the identification function of a trade mark, “informed 
consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in quality, could not 
exist.” 283  In Calvin Klein Cosmetics, the Eighth Circuit emphasised the 
importance of the source distinguishing function in competition when it found no 
likelihood of confusion in the use, by Lenox, of the Calvin Klein’s registered 
trade mark OBSESSION in comparative advertising.
284
 The court stated that “an 
imitator is entitled to truthfully inform the public that it believes that it has 
produced a product equivalent to the original and that the public may benefit 
through lower prices by buying the imitation.”285 Other US courts also found that 
the functions of indicating source and distinguishing between sources stem from 
competition in the light of the legislative history of the Lanham Act,
286
 citing the 
senate report.
287
  
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit asserted in Smith that the advertising 
function would make consumers choose products not by their quality and price 
but by “economically irrational elements,” and as a result, trade mark proprietors 
would not be affected by quality and price competition, and thus “the competitive 
system fails to perform its function of allocating available resources 
efficiently.”288 The court said that “the economically irrelevant appeal of highly 
publicized trademarks is thought to constitute a barrier to the entry of new 
competition into the market.”289 Other courts, however, just stated that dilution, 
which is closely related to the advertising function, can occur regardless of 
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competition between the parties.
290
  
 The ECJ takes a somewhat different position as to the relationship 
between trade mark functions and the competition system. According to the ECJ, 
it appears that all trade mark functions originate from the system of undistorted 
competition. The source indicating and distinguishing function—the function of 
guaranteeing the identity of origin of products by enabling consumers, without 
any possibility of confusion, to distinguish products from others—is the essential 
function of trade marks because only distinctive signs enable producers to 
compete with the quality of products.
291
 The quality assurance function also 
comes from competition in that it is a prerequisite for the essential function of 
trade marks in the undistorted competition system.
292
 As regards the functions of 
communication, investment, and advertising, the ECJ has not explored fully their 
relationship with competition. On the other hand, the ECJ regarded trade mark 
rights as an essential element of the undistorted competition system, and at the 
same time, found that these functions should also be protected by trade mark 
law.
293
 This, somewhat cyclical, position appears to admit that these functions 
stem from competition.  
In Korea, the functions of indicating source, distinguishing between 
sources, and guaranteeing the consistent quality of products are construed to 
‘maintain’ competition, but there are no court decisions about the connection of 
other functions with competition. In Rolex, the Supreme Court of Korea asserted 
that trade mark law is intended to protect the goodwill of the proprietor and to 
‘maintain distribution order’ by safeguarding ‘the source distinguishing function 
and the quality guaranteeing function,’ on the one hand, and to protect the interest 
of consumers by enabling them to distinguish the origin of products from others 
and accordingly to purchase the product with the quality that they want, on the 
other.
294
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 In sum, courts have the same approach regarding the origin indicating, 
source distinguishing, and quality guaranteeing functions: they promote 
competition. As to other functions such as the advertising function, however, 
some US courts considered it to be anti-competitive, while the ECJ found it 
indirectly linked to competition.  
Second, the meaning of some functions is so obscure that it is difficult to 
establish the exact relationship between those functions and competition. The 
origin function is conceived as a function of indicating ‘the same but possibly 
anonymous source’ or ‘sponsorship.’ These expressions, however, do not have 
clear-cut meanings. Given the transfer of trade mark rights, ‘the same but 
possibly anonymous source’ does not sufficiently define what is identical. Further, 
‘sponsorship’ can expand to encompass some kind of relationship between trade 
mark owners and users. As a result, where consumers mistakenly believe that 
trade mark owners possess the share of third party users but they do not think that 
the owners control the quality of users’ products, users can be liable for their use. 
This could unduly reduce users’ competitive interests. This is also the case with 
the source distinguishing function. 
 Additionally, the advertising and communication functions are unclear. If 
trade mark protection is understood as protection against all uses of trade marks 
that could hinder proprietors’ use of trade marks as a tool of advertising or 
communication, that protection could lead to an unfair competitive advantage. In 
this sense, the ECJ restricts the scope of these functions. The ECJ found in 
Parfums Christian Dior that the advertising function is not harmed where a 
reseller’s advertising is “customary in his trade sector.”295 In Interflora, the ECJ 
also concluded that the mere fact that use of a trade mark forces a trade mark 
proprietor to intensify advertising does not adversely affect the mark’s advertising 
function because the trade mark does not aim to guarantee the proprietor against 
practices inherent in competition.
296
  
Third, even the relationship between trade mark functions is not clear, 
particularly between the functions of indicating source and distinguishing 
between sources, on the one hand, and the quality guaranteeing function, on the 
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other. Some US courts have interpreted an indication of source or sponsorship as 
information about quality consistency. The US Seventh Circuit held in Gorenstein 
that trade marks aim at identifying products to consumers and identity means 
“consistency and a correlative duty to make sure that the good or service really is 
of consistent quality, i.e., really is the same good or service.”297 In TMT North 
America, the same Circuit also asserted that the usefulness of a trade mark to 
society stems from its function of imparting information about product quality, 
and that trade mark law primarily protects this information, not trade mark 
owners’ reputations.298  
The Seventh Circuit put more weight on consistent quality assurance in a 
relatively recent case. In XMH, the court stated that “[i]f without notice the seller 
reduces the quality of his brand, the trademark becomes deceptive because its 
assurance of continuity of quality is no longer truthful.”299  
The ECJ asserted in many cases including Emanuel that for a trade mark 
to fulfil its function as an indication of source in the undistorted competition 
system, “it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have 
been manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking which is 
responsible for their quality.” 300  In other cases such as L’Oréal, the ECJ 
considered harm to the quality guaranteeing function to be adverse effects on the 
origin function, stating that the origin function is harmed “in that the mark is 
denied its essential function of guaranteeing that the goods that it designates are 
supplied under the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their 
quality.”301 
In the same vein, some courts emphasised that trade marks help to 
differentiate between products by the different positions of product quality. In 
Nitro Leisure Products, a case about use of a proprietor’s trade mark on 
refurbished golf balls, the US Federal Circuit asserted that “so long as the 
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customer is getting a product with the expected characteristics, and so long as the 
goodwill built up by the trademark owner is not eroded by being identified with 
inferior quality, the Lanham Act does not prevent the truthful use of trademarks, 
even if such use results in the enrichment of others.”302  
As to the meaning of ‘the consistency of quality,’ the Second Circuit 
interpreted it as ‘the maintenance of the control of quality’ in El Greco Leather 
Products, holding that the actual quality is immaterial.
303
 In Eva’s Bridal Ltd., a 
naked license case, the Seventh Circuit also stressed the importance of control 
over consistent quality, stating that “Safeway could not license its marks to a 
corner grocery store, while retaining no control over inventory, appearance, or 
business methods, just because every grocery store is sure to have Coca–Cola and 
Wheaties on the shelf.”304 
On the other hand, some other courts deny the strong relationship 
between the origin indicating and distinguishing functions and the quality 
guaranteeing function. In merchandising cases, even if consumers did not believe 
that a trade mark owner controlled product quality, some US federal courts 
admitted that there was a likelihood of confusion as to source or sponsorship.
305
  
Fourth, where a third party uses trade marks on non-competing products, 
whether trade mark functions are protected in trade mark owners’ markets or in 
users’ markets is hard to be identified. Basically, proprietors’ trade marks fulfil 
functions in proprietors’ product markets. Trade marks indicate the source or 
sponsorship of the products of ‘proprietors,’ enable ‘consumers in their markets’ 
to distinguish their products from others’, and guarantee the quality of their 
products. Trade marks are used to advertise their products and motivate them to 
invest money and efforts in their products. 
According to some courts, however, trade marks appear to be able to 
perform their functions in non-competing product markets which the owners have 
never entered or have never shown their evident intention to enter by applying for 
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registration. One example would be decisions that find trade mark infringement 
on the ground of the misappropriation of goodwill. These decisions focus more 
on the ‘unfairness’ of users’ conduct without discussing any effect on owners’ 
markets. In Universal City Studios, plaintiffs neither registered nor licensed their 
marks ‘Jaws One,’ ‘Jaws Two,’ and ‘Jaws Power’ for food waste disposers; in 
fact, they did not accept a license for garbage can liners to maintain their brand 
image.
306
 A district court in the Seventh Circuit, however, prevented defendants 
from using the trade marks for food waste disposers on the basis of likelihood of 
confusion as well as dilution under the Illinois Anti-Dilution Statute.
307
 The court 
stressed defendants’ intent to capitalise on plaintiffs’ marks in determining 
likelihood of confusion.
308
 
In conclusion, in order to elucidate the relationship between ‘fair and 
efficient competition’ and protectable trade mark functions, these functions need 
to be reclassified with the focus on essential functions that are considered to be 
pro-competitive by courts. Moreover, the meaning and scope of trade mark 
functions should be defined from the perspective of fair and efficient competition. 
Additionally, whether owners’ trade marks fulfil functions beyond owners’ 
markets or not should be made clear. 
 
4) Protectable Trade Mark Functions 
 
(1) Information and Differentiation Functions 
 
 True and non-misleading information is indispensable for consumers’ 
free and reasonable decisions. Trade marks can convey two types of significant 
information for consumers’ rational choice: information on the origin, quality, and 
brand image of owners’ products and information on differences in origin, quality, 
and brand image. The former information roughly corresponds to the currently 
accepted functions of indicating origin and guaranteeing product quality and the 
latter to the source distinguishing function. The advertising and investment 
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functions, which courts do not evidently regard as pro-competitive, are relevant to 
both types of information only to the extent that trade marks can connote brand 
image and differentiate products of one undertaking from others based on brand 
image. According to the above types of information, trade mark functions can be 
classified into two: the intra-trade mark information function and the inter-trade 
mark differentiation function.  
It is suggested here that these functions are essential for fair and efficient 
competition and thus protectable by trade mark law.
309
 First, trade marks 
complement consumers’ insufficient information, which deters consumers’ 
informed choices, by concisely conveying information as to origin, quality, and 
brand image, and by readily differentiating them from those of others products. 
Trade marks make it possible for consumers to search for products they want to 
purchase at a lower cost,
310
 and to trust the quality of products in markets
311
 
through their information and differentiation functions. Consumers form a 
preference for certain products or buy them because the information as to source 
or quality tells them what they want, or because they would like to enjoy the 
image that trade marks carry. 
 Second, these functions enable trade mark owners to compete with other 
manufacturers or sellers more efficiently. By positioning their trade marks in 
markets and conveying information on the position of their marks, owners can 
establish effective marketing strategies. The functions also incentivise owners to 
‘competitively’ develop or maintain the quality or brand image of their products. 
If they manufacture low quality products or cannot present appealing brand 
images, they would be punished by the drop in consumer demand. The 
differentiation function, together with the information function, offers consumers 
‘a navigation system’ which can help locate the products they do or do not want. 
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This navigation system has become more efficient with the advancement of 
online technology that makes it quicker for consumers to retrieve information by 
using trade marked terms. 
 Finally, the information and differentiation functions facilitate start-up 
companies to set foot in new markets. Without use of trade marks, they would 
have to invest a considerable amount of money and efforts in exposing their 
products to the relevant public. With the help of trade marks, however, they can 
access markets more smoothly. Moreover, through market surveys or research on 
existing trade marks in markets, they can be more strategic in starting business. 
Furthermore, these functions encourage trade mark owners to advance into 
different product markets through brand extension. Because of established brand 
images, proprietors can enter these markets at a low cost by using identical trade 
marks. The entry of start-up companies and trade mark owners into product 
markets could result in more consumer choice. 
  
(2) Meaning and Scope of Functions 
 
a) Information Function 
 
Trade marks are a means to concisely convey to consumers information 
as to the position of product quality and brand image. This intra-trade mark 
function includes the currently accepted source indicating and quality 
guaranteeing functions. It also relates to part of the advertising and investment 
functions to the extent that trade marks convey brand image.  
US courts have mentioned trade marks’ information function without 
embracing brand image in the scope of information. In Smith
312
 and Vuitton Et 
Fils,
313
 the Ninth Circuit asserted that “the only legally relevant function of a 
trademark is to impart information as to the source or sponsorship of the product.” 
The First Circuit mentioned in Boston Duck Tours that trade marks “concisely 
impart information to consumers,” serving to identify and distinguish products 
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and sources.
314
 The Seventh Circuit stated that trade marks provide potential 
purchasers with information on the origin of products and this information “may” 
convey information on the “attributes and quality” of products.315  
Unlike US courts, this thesis suggests that the pro-competitive 
information function that deserves protection under trade mark law should be 
interpreted as being connected directly with the position of product quality and 
brand image in product markets.  
Information on the origin or sponsorship of products itself has its limits 
in contributing to fair and efficient competition since its broad meaning could 
conflict with the pro-competitive information function. It cannot justify the pro-
competitive nature of the information function insofar as ‘origin’ is interpreted as 
meaning ‘a single but anonymous source’ and ‘sponsorship’ is construed as 
encompassing ‘some kind of relationship between trade mark owners and users.’ 
‘A single source’ can be understood to mean no other than ‘the identity or 
similarity between trade marks,’ whether trade marks are used in competing or 
non-competing product markets. ‘Some kind of relationship’ can include the case 
where trade mark owners do not care about the quality and brand image of users’ 
products.  
This interpretation can broaden the scope of the information that trade 
marks convey, meaning that different information with different values is 
embedded in trade marks. This amorphous and vague information cannot make it 
possible for trade mark owners, competitors, and consumers to differentiate 
between products or to decide rationally what they wish. The information would 
cloud their choices of marketing strategies or preferences. It is likely that 
consumers’ decisions based on this information stem from their conjectures, not 
from their rationality or certainty. Besides, if this equivocal information is also 
protected by trade mark law, competitors could not use others’ trade marks even 
in comparative advertising
316
 that is capable of delivering more accurate 
information to consumers required for their reasonable choice. Furthermore, the 
threat of litigation on the ground of ‘unpredictable information’ of trade marks 
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could even postpone the entry of other producers or distributors into new 
markets.
317
 
On the other hand, brand image should be treated as information 
necessary for the competition system. The allure, prestigious image, and aura of 
luxury surrounding products stated by the ECJ in Parfums Christian Dior
318
 and 
Copad
319
 constitute this information. Consumers’ emotions towards or against 
branded products are as significant as other factual information for reaching 
reasonable decisions under the circumstances of asymmetric information.
320
 
Positive emotions reduce the risk that consumers may fail to purchase what they 
want to, and consumers can enjoy those positive feelings as a result of their 
purchasing choice. Brand image is significant also for both trade mark owners 
and competitors; trade mark owners can differentiate their products from others 
by embedding their own brand images in their marks, and competitors can 
determine their marketing strategies in the light of these brand images. 
 Therefore, trade marks should be understood as indicating that trade 
mark owners ‘control the position of product quality and brand image in product 
markets.’ A trade mark signifies the message that “all goods bearing the trade 
mark are of an equal level of quality”321 and brand image even if it does not 
guarantee the consistency of product quality
322
 and brand image. Where 
consumers mistakenly believe that third party users acquire licenses from trade 
mark owners because of similar trade marks, but they do not believe that trade 
mark owners control the quality and brand image of users’ products, this belief 
does not conflict with the information function of trade marks.  
From this perspective, the information that trade marks may convey 
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about the specific nature of products is beyond the scope of the information 
function. Court decisions also show that this information is not protected by trade 
mark law. In Dastar, the US Supreme Court interpreted ‘the origin of goods’ as 
“the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale,” not “the author of 
any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods” on the grounds of 
both “the Act’s common-law foundations (which were not designed to protect 
originality or creativity)” and “the copyright and patent laws (which were).”323 In 
Emanuel, a case about a trade mark corresponding to the name of a designer who 
was historically linked with the product, the ECJ held that despite the possibility 
that the average consumer might mistakenly believe that the designer was 
currently engaged in the design of the garment, “the characteristics and the 
qualities of that garment remain guaranteed by the undertaking which owns the 
trade mark.”324 The Supreme Court of Korea also concluded in the James Dean 
case
325
 and the Mozart case
326
 that the name of a famous deceased person in 
itself does not signify the connection of products with the person.
327
  
The scope of the information function is also limited to the extent that 
fair and efficient competition permits. First, only a sign which can fulfil the 
information function at a minimum level constitutes ‘a trade mark’ within the 
meaning of trade mark law. If a sign is only a property of products or is not 
perceivable by one of our senses, it cannot deliver information to consumers. In 
this sense, a colour or a shape, in every conceivable form, cannot function as a 
trade mark because competitors, who cannot identify the precise scope of the 
trade mark, could not use the colour or the shape at all, and consumers could not 
make choices on products based on uncertain identification. In Heidelberger, the 
ECJ asserted that “[t]he mere juxtaposition of two or more colours, without shape 
or contours, or a reference to two or more colours “in every conceivable form” … 
does not exhibit the qualities of precision and uniformity required by Art.2 of the 
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Directive.”328 In Dyson, the ECJ found that the totality of conceivable shapes of a 
transparent collecting bin of a vacuum cleaner was a mere property of a product 
and thus did not constitute a trade mark within the meaning of article 2.
329
  
Second, the functionality doctrine, which precludes an exclusive right 
over functional product features, delimits the scope of the information function. 
Despite the de facto information function of functional features, these features are 
not protected as trade marks on the grounds of competition and other intellectual 
property systems. Protection of functional features as trade marks would lead to 
an unfair advantage for trade mark owners.  
Third, trade marks which consist solely of generic terms or descriptive 
signs are regarded as not being capable of fulfilling the information function 
unless they acquire secondary meaning. If not, only trade mark owners can 
efficiently convey information on their products, deterring competitors from 
offering information on competitors’ products. As a result, existing competitors 
could not compete fairly with trade mark owners, and new comers would not 
enter a product market. Consumers could not purchase what they want based on 
sufficient information acquired at a low cost.  
 Finally, where trade marks directly impart misleading information, they 
are not protectable since this information does not help consumers to make well-
informed choices. Conversely, trade marks interfere with consumers’ reasonable 
decisions by deteriorating information. Trade mark law prevents this anti-
competitive function in relation to registration. 
   
b) Differentiation Function 
 
 Trade marks serve to enable producers to differentiate their products from 
those of others and consumers to distinguish between products, to form a 
preference for certain trade marked products, and to make purchasing decisions, 
based on the information conveyed by the marks. This inter-mark function can be 
called ‘the differentiation function.’ The differentiation function covers the 
distinguishing function and part of the advertising and investment functions.  
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US courts mentioned the differentiation function in some cases without 
suggesting specific meanings. In the International Order of Job’s Daughters, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that trade mark protection is necessary “to protect consumers 
against deceptive designations of the origin of goods and, conversely, to enable 
producers to differentiate their products from those of others,” refuting broader 
protection in Boston Hockey.  
The differentiation function is not the same as the distinguishing function 
in that it relates also to the formation of consumer preference for certain trade 
marked products. According to the theory of consumer choice, consumers make 
choices based on two key factors: their budget constraint and preference.
330
 
Consumer preference that usually triggers repeat purchases means consumers’ 
strong or habitual positive assessment or feelings, based on the utility of products, 
as to certain products over other products.
331
 In this context, trade marks do not 
just enable consumers to distinguish between products; they also play a key role 
in creating consumer preference by facilitating consumers’ comparison of the 
product quality and brand image of one company with those of others. Trade 
mark owners aim at maximising their profits by creating consumer preference for 
their products over other products, beyond just showing that their products are 
different from others. After all, trade marks perform the differentiation function 
not only at the stage of consumers’ making purchasing decisions but also at the 
stage of consumers’ forming or altering preferences. 
The differentiation function differentiates ‘between products’ in owners’ 
markets. Even though this differentiation results from the distinction between 
sources or sponsors, the ultimate subject of the differentiation function is not 
sources or sponsors, much less trade marks in and of themselves. For example, 
where a computer manufacturer and a shoe maker use an identical trade mark, the 
trade mark fixed on computers serves to differentiate between computers and the 
same trade mark used on shoes helps to differentiate between shoes. Use of the 
same trade mark neither aims at distinguishing between trade marks nor between 
the computer manufacturer and the shoe maker. Thus, it is not quite accurate to 
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say that trade marks perform the function of distinguishing between sources. 
Like the information function, the scope of the differentiation function 
should be restricted by fair and efficient competition. The subject-matter of trade 
marks, functionality, and other provisions which delimit the scope of the 
information function also concern that of the differentiation function because the 
differentiation function is based on the information function.  
 
(3) Protectable Functions and Product Markets 
 
 Whether the scope of protectable trade mark functions is limited to trade 
mark owners’ markets or extends to users’ product markets is significant for the 
justification and scope of trade mark protection, particularly in the case of non-
competing use. If it is interpreted that trade marks perform their functions only in 
competing product markets, third party use in non-competing product markets 
could only indirectly affect these functions; additional explanation as to direct 
harm to them would be necessary. On the other hand, if it is accepted that the 
functions reach non-competing product markets, third party use in these markets 
could directly harm the functions and this harm would justify trade mark 
protection.  
 Here it is argued that trade marks convey information as to the position 
of product quality and brand image ‘in owners’ markets’ and enable producers to 
differentiate their products from those of competitors and consumers ‘in these 
markets’ to distinguish between products. Additionally, trade mark functions can 
reach the markets of products that can replace owners’ products. This is because 
product quality and brand image in owners’ markets can satisfy consumers in 
substitute product markets by offering similar utility or satisfying similar desires. 
For example, trade marks for instant coffee enable roasted coffee consumers to 
make choices even between roasted coffee and instant coffee by conveying 
information on the quality and brand image of their instant coffee. Roasted coffee 
consumers, who believe that the trade marked instant coffee can satisfy them 
more than roasted coffee, will shift their preference or purchasing decision from 
roasted coffee to the trade marked instant coffee. Thus, roasted coffee makers 
would establish appropriate marketing strategies in the light of trade mark 
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functions in an instant coffee market. 
 Trade marks, however, cannot function in non-competing product 
markets unless trade mark owners strongly show their intent to enter these 
markets by, for instance, acquiring trade mark registration that is linked with 
subsequent use. Even where non-competing products are related to owners’ 
products because both products are often used together in a complementary way, 
trade mark functions do not extend to the non-competing products because 
owners’ products cannot be interchanged with these non-competing products. For 
example, the information and differentiation functions of trade marks for instant 
coffee would not have any impact on consumer choice between coffee syrup and 
instant coffee since the utility given by coffee syrup is not similar to that by 
instant coffee. 
Also in the case of famous marks, their functions do not extend beyond 
competing product markets to non-competing product markets. First, the strong 
information and differentiation functions of famous marks in competing product 
markets are the result of trade mark owners’ investment, but also the consequence 
of consumers’ imbuing trade marks with images.332 Some US courts asserted this 
point. In Toyota, the Ninth Circuit held that “[a] large expenditure of money does 
not in itself create legally protectable rights.”333 Thus, trade mark functions 
should not expand to non-competing product markets on the ground of owners’ 
investment. Second, the images of famous marks play a different role outside 
competing product markets. Famous marks do not show the position of brand 
image of ‘owners’ products’ in non-competing product markets. They just 
connote brand images separated from ‘owners’ products’ or function as a concept 
that contributes to the creation of new meanings. The connotation of brand 
images independent of owners’ products and the creation of new words, however, 
do not fall within the scope of the information and differentiation functions. Third, 
the fact that trade marks become well-known to consumers in other markets does 
not mean that owners of famous marks intend to enter all other product markets in 
the near future or that the owners’ markets are broadened to include all other 
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markets. It just indicates that famous marks perform their functions so powerfully 
in owners’ markets that the functions in these markets are well recognised by 
consumers in other markets. Only where unfair use of famous marks is likely to 
lead to the malfunction of famous marks in owners’ markets or competing 
product markets and thus harm to competition in these markets, the use should be 
prohibited. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
 As a starting point of a virtuous cycle in the application of trade mark law, 
I suggest a catalyst: the ultimate purpose of trade mark protection should be ‘fair 
and efficient competition.’ Trade mark law reaches and can reach this purpose by 
way of protecting pro-competitive trade mark functions; not all trade mark 
functions deserve protection. Thus, I submit that trade mark law aims at fostering 
and maintaining fair and efficient competition by means of protecting pro-
competitive trade mark functions against unfair use of trade marks.  
This thesis suggests that the information and differentiation functions are 
pro-competitive. The information function is the function of concisely conveying 
to consumers information as to the position of product quality and brand image. 
Trade marks also perform the differentiation function which enables producers to 
differentiate their products from those of others and consumers to distinguish 
between products, to form a preference for certain trade marked products, and to 
make purchasing decisions, based on the information conveyed by the marks.  
The scope of information in the information and differentiation functions 
is limited to information on, or in connection with, the position of product quality 
and brand image. Moreover, trade marks fulfil these pro-competitive functions in 
owners’ markets and competing product markets. This is also the case with 
famous trade marks. Thus, trade mark law should prevent third party use only 
where it is likely to impair the functions in these markets. 
 Protectable trade mark functions in paid search marketing are the same as 
those of trade marks used in offline contexts. Only pro-competitive functions can 
be protected against third party use of trade marks as keywords. Therefore, use of 
trade marks in online marketing should be protected neither less nor more than 
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other uses in an offline world. Trade mark liability should be examined in this 
vein. 
In this respect, it does not appear to be desirable to introduce theories 
which treat trade mark use in paid search marketing in a different way from other 
uses in determining trade mark liability. For example, the fact that search engines 
enable consumers to retrieve information more quickly and easily alone should 
not be the rationale for not preventing third parties from using trade marks as 
keywords. The initial interest confusion theory, if it applies only to use of trade 
marks on the Internet, should not be permitted.  
 Beyond its role as a starting point of the virtuous cycle, fair and efficient 
competition plays a core part in the cycle since it also concerns free speech 
standards. It determines the absence or existence of substantial or compelling 
societal interests which is a main factor of the standards. 
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Part II. Direct Trade Mark Liability 
 
Chapter 4: Trade Mark Jurisprudence with regard to Paid Search 
Marketing 
 
 This chapter analyses the jurisprudence of US federal courts, the ECJ, 
and Korean courts in relation to trade mark use in paid search marketing. The 
analysis is made according to regions and according to the liability of advertisers 
and search engines in order to explore how courts balance between the rights and 
interests of all relevant parties. This chapter shows that courts are split because 
factual contexts and their evaluation, or the interpretation of essentially very 
similar legal provisions are different. In the USA where there is no decision of the 
Supreme Court on paid search marketing cases, federal courts have disparate 
approaches whilst applying the same law. 
 
1. US Federal Courts  
 
 US federal courts have not taken a common position as to the trade mark 
liability of advertisers and search engines: they diverge. Some courts favour trade 
mark protection, employing a more loose interpretation of likelihood of confusion 
or likelihood of dilution rather than following the trade mark use doctrine. Other 
courts, which do not find advertisers or search engines liable, argue for the trade 
mark use theory, the high degree of consumer attention, and broad defences.  
 
1) Liability of Advertisers 
 
 Court decisions on use of trade marks in metatags or as terms to trigger 
pop-up or banner advertisements contribute to the understanding of their position 
in paid search marketing. Because of the similarity of the ‘mechanics’ behind the 
two types of cases, federal courts have cited these decisions in determining 
liability of advertisers or search engines in paid search marketing. Particularly, 
conducive are court decisions on use of trade marks in metatags, since many 
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advertisers have used trade marks both in metatags and paid search marketing
334
 
and all these cases have occurred between trade mark owners and third party 
advertisers. 
 Federal courts that focused their analysis on the existence of likelihood of 
confusion did not construe the use requirement as meaning ‘use as trade marks.’ 
In North American Medical, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Axiom’s use of North 
American Medical’s trade marks as metatags constituted use in commerce in 
connection with the sale or advertising of products under the plain meaning of the 
language of the Lanham Act.
335
 The Circuit additionally pointed out that lack of 
the display of trade marks is relevant in assessing the presence of likelihood of 
confusion, not the existence of ‘use in commerce.’336  
Likewise, in Edina Realty, a district court in the Eighth Circuit regarded 
‘the purchase of trade marked keywords’ as constituting use in commerce based 
on the plain meaning of the Lanham Act.
337
 A district court in the First Circuit 
also concluded in Hearts on Fire that an advertiser’s purchase of a trade mark as a 
keyword to trigger its advertisement constituted ‘use’ within the meaning of the 
Lanham Act on the grounds of “the Lanham Act’s language and the broader 
purposes of the trademark statute.”338 In particular, the court observed that the 
text, for instance, ‘Web search results for hearts on fire,’ prominently displayed 
above the search results in response to an online user’s search for the ‘hearts on 
fire’ trade mark, constituted ‘displays associated’ within the meaning of the 
Lanham Act’s definitions section.339 
Some courts found ‘use in commerce,’ stressing that consumers can 
perceive use of trade marks as keywords. A district court in the Third Circuit held 
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in J.G. Wentworth that the defendant “crossed the line from internal use to use in 
commerce under the Lanham Act” since it created an opportunity to “reach 
consumers via alleged purchase and/or use of a protected trademark.”340 The 
court distinguished this case from the WhenU.com line of cases in that those 
cases did not relate to ‘the purchase’ of trade marks and concerned use of 
‘domain addresses’ in the defendant’s database.341  
Moreover, the decision of the Second Circuit in Rescuecom caused a 
large majority of federal courts to regard use of trade marks in paid search 
marketing as constituting use in commerce. In Network Automation, the Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit, admitting that the Ninth Circuit had 
assumed previously, “without expressly deciding,” that use of trade marks as 
keywords is use in commerce under the Lanham Act.
342
 
As to the interpretation of likelihood of confusion, many courts, which 
found advertisers liable for use of trade marks in metatags, interpreted the 
concept broadly by adopting an initial interest confusion theory. In Brookfield 
Communications, a case about use of a trade mark both in a metatag and a 
domain name, the Ninth Circuit concluded that an advertiser’s use of the trade 
mark in a metatag was inadmissible on the ground of the existence of initial 
interest confusion, comparing use of a trade mark to putting up a billboard on a 
highway.
343
 It denied likelihood of confusion because the entry of “MovieBuff” 
into a search box could bring up a list which embraced both West Coast’s and 
Brookfield’s websites and the domain name of West Coast’s website, 
‘westcoastvideo.com,’ would not cause consumer confusion. 344  The Circuit, 
however, found initial interest confusion in the sense that “West Coast improperly 
benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its mark.”345 It also 
stressed the stronger possibility of confusion in an online world than in an offline 
world in its decision about use of a trade mark in a domain name.
346
 In another 
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metatag case, Promatek Industries, the Seventh Circuit decided that the degree of 
consumer care could create a likelihood of initial consumer confusion, adopting 
the test in Brookfield Communications.
347
  
Likelihood of confusion was also broadly construed by federal courts in 
determining advertisers’ liability for use of trade marks as keywords. In 
Australian Gold, after assessing the presence of initial interest confusion 
according to the six-prong likelihood of confusion test, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that consumer confusion was likely.
348
 The Circuit explained three 
kinds of damage to trade marks that initial interest confusion causes: “(1) the 
original diversion of the prospective customer’s interest to a source that he or she 
erroneously believes is authorized; (2) the potential consequent effect of that 
diversion on the customer’s ultimate decision whether to purchase caused by an 
erroneous impression that two sources of a product may be associated; and (3) the 
initial credibility that the would-be buyer may accord to the infringer’s products-
customer consideration that otherwise may be unwarranted and that may be built 
on the strength of the protected mark, reputation and goodwill.”349  
In some keyword cases, federal courts further expanded the scope of 
likely confusion by combining initial interest confusion with the so-called internet 
troika. In Perfumebay.com, the Ninth Circuit ruled that there was actionable 
initial interest confusion on the ground that the similarity of marks, the marketing 
channel utilised, and the similarity of products weighed against Perfumebay.
350
 
In Storus, a district court in the Ninth Circuit also found initial interest confusion 
to be likely on the ground of the internet trilogy.
351
 
Although not limiting consumer confusion to point-of-sale confusion, 
some courts required more than mere diversion of consumer attention in order for 
confusion to be likely in metatag or keyword cases. This strictness did not mean 
that advertisers’ use of trade marks was beyond the reach of trade mark protection. 
Although denying mere diversion, courts found advertisers responsible. In 
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Venture Tape, the First Circuit concluded that metatags and invisible background 
text on the website incorporating trade marks caused a likelihood of confusion, 
after conducting the eight part Pignons analysis.
352
 Without mentioning initial 
interest confusion, the First Circuit implied that “strong circumstantial evidence 
of pre-sale confusion was sufficient to sustain summary judgment for the 
plaintiff.”353 In Hearts on Fire, a district court in the First Circuit also asserted 
that likelihood of confusion should be based on the eight-part test and “what the 
consumer saw on the screen and reasonably believed, given the context,” stating 
that “[m]ere diversion, without any hint of confusion, is not enough.”354 
In some cases, courts, which held advertisers liable for confusion, also 
found them liable for dilution. In Perfumebay.com, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that use of Perfumebay’s marks was likely to dilute the uniqueness of eBay’s 
mark, stating that “consumers [might] no longer associate the usage of the “Bay” 
suffix with eBay’s unique services, specifically the sale of products on an 
internet-based marketplace.”355 The Circuit, however, did not discuss sufficiently 
why use of Perfumebay’s marks could lead to this disassociation. 
On the other hand, other courts deny advertisers’ liability for their use of 
trade marks in metatags or as keywords by following the trade mark use doctrine, 
strictly interpreting likelihood of confusion, admitting the higher level of 
consumer care, or accepting broad defences.  
Courts in the Second Circuit denied advertisers’ liability on the ground 
that use of trade marks as metatags or keywords did not constitute ‘use’ within the 
meaning of the Lanham Act before the Second Circuit’ decision in Rescuecom.356 
In Merck, a district court in the Second Circuit ruled that defendants’ purchase of 
the ‘ZOCOR’ marks as keywords did not constitute infringing use of trade marks 
because “defendants [did] not ‘place’ the ZOCOR marks on any goods or 
containers or displays or associated documents, nor [did] they use them in any 
way to indicate source or sponsorship” and that “the ZOCOR mark [was] ‘used’ 
only in the sense that a computer user’s search of the keyword ‘Zocor’ [would] 
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trigger the display of sponsored links to defendants’ websites.”357 The court 
further asserted that this internal use was analogous to an individual’s private 
thoughts about a trade mark, citing pop-up advertisement cases which occurred 
between trade mark proprietors and an online marketing company.
358
 The court 
also emphasised that “there [was] nothing improper with defendants’ purchase of 
sponsored links to their websites” since Zocor products manufactured by the 
plaintiff Merck’s Canadian affiliates was sold on defendants’ websites.359  
In Site Pro-1, a district court in the Second Circuit also held that Better 
Metal’s use of Site Pro-1’s trade mark in a metatag and as a keyword did not 
constitute use of trade marks within the meaning of the Lanham Act because 
Better Metal did not place plaintiff's SITE PRO 1®  trade mark on any goods, 
displays, containers, or advertisements and did not use the trade mark in any way 
that indicated source or origin.
360
 The district court reached the same conclusion 
in FragranceNet.com, agreeing with the reasoning of the courts in Merck and Site 
Pro-1.
361
  
Moreover, the district court concluded that there was no use of trade 
marks even where trade marks appeared in advertisements on a SERP. In S&L 
Vitamins, S&L Vitamins made use of Australian Gold’s ‘Australian Gold’ and 
‘Swedish Beauty’ marks in metatags and as keywords.362 S&L Vitamins also 
used these marks in its advertisement displayed on the website of a search 
engine.
363
 In this case, the district court held that S&L Vitamins did not use trade 
marks in the trade mark sense because it really sold the trade marked products on 
its website.
364
  
Some courts, without following the trade mark use doctrine, denied 
advertisers’ liability on the ground that consumer confusion was not likely. In 
Standard Process, a district court in the Seventh Circuit found no likelihood of 
confusion in Dr. Banks’s use of Standard Process’s trade mark in a metatag, 
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reasoning that search engines no longer used metatags as indicators of relevancy 
in the algorithms of ranking websites and consumers could purchase unaltered SP 
Products on Dr. Banks’s website. 365  Interestingly, the latter reasoning was 
employed in S&L Vitamins to suggest that no trade mark use was made. 
A district court in the Ninth Circuit also concluded in Designer Skin that 
S&L Vitamins’ use of Designer Skin’s trade mark in metatags and as keywords 
did not generate initial interest confusion because the use was for the purpose of 
describing the content of S&L Vitamins’ websites. 366  This district court 
considered the Tenth Circuit’s finding in Australian Gold to be unpersuasive.367 
Another court interpreted initial interest confusion narrowly to reject a 
plaintiff’s likelihood of confusion claim, emphasising that consumers were not 
“taken by a search engine” to the defendant’s website.368 In J.G. Wentworth, a 
district court in the Third Circuit found no likelihood of confusion in use of trade 
marked keywords because i) a link which was displayed in response to the entry 
of a trade mark was “one of many choices”, ii) links were independent and 
distinct on SERPs, and iii) advertisements and links did not include trade 
marks.
369
  
Moreover, in a recent keyword case, the level of consumer care together 
with the labelling and position of paid results played a significant role in finding 
no likelihood of confusion. In Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
initial interest confusion was not likely because the default degree of consumer 
care rose and advertisements were displayed under the separate title of ‘sponsored 
links,’ holding that the internet troika is not proper for keyword cases.370  
Defences were interpreted more broadly among courts that did not find 
advertisers liable, compared to courts that held them liable. In Brookfield 
Communications, the Ninth Circuit did not accept a fair use defence in use of 
trade marks as metatags because i) the descriptive term meaning ‘a motion picture 
enthusiast’ was not ‘MovieBuff’ but ‘Movie Buff’ and ii) MovieBuff was not 
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used to indicate Brookfield’s products, but to describe West Coast’s products and 
to divert consumer attention to West Coast’s website.371 The same Circuit, 
however, concluded in Playboy that Welles’s inclusion of trade marked terms 
‘playboy’ and ‘playmate’ in metatags was permissible fair use because these 
terms “accurately describe[d] the contents of Welles’ website, in addition to 
describing Welles.”372  
A district court in the Ninth Circuit also applied a nominative fair use 
defence to a keyword case. The court held that S&L Vitamins’ use of Designer 
Skin’s trade marks in its metatags and as keywords could be defended by the 
nominative fair use defence to dilution-based liability, on the grounds that the use 
was intended to “accurately identify the contents of its websites” and satisfied the 
three-part test for nominative fair use.
373
   
 Similarly, in Tiffany (NJ), after the decision in Rescuecom, the Second 
Circuit concluded that the use of Tiffany’s mark on eBay’s website and in 
sponsored links did not amount to direct trade mark infringement on the basis of 
nominative fair use, stating that “eBay used the mark to describe accurately the 
genuine Tiffany goods offered for sale on its website” and that “none of eBay’s 
uses of the mark suggested that Tiffany affiliated itself with eBay or endorsed the 
sale of its products through eBay’s website.”374 
In sum, US court decisions are split as to advertisers’ liability for use of 
trade marks in metatags and as keywords on the basis of the different evaluation 
of factual contexts and the disparate interpretation of requirements for and 
exceptions from trade mark liability. This inconsistency cannot ensure the 
predictability that both trade mark owners and advertisers would desire. 
 
2) Liability of Search Engines 
 
Trade mark disputes in paid search marketing have also arisen between 
trade mark owners and search engines. Like their attitudes towards advertisers’ 
liability in metatags and keyword cases between trade mark proprietors and 
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advertisers, US courts have not had a common position as to search engines’ 
liability. While some courts regarded search engines’ use as constituting 
actionable use or further found liability based on confusion, others did not hold 
search engines liable. Court positions on search engines’ liability in paid search 
marketing are closely related to those on search engines’ use of trade marks as 
keywords in pop-up or banner advertising. 
Some federal courts found that search engines’ use was actionable. In 
GEICO I, a district court in the Fourth Circuit decided that the sale of a trade 
mark as a keyword constituted ‘use of a trade mark’, taking into account the 
inclusion of the mark in advertisements and Google’s overall control of its 
advertising programme.
375
 In GEICO II, however, the court did not find a 
likelihood of confusion stemming from the sale, holding that there was a 
likelihood of confusion only with regard to sponsored links that included 
GEICO’s trade mark in their headings or text.376  
In 800-JR Cigar,
377
 a district court in the Third Circuit additionally 
considered the location of paid search results and search engines’ 
recommendation of trade marks to advertisers in determining whether there was 
an actionable trade mark use. It held that GoTo.com made use of the JR marks by 
accepting bids from advertisers, ranking paid advertisers before any “natural” 
listings in a search results list, and recommending a keyword through the Search 
Term Suggestion Tool.
378
 The court, however, did not conclude whether 
confusion was likely on the ground that many factors were in dispute.
379
  
In Rescuecom, the Second Circuit also regarded the recommendation as a 
use in commerce, holding that “Google display[ed], offer[ed], and s[old] 
Rescuecom’s mark to Google’s advertising customers when selling its advertising 
services” and that “Google encourage[d] the purchase of Rescuecom’s mark 
through its Keyword Suggestion Tool.”380 The Circuit distinguished this case 
from 1-800 Contacts in that i) a search term in 1-800 Contacts alleged to trigger 
pop-up advertisements was not the plaintiff's trade mark, but its website address, 
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and ii) advertisers could not request or purchase keywords from the defendant to 
cause their advertisements to appear.
381
 Moreover, it suggested that use of a trade 
mark in an internal software programme could constitute trade mark use and 
cause confusion, commenting that the previous decisions of courts in the Second 
Circuit
382
 “over-read” 1-800.383  
In Rosetta Stone, the Fourth Circuit even regarded a search engine’s trade 
mark policy as its use of trade marks, concluding that summary judgment on a 
trade mark infringement claim was not warranted.
384
 The Circuit held that it 
assumed that “Google’s policy permitting advertisers to use Rosetta Stone’s 
marks as keywords in the AdWords program and to use Rosetta Stone’s marks in 
the text of advertisements constituted an unauthorized use “in commerce” and “in 
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any 
goods or services.””385 
Several courts further held that search engines’ use generated actionable 
likelihood of confusion. Regarding banner advertisements, in Playboy, the Ninth 
Circuit found a search engine liable without explicitly discussing the trade mark 
use issue.
386
 The court held that a majority of factors favoured likelihood of 
initial interest confusion and thus a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the 
likelihood of confusion resulting from Netscape’ use of PEI’s marks.387 In 
particular, the Circuit acknowledged that consumer care for materials with an 
adult-oriented and graphic nature is expected to be so low that consumers are 
“easily diverted from a specific product he or she is seeking if other options, 
particularly graphic ones, appear more quickly.”388  
Similarly, in a keyword case, American Blind & Wallpaper, a district 
court in the Ninth Circuit ruled that Google’s sale of American Blind’s mark as a 
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keyword in the AdWords programme constituted use in commerce for the 
purpose of the Lanham Act
389
 and that the sale caused a likelihood of confusion 
in spite of Google’s argument that “actions of participants in AdWords should not 
be treated as actions of Google.”390 In this case, the court presumed a low degree 
of consumer care without analysing the price or nature of products and regarded 
Google’s intent to maximise profits as contributing to the existence of likelihood 
of confusion.
391
  
Moreover, courts that found search engines liable appeared to interpret 
defences strictly. In Playboy, the Ninth Circuit did not accept fair use, nominative 
fair use, and functional use defences, on the grounds that i) “a fair use may not be 
a confusing use,” ii) “[Netscape] could use other words, besides PEI’s marks, to 
trigger adult-oriented banner advertisements” and thus could not satisfy the first 
requirement of nominative use, and iii) “[n]othing about the marks used to 
identify PEI’s products [wa]s a functional part of the design of those products.”392 
In contrast, other courts have not found search engines liable, based on 
the trade mark use doctrine, the functionality doctrine, and the broad 
interpretation of defences. District courts in the Fourth and the Sixth Circuits, and 
the Second Circuit
393
 adopted the trade mark use doctrine in a series of 
WhenU.com cases about pop-up advertisements. In U-Haul, a district court in the 
Fourth Circuit found that use of a trade mark in a pop-up advertisement was not 
use in commerce because i) the pop up advertisement appeared in a window, 
separate and distinct from the window where the U-Haul website was displayed, 
ii) the mere fact that “trademarks [were] simultaneously visible to a consumer” 
did not establish ‘use,’ iii) WhenU’s incorporation of U-Haul’s URL and ‘U-Haul’ 
in the directory was only a use for the “pure machine-linking function” and 
WhenU did not sell or display the U-Haul URL or the word ‘U-Haul’ to computer 
users, and iv) the SaveNow programme was installed by internet users, so it did 
not hinder their access to U-Haul’s website “in such a manner that WhenU [used] 
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U-Haul’s trademarks.”394 The court, however, did not address a likelihood of 
confusion issue.  
In Wells Fargo, a district court in the Sixth Circuit decided that there was 
no use in commerce on similar grounds.
395
 It also held that the confusion 
requirement was not satisfied because i) users of WhenU’s software SaveNow got 
used to receiving advertisements provided by WhenU, ii) WhenU indicated that 
advertisements came from it, and iii) advertisements were displayed in a separate 
window.
396
  
By contrast, in 1-800 Contacts, a district court in the Second Circuit held 
that WhenU.com used the trade mark i) by triggering the appearance of pop-up 
advertisements in response to users’ attempt to access 1-800 Contacts’ website, 
and ii) by involving 1-800 Contacts’ URL, a version of the trade mark, in the 
WhenU.com directory.
397
 It also admitted both source confusion and initial 
interest confusion.
398
  
This decision was remanded by the Second Circuit. It found that the 
inclusion of 1-800’s website address in the directory did not constitute use in 
commerce since i) WhenU did not “place” 1-800’s trade mark on products in 
order to confuse consumers as to source, ii) the input, by computer users, of the 
trade mark could not trigger pop-up advertisements, and iii) WhenU neither 
unveiled the directory nor sold specific keywords to advertisers.
399
 It asserted 
that “internal utilization of a trademark in a way that does not communicate it to 
the public” is similar to “an individual’s private thoughts about a trademark.”400 
Moreover, the Second Circuit found that not only the internal use but also 
triggering pop-up advertisements was not use in commerce since i) pop-up 
advertisements appeared in a separate window and did not include the 1-800 trade 
mark, ii) they did not appear in response to 1-800’s trade mark, the trade mark’s 
appearance on 1-800’s website, or the mark’s similarity to 1-800’s website 
address, and iii) WhenU did not sell keyword trade marks or otherwise 
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manipulate the display of advertisements.
401
 The Court also mentioned likelihood 
of confusion briefly in a footnote, finding that a confusion claim was doubtful, 
given the fact that SaveNow users received various WhenU pop-up 
advertisements “in varying contexts and for a broad range of products.”402  
In Rescuecom, a district court in the Second Circuit used similar 
reasoning, holding that there was no confusion-based or dilution-based liability 
on the ground of non-trade mark use.
403
 As was mentioned before, on appeal, this 
decision was vacated by the Second Circuit.
404
 
After the Second Circuit’s decision in Rescuecom, the Rosetta Stone 
court in the Fourth Circuit raised an issue of functionality doctrine,
405
 which had 
been already addressed in Playboy, following the opposite direction. The court 
held that Google’ use did not constitute trade mark infringement since keywords 
had an essential indexing function by which Google identified in its databases 
relevant information in response to a query.
406
 The court even mentioned that 
“the keywords affect the cost and quality of Google’s AdWords program because 
absent third party advertisers’ ability to bid on trade marked terms as keyword 
triggers, Google would be required to create an alternative system for displaying 
paid advertisements on its website-a system which is potentially more costly and 
less effective in generating relevant advertisements.”407 Here the focus was on 
the internal functionality of the keywords for the search engine rather than the 
functional nature of the name itself. 
Moreover, the Rosetta Stone court adopted the trade mark use doctrine 
based on a fair use defence in determining dilution-based liability, finding that 
Google was not responsible for trade mark dilution “[a]bsent proof that Google 
use[d] the Rosetta Stone Marks to identify its own goods and services.”408 The 
district court also denied a likelihood of confusion claim on the basis of Google’s 
intent, lack of proving actual confusion, and consumer sophistication.
409
 In 
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particular, the court found that consumers were capable of distinguishing between 
paid search results and natural results, considering that products were expensive 
and consumers were well-educated.
410
 The district court’s conclusion as to the 
functionality doctrine, the trade mark use theory, and likelihood of confusion was 
remanded by the Fourth Circuit.
411
 
On the whole, US courts treated search engines’ liability diversely. They 
evaluated contexts differently and applied the different interpretation of the 
Lanham Act to paid search marketing cases. 
 
2. ECJ 
 
 The ECJ has attempted to provide consistent guidance as to the liability 
of advertisers and search engines in paid search marketing since its first decision 
in the Google joined cases: it found the possibility of advertisers’ liability, while 
denying search engines’ responsibility. 
 Several recent cases were brought before the ECJ. Among them are the 
Google joined cases including Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, Google 
France v. Viaticum, and Google France v. CNRRH (“Google joined cases”),412 
BergSpechte,
413
 Portakabin,
414
 L’Oréal,415 and Interflora.416  
 
1) Liability of Advertisers 
 
 In the Google joined cases, Advocate General Maduro distinguished 
advertisers’ selection of keywords from the display of an advertisement because 
consumers in the former were advertisers while internet users constituted 
consumers in the latter.
417
 Based on this distinction, the Advocate General 
rejected advertisers’ liability on the ground that the selection was just private, not 
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“a commercial activity with a view to gain.”418 He also reasoned that if such 
selection was regarded as infringing a trade mark right, it could result in the 
prevention of all legitimate uses such as purely descriptive use and comparative 
advertising.
419
 
 The ECJ, however, held in favour of trade mark proprietors, ruling that 
they could prohibit advertisers from advertising under article 5(1)(a) of the EU 
Trade Mark Directive. According to the ECJ, advertisers’ selection of keywords 
constituted ‘use in the course of trade’ since trade marks selected as keywords 
were the means to trigger the display of advertisements.
420
 The court also 
regarded such selection as constituting use ‘in relation to goods or services,’ on 
the grounds that a list of the types of use prescribed in article 5(3) of the EU 
Trade Mark Directive and article 9(2) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation 
was not exhaustive, and advertisers intended to offer their products to internet 
users as an alternative to trade mark proprietors’ products or sought to confuse 
them as to origin.
421
  
Moreover, the ECJ found that the selection could have an adverse effect 
on the function of indicating origin even where trade marks are not used in 
advertisements. Where the text of advertisements implies an economic link 
between trade mark proprietors and advertisers, “the conclusion must be that 
there is an adverse effect on the function of indicating origin.”422 Even where 
advertisements, without suggesting such an economic link, are equivocal on the 
origin of products, the conclusion must be the same if “normally informed and 
reasonably attentive internet users are unable to determine, on the basis of the 
advertising link and the commercial message attached thereto, whether the 
advertiser is a third party vis-à-vis the proprietor of the trade mark or, on the 
contrary, economically linked to that proprietor.”423 The Court also emphasised 
the importance of contexts, stating that in a situation where advertisements appear 
in response to the entry of trade marks as keywords and at the same time the trade 
marked keywords remain on screens, “internet user[s] may err as to the origin of 
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the goods or services in question” and advertisers’ use of trade marks “is liable to 
create the impression that there is a material link in the course of trade between 
the goods or services in question and the proprietor[s] of the trade mark[s].”424 
By contrast, the Court found that the advertising function was not likely 
to be adversely affected because the display of home and advertising pages of 
trade mark owners in a list of natural results meant the visibility of proprietors’ 
products, irrespective of the display in paid results.
425
 As to dilution, the ECJ 
stated that the taking of unfair advantage was relevant “where advertisers on the 
internet offer[ed] for sale, through the use of signs identical with reputable trade 
marks such as “Louis Vuitton” or “Vuitton,” goods which [were] imitations of the 
goods of the proprietor of those marks,” citing its previous decision in L’Oréal.426  
 Right after the decision in the Google joined cases,
427
 the ECJ designed a 
similar path on another paid search marketing case, BergSpechte. In this case, 
article 5(1)(b) was also discussed because the keyword ‘Edi Koblmüller’ was not 
identical with BergSpechte’s Austrian figurative and word mark. The ECJ 
concluded that there was use in the course of trade, reasoning that the selected 
keyword was the means to trigger the display of advertisements and that the mark 
was used in relation to goods or services, regardless of the inclusion of the mark 
in the advertisements on a SERP.
428
 The ECJ also emphasised the manner in 
which advertisements were displayed in determining the effect on the origin 
function of the mark for the purpose of article 5(1)(a). With regard to likelihood 
of confusion under article 5(1)(b), the ECJ made a similar decision as it did as to 
the effect on the function of indicating source.
429
 Unlike its decision in the 
Google joined cases, the ECJ did not make a judgment about a search engine’s 
liability since the search engine was not a party in this case. 
 The Portakabin case concerns the resale of used products. Primakabin 
sold and leased new and used mobile buildings, including used units 
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manufactured by Portakabin.
430
  Primakabin replaced Portakabin’s trade mark 
fixed on used Portakabin products with its own in some instances.
431
 For the 
purpose of marketing, Primakabin purchased from Google the keywords 
“portakabin”, “portacabin”, “portokabin” and “portocabin” which were identical 
with, or similar to, Portakabin’s Benelux trade mark PORTAKABIN.432 The 
heading of Primakabin’s advertisement displayed on a SERP was altered from 
“new and used units” to “used portakabins.”433 Because of Primakabin’s resale of 
Portakabin’s products, this case concerned not only article 5 but also articles 6 
and 7 of the EU Trade Mark Directive.  
As to article 5, the ECJ reached the same conclusion: where a third 
party’s advertisement on a SERP suggests an economic link between the third 
party and the proprietor of a trade mark, or where the advertisement only shows, 
without suggesting an economic link, the origin of products so vaguely that 
normally informed and reasonably attentive internet users are unable to determine 
the origin, the trade mark’s origin function would be likely to be adversely 
affected or consumer confusion would be likely.
434
  
At the same time, the ECJ, in principle, did not admit defences under 
articles 6(1)(b) and (c) by linking the interpretation of ‘honest practices’ to the 
standard for the adverse effect on trade mark functions and likelihood of 
confusion. The Court found that, “in general,” an advertiser’s use of a trade mark 
as a keyword, which is liable to be prohibited in accordance with article 5, cannot 
be regarded as an action “in accordance with honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters,” and thus it cannot constitute the exception under article 
6(1).
435
  
  Moreover, the ECJ also stated that the circumstances in which use of a 
trade mark as a keyword is prevented under article 5 of the Directive “correspond 
to a situation in which art.7(2) of that directive applies,” giving guidance to the 
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national court as regards this case.
436
 It held that the national court cannot find a 
legitimate reason only because an advertiser uses another person’s trade mark 
with additional wording such as used or second-hand, and therefore the use 
cannot be prohibited.
437
 Nevertheless, the ECJ suggested that the national court 
should find a legitimate reason within the meaning of article 7(2) where the trade 
mark PORTAKABIN had been eliminated from used mobile buildings and 
replaced with the word ‘Primakabin’438  
 The L’Oréal case is about online marketplace operator eBay’s use of 
keywords corresponding to L’Oréal’s trade marks. In this case, Advocate General 
Jääskinen opined that eBay’s selection and purchase of L’Oréal’s trade marks 
constituted ‘use as trade marks’ in that it used the trade marks to distinguish 
between the products that were traded on eBay’s marketplace and those that were 
not, or to offer an alternative source of the same products bearing L’Oréal’s trade 
marks regarding L’Oréal’s distribution network.439 On the other hand, he stated 
that the use would not adversely affect the origin and advertising functions of the 
trade marks.
440
 He added that possible problems arising from market participants’ 
conduct could not be attributed to the marketplace operator unless national law 
provides for indirect liability.
441
  
 The ECJ, admitting the peculiarities of this case, stated that only insofar 
as eBay used keywords corresponding to L’Oréal’s trade marks “to promote its 
customer-sellers’ offers for sale of goods bearing those marks,” the use was made 
for products identical with L’Oréal’s products.442 As to eBay’s liability, however, 
the ECJ basically took the same position as that in the Google joined cases, 
BergSpechte, and Portakabin, finding that a trade mark proprietor can prevent an 
online marketplace operator from promoting products bearing a trade mark 
through use of the trade mark as a keyword, “where that advertising does not 
enable reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant internet users, or 
enables them only with difficulty, to ascertain whether the goods concerned 
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originate from the proprietor of the trade mark or from an undertaking 
economically linked to that proprietor or, on the contrary, originate from a third 
party.”443  
 Advocate General Jääskinen again gave the opinion in Interflora, a 
conflict between Marks & Spencer (“M&S”) and Interflora.444 M&S purchased 
‘interflora,’ modifications of ‘interflora’ with ‘minor errors,’ and expressions 
including ‘interflora’ as keywords.445 As a result internet users’ entry of one of 
them as a search term into the Google search engine triggered the display of 
M&S’s advertisement under the heading ‘sponsored links,’ but the advertisement 
did not contain the word ‘interflora.’446 The Advocate General suggested in this 
case that where an advertisement does not include a trade mark, the likelihood of 
an adverse effect on the origin function under article 5(1)(a) hinges on “the nature 
of goods and services” protected by the trade mark, considering both “the scope 
of protection registered for the trade mark” and “the meaning and repute the trade 
mark has acquired through use in the minds of the relevant sector of the 
public.”447 He concluded that there is an adverse effect on the origin function 
when a competitor’s display of an advertisement on a SERP is liable to cause 
consumers to believe that the competitor is “a member of the trade mark 
proprietor’s commercial network.”448  
Advocate General Jääskinen, however, did not support a dilution-based 
liability for M&S under article 5(2), focusing on the content of advertisements. 
Dilution by blurring in the sense of degeneration was not likely to occur because 
the trade mark INTERFLORA was not used as a generic term in M&S’s 
advertisement.
449
 Moreover, the likelihood of tarnishment could not arise since 
M&S’s products did not possess a characteristic or a quality which could affect 
the image of INTERFLORA negatively.
450
 There was no dilution by free-riding 
because M&S’s selection of keywords suggested “a marketing message that they 
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offer an alternative to Interflora,” which constituted ‘due cause’.451  
 In this case, the ECJ mentioned the impact on the investment function. It 
found that the investment function is likely to be adversely affected “if [an 
advertiser’s use] substantially interferes with the proprietor’s use of its trade mark 
to acquire or preserve a reputation capable of attracting consumers and retaining 
their loyalty.”452 On the other hand, it stated that both the facts that “the only 
consequence of [the advertisers’] use is to oblige the proprietor of that trade mark 
to adapt its efforts to acquire or preserve a reputation capable of attracting 
consumers and retaining their loyalty” and that “[the advertisers’] use may 
prompt some consumers to switch” from trade marked products cannot adversely 
affect the investment function.
453
 
 Moreover, the ECJ admitted the possibility of blurring in the sense of 
degeneration, diverging from the opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen. The 
Court found that blurring would be likely “if the advertising did not enable the 
reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant internet user to tell that the 
service promoted by M&S is independent from that of Interflora and if Interflora 
were to seek a finding that M&S has also caused detriment to the distinctive 
character of the INTERFLORA trade mark by contributing to turning it into a 
generic term.”454 As to unfair advantage, the ECJ considered the advantage 
acquired by third party selection of a famous mark as a keyword to be unfair 
because such a selection was made for the purpose of obtaining “a real advantage 
from the distinctive character and repute of the trade mark” “without paying any 
financial compensation” to the proprietor of the famous mark.455 The Court, 
however, held that the taking of unfair advantage could not be found where the 
selection was not intended to offer the imitations of the proprietor’s products, but 
just to provide an alternative to them.
456
 It reasoned that the selection constituted 
‘due cause’ within the meaning of the Directive and the Regulation.457 
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2) Liability of Search Engines 
 
At both the Advocate General and the ECJ level, little discussion was 
made on search engines’ liability, compared to the discussion on advertisers’ 
liability.  
In the Google joined cases, Advocate General Maduro distinguished 
between Google’s permission for advertisers to select trade marks as keywords 
and Google’s display of advertisements in response to the entry of keywords 
because of their differences in the timing of occurrence, target consumers, and 
relevant products.
458
 Based on this distinction, the Advocate General denied 
Google’s responsibility for the permission because “AdWords [wa]s not identical 
or similar to any of the goods or services covered by the trade marks” and thus it 
did not amount to use ‘in relation to goods or services.’459 The Advocate General 
also denied Google’s liability for the display, on the ground that the display did 
not affect trade mark functions.
460
 The Advocate General found no adverse effect 
on the origin function, reasoning that internet users would assess the origin of 
products “on the basis of the content of the ad and by visiting the advertised 
sites.”461 Other functions were also regarded as not being adversely affected 
because the interests of trade mark proprietors did not outweigh consumer 
benefits to obtain the information that did not cause confusion.
462
  
On the other hand, the ECJ did not find Google liable for both confusion 
and dilution, on the ground that the creation of the technical conditions necessary 
for use of a sign and the receipt of the payment for that service did not constitute 
‘use of trade marks.’463 
 
3. Korean Courts 
 
                                         
458
 Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier (Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08 and C-238/08) 
[2010] E.T.M.R. 30, 521 
459
 Id. at 523 
460
 Id. at 526-531 
461
 Id. at 527 
462
 Id. at 528-531 
463
 Id. at 551, 558 
115 
 
Although there is only one decision of the Supreme Court of Korea as to 
trade mark use in paid search marketing, a number of other relevant decisions are 
conducive to the understanding of the Court’s future position. 
The Supreme Court of Korea has consistently construed ‘use of trade 
marks’ as meaning ‘use as trade marks’ based on the fact that only use as trade 
marks can infringe trade mark rights,
464
 or additionally that use of marks for the 
purpose of trade mark infringement should fall under the acts defined in article 
2(1)(vi) of the Trade Mark Act.
465
 The Court, however, has explained neither 
why trade mark infringement can arise only from use as trade marks nor why 
article 2(1)(vi) of the Act also applies to trade mark liability. 
Moreover, the notion of ‘use as trade marks’ has been interpreted in terms 
of the origin function. Trade marks should be used to indicate the origin of 
products. In determining this, the Court has considered factors such as the relation 
of marks to products, the form of their use (the location and size of marks used on 
products), their fame, and users’ intent.466 Therefore, ‘use of trade marks’ hinges 
on the factual context in which marks are employed. 
In Pachulpaksa, a case about Korean keyword domain names,
467
 the 
registrant of the Korean keyword domain name ‘파출박사’(pronounced 
‘pachulpaksa’) linked this keyword to its website ‘www.pachulpaksa.com’ where 
it provided information about job opportunities;
468
 the entry of the keyword into 
the internet address bar of a web browser triggered the defendant’s website.469 
Against the defendant, the proprietor of the Korean service mark ‘파출박사’ 
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(pronounced ‘pachulpaksa’) for employment agencies filed a suit, claiming that 
the registration and use of the Korean keyword domain name similar to the 
service mark amounted to ‘unfair competitive acts’ under the Korean Unfair 
Competition Act or an infringement on its trade mark right and hence the 
defendant should cancel the registration of the Korean keyword domain name.  
In this case, the Seoul High Court found trade mark infringement, on the 
grounds that i) the keyword domain name was identical with the service mark, ii) 
the defendant used the keyword domain name as a service mark by providing job 
information on the website triggered by the Korean keyword domain name, and 
iii) the defendant’s service was identical with, or similar to, the service for which 
the service mark was registered. 
This conclusion was reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that 
the registration and use of the Korean keyword domain name did not function as 
an indication of source because i) its original purpose was not to indicate source, 
ii) it did not appear in the internet address bar of the defendant’s website, unlike a 
general domain name, and iii) the defendant’s own mark was displayed on the left 
upper hand side of the defendant’s website, functioning as an indication of source. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court stated in ‘Jangsuondol’470 and ‘Mahamall’471 cases 
that the determination as to whether use of a domain name constitutes use as a 
mark should rely on whether the domain name performs the origin and 
distinguishing functions in the light of the form of its use and the content of a 
user’s website to which it is linked. 
The NHN case between an internet search engine and an online 
advertising company also concerns the interpretation of ‘use as trade marks.’472 
NHN Corporation operated a Korean internet portal and search engine ‘Naver,’ 
and Neoconsoft developed an online advertising system.
473
 According to this 
system, advertisements provided by Neoconsoft appeared to internet users who 
had downloaded the software of that system when they visited the Naver 
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website.
474
 These advertisements were displayed on the margin of the website, 
blocked the display of advertisements offered by NHN, or were inserted between 
advertisements presented by NHN.
475
   
The Seoul High Court construed ‘use’ as meaning ‘use in the manner that 
indicates origin’ on the ground that the purpose of the Korean Unfair Competition 
Act is to prohibit unfair competitive acts which could cause confusion as to 
source. Based on this interpretation, the Court held that there was no use and 
hence no unfair competitive act because Neoconsoft removed the possibility of 
confusion
476
 by, for example, indicating in the lower part of advertisements that 
‘the content is offered by internet channel 21.’477 On the other hand, the High 
Court found Neoconsoft liable under the tort provision of the Civil Law, 
reasoning that Neoconsoft used NHN’s reputation and power of attracting 
consumers without NHN’s consent and would ride on the coat-tails of NHN’s 
long-standing efforts and investment.
478
 The Supreme Court found Neoconsoft’s 
liability of torts under article 750 of the Civil Law without determining whether 
there was use as a mark.
479
  
In NHN concerning Neoconsoft’s criminal liability, the Seoul High Court 
denied the liability on the ground of non-trade mark use. The Court reasoned that 
i) Neoconsoft made use of a search engine Naver as space for advertising but it 
did not use NHN’s mark Naver to indicate its origin for the purpose of utilising 
the distinctiveness of the mark, that ii) users valued the content of information 
rather than suppliers of information, that iii) users, who had agreed with the 
installation of Neoconsoft’ software programme, generally recognised that 
Neoconsoft would present advertisements on the Naver’s website, and that iv) 
NHN itself did not have little recognition that it used the distinctiveness of its 
mark in doing its advertising business.
480
 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision, finding actionable 
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use and likelihood of confusion.
481
 According to the Court, the facts that 
Neoconsoft’ advertisements did not have outlines and that there was no indication 
of source in the advertisements led to the conclusion that Neoconsoft used NHN’s 
mark and generated confusion by offering Neoconsoft’ advertisements in the form 
integrated with Naver’s display.482 This reasoning can be understood as meaning 
that context can show ‘use as marks’ even where there is no use in advertisements 
themselves.  
 In a recent paid search marketing case, the issue was whether third party 
use of trade marks in the title of paid search results constituted ‘use as trade 
marks.’ In VSP, the defendant purchased ‘VSP’ as a keyword which was identical 
with the Plaintiff’s registered trade mark for voltage surge protectors, voltage 
stabilisers, and circuit breakers.
483
 Thus, when internet users input ‘VSP’ into a 
search box, the defendant’s advertisement, including its title ‘VSP 엔티씨’ 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘VSP NTC’), for surge protectors, voltage sag 
protectors, and lightening protection systems was displayed on the screen.
484
 The 
Korean Patent Court found no trade mark use, on the grounds that VSP NTC 
constituted only links that connect the defendant’s advertisement to its website, 
and that VSP was not used on its website.
485
 The Supreme Court of Korea, 
however, concluded that the use of VSP NTC satisfied trade mark use 
requirement, reasoning that the use constituted an act of using a trade mark on 
advertisements under article 2(1)(vi)(c) of the Korean Trade Mark Act, and thus 
VSP NTC indicated the source of products.
486
 The finding that the use amounted 
to advertising was based on the text of an advertisement and the structure of paid 
search marketing that links an advertisement to the defendant’s website.487 The 
Court added that the fact that VSP was not used on the defendant’s website was 
just a situation that occurred after VSP NTC was used as a trade mark on the 
screen.
488
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 Despite this decision, the position of the Court as to invisible use of trade 
marks is still uncertain. This case concerns only trade marks included visibly in 
advertisements. The Court never mentioned the invisible use of trade marks. 
Moreover, no keyword case between proprietors and search engines has been 
brought before the Supreme Court of Korea and thus the Court’s precise attitude 
towards search engines’ use cannot be predicted.  
 
4. Comparative Perspective  
 
1) Liability of Advertisers 
 
 In paid search marketing, some US courts have protected trade mark 
owners’ interests rather than third party users’. They have sought to expand the 
scope of trade mark protection by widely recognising as actionable contexts 
where trade marks are used and by broadly interpreting liability requirements.  
 They regarded the context which computer users could not perceive as 
part of ‘contexts in which trade marks were used.’ Advertisers’ purchase of trade 
marked keywords from search engines occurs prior to internet users’ search for 
trade marks. Without any clear information on the purchase, computer users 
cannot be aware of advertisers’ purchase. The users can only feel that trade marks 
were somehow used in search engines’ programmes since the marks trigger 
advertisements some of which do not include the marks. Nevertheless, the 
purchase was considered use of trade marks in direct connection with advertisers’ 
product market. Some courts even stressed ‘the purchase’ to show that consumers 
could perceive advertisers’ use as trade marks.489 The purchase should have been 
deemed to be use of trade marks in a different product market that did not directly 
affect internet users’ perception. 
 Moreover, courts readily accepted likelihood of confusion by introducing 
initial interest confusion or the internet troika in keyword cases. By admitting 
initial interest confusion, some courts found confusion based solely on the 
diversion of consumer attention. The troika resulted in the shift in the burden of 
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proving confusion. The Ninth Circuit even combined these two in some cases.
490
 
At the same time, this court found dilution-based liability.
491
 
 On the other hand, other US courts have sought to limit the expansion of 
trade mark protection, by taking into account indirectly relevant contexts, strictly 
construing conditions for liability, and broadly interpreting defences. 
 First, courts held that the purchase did not satisfy the use requirement, 
interpreting the requirement as ‘use as trade marks.’492 The sale of trade mark 
owners’ products on advertisers’ websites was also considered a factor to deny 
‘use as marks.’493  
 Second, courts did not find confusion on the grounds of indirectly 
relevant contexts,
494
 the high degree of consumer care,
495
 or the partition 
between natural and paid search results.
496
 A district court in the Ninth Circuit 
denied confusion because use as keywords was intended to describe ‘the content 
of advertisers’ websites.’497 The Ninth Circuit, which did not find confusion, 
reasoned that the default degree of consumer care in online commerce was 
“becoming heightened” and advertisements appeared in the section labelled 
‘sponsored links.’498 
 Third, advertisers’ intention of identifying the content of advertisers’ 
websites via use as keywords was also used as evidence for nominative fair use. 
In Tiffany (NJ), the Second Circuit accepted a nominative fair use defence, on the 
ground that the use aimed at accurately describing products offered for sale on 
eBay’s website.499  
 Compared to US courts, the ECJ appears to have sought a balance 
between trade mark owners and advertisers by assessing the effect on the 
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essential function and consumer confusion based in principle on contexts that 
consumers could perceive on the screen. Even though it considered the selection 
and purchase to be an act of employing trade marks, it focused more on the 
selection than the purchase in the analysis of the use requirement. Moreover, the 
Court did not take into account ‘the content of advertisers’ websites’ in assessing 
use of marks, likelihood of confusion, and defences. Rather, it emphasised the 
manner in which advertisements were displayed and “the advertising link and the 
commercial message attached thereto” in assessing the effect on the essential 
function and confusion.
500
 
Nevertheless, the balance found in the decisions of the ECJ is still 
uncertain. It tilts in favour of advertisers to the extent that the ECJ regards 
internet users as the only relevant consumers. The ECJ considered that “normally 
informed and reasonably attentive internet users” are relevant consumers.501 This 
could heighten the default degree of consumer care for use of trade marks in an 
online world and hence help lower the likelihood of confusion. 
Meanwhile, the ECJ tips the balance towards trade mark owners by 
broadly protecting trade mark functions in cases where trade marks and products 
at issue are identical (“double identity cases”) and directly connecting defences 
with the effect on trade mark functions and confusion. First, in double identity 
cases, the ECJ protected proprietors more strongly by admitting that third party 
use could adversely affect the investment function of trade marks, whether the 
trade marks were famous or not. Second, by applying the same test for the 
adverse effect on the origin function and confusion to the analysis of ‘honest 
practices,’ the ECJ did not accept fair use defences when the adverse effect or 
confusion had been established.
502
 
 The position of the Supreme Court of Korea is not yet certain. The Court 
could deny trade mark protection, on the ground that internal use cannot satisfy 
the use requirement. It could reach opposite conclusion, relying on the text of 
advertisements and other contexts resulting from the entry of keywords. Still, it 
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can be suggested that the Supreme Court would not base a finding of non-use 
exclusively on the ground that use is invisible. And, probably, it would not 
consider the content of advertisers’ websites to be a directly relevant context. 
 
2) Liability of Search Engines 
 
 US courts were also split regarding search engines’ liability. Some courts 
that accorded trade mark protection broadened the scope of search engines’ use of 
trade marks in paid search marketing, including internal use in a software 
programme, the recommendation and sale of trade marked keywords,
503
 and even 
search engines’ trade mark policy.504 In particular, the ranking of advertisements 
was taken into account in determining confusion.
505
 Internet users’ degree of care 
was considered to be low.
506
 At the same time, they interpreted liability 
extensively but the limits of trade mark rights narrowly. Whilst accepting initial 
interest confusion, they did not construe the use requirement as meaning ‘use as 
marks.’507 Likelihood of confusion was an important factor to deny a fair use 
defence.
508
  
 Other US courts, which did not find search engines liable, understood the 
scope and meaning of search engines’ use in the opposite way. The 
recommendation of keywords and trade mark policy were not embraced in this 
scope. The use was considered to be for the purpose of “pure machine-linking 
function.”509 Moreover, these courts adopted the trade mark use theory.510 On 
the basis of this understanding and the trade mark use theory, they held that 
search engines’ use did not meet the use requirement. This means that even if 
search engines actively participate in creating the text of advertisements, they 
would not bear trade mark liability. In this sense, these courts tilted the balance in 
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favour of search engines in paid search marketing cases between trade mark 
owners and search engines. 
 In Rosetta Stone, a district court in the Fourth Circuit also favoured 
search engines over trade mark owners by broadly interpreting the functional use 
doctrine, finding no likelihood of confusion, and following the trade mark use 
theory in determining dilution-based liability.
511
 
 The position of the ECJ is very similar to that of the US courts adopting 
the trade mark use theory: the ECJ favoured search engines over trade mark 
owners. The ECJ stated that search engines “[were] not involved in use in the 
course of trade” but in “creating the technical conditions necessary for 
[advertisers’] use.”512 Moreover, the ECJ understood search engines’ action in a 
passive sense. According to the ECJ, the sale of trade marked keywords was no 
more than an action of “being paid for” the creation of technical conditions.513 
The ECJ stressed search engines’ role “in the drafting of the commercial message 
which accompanie[d] the advertising link or in the establishment or selection of 
keywords” only in relation to the restriction of the liability of intermediary 
service providers set out in article 14 of Directive 2000/31 on electronic 
commerce.
514
  
It is not evident whether the Supreme Court of Korea would find that 
search engines’ use constitutes ‘use as marks.’ The ambivalence of US and 
European courts on this issue shows the difficulties the Court will face. 
 
3) Conclusion 
 
US federal courts, the ECJ, and the Supreme Court of Korea have 
adopted various positions as to the liability of advertisers and search engines. In 
the USA, some show too much favour towards trade mark protection while others 
the opposite. Given the fact that there is no consistency even within the same 
                                         
511
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512
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circuit,
515
 these disparate approaches among US courts are not just because the 
federal appeals system consists of 13 federal circuits; it is also because US 
jurisprudence as to use of trade marks in paid search marketing is in the process 
of development. Moreover, in recent keyword cases including Tiffany,
516
 College 
Network,
517
 and Network Automation,
518
 federal circuits hardly found 
advertisers liable. Under this circumstance, the US Supreme Court would not find 
trade mark liability based solely on initial interest confusion or the internet troika 
even when it grants certiorari.  
On the other hand, the balance between trade mark proprietors and 
advertisers in the ECJ remains unstable, although the ECJ appears to favour 
search engines. The ECJ favours advertisers’ interests over proprietors’ to the 
extent that it regards internet users as the only relevant consumers, whereas it 
supports the interests of proprietors rather than those of advertisers in that it 
protects broad trade mark functions in double identity cases and directly links 
defences with the effect on trade mark functions and confusion. In the meantime, 
the balance between trade mark proprietors and search engines tips towards 
search engines in that the ECJ emphasises the technical and passive nature of 
their action. 
The Supreme Court of Korea, which has consistently interpreted ‘use of 
trade marks’ as ‘use as trade marks,’ has yet to clarify whether internal use of 
marks as keywords constitutes ‘use as trade marks. It only decided that 
advertisers’ use of trade marks in advertisements on SERPs amounts to use as 
trade marks even if trade marks are also employed as links between 
advertisements and websites. 
This chapter showed that various balances, created by court decisions, 
between interested parties in paid search marketing stem from factual contexts 
and their different evaluation, or more importantly diverging interpretations of 
essentially very similar legal provisions. Thus, in order to find a balance between 
interested parties in this specific context, the interpretation of requirements for 
                                         
515
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and exceptions from trade mark liability needs to be explored based on fair and 
efficient competition and pro-competitive trade mark functions.   
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Chapter 5: Direct Liability in Paid Search Marketing 
 
This chapter explores possible approaches as to requirements for and 
exceptions from trade mark liability in keyword cases. Then, as part of a virtuous 
cycle in applying trade mark law, I draw my own approach from the perspective 
of ‘fair and efficient competition by means of the protection of pro-competitive 
trade mark functions.’ It concludes with an analysis of the responsibility of 
advertisers and search engine providers. 
 
1. Pro-competitive Trade Mark Functions and Trade Mark Liability 
 
In chapter 3, this thesis suggested that the ultimate purpose of trade mark 
protection should be to promote fair and efficient competition and that trade mark 
law should pursue this purpose by means of protecting pro-competitive trade 
mark functions, the information and differentiation functions, against unfair use 
of trade marks.  
On this basis, likely harm to pro-competitive functions should justify the 
prevention of third party use. Where third party use causes likelihood of 
confusion ‘in users’ product markets’ that could lead to harm of the information 
and differentiation functions of owners’ trade marks ‘in owners’ product markets,’ 
it should be prevented. Similarly, third party use should be prohibited when it 
creates likelihood of dilution that could harm these functions ‘in owners’ product 
markets.’ Where these functions are likely to be impaired, trade mark owners 
cannot efficiently compete on the basis of product quality and brand image since 
they cannot concisely convey information on the position of product quality and 
brand image that they want to deliver to consumers. Competitors cannot establish 
their marketing strategies based on the information that trade marks impart. 
Consumers cannot form or alter their preferences based on the identification of 
product quality and brand image; nor can they make rational purchasing decisions. 
Insofar as there is a probability that pro-competitive functions are damaged by 
third party use, this use should not be allowed. 
At the same time, third party use that does not cause harm to pro-
competitive functions should not be prohibited. For instance, use of others’ marks 
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can be permitted if it causes consumer confusion exclusively in relation to 
information that is beyond the scope of pro-competitive functions. There can be 
no likelihood of dilution by blurring or tarnishment where famous marks perform 
their strong functions despite the fact that third party use results in a delay or 
additional cognitive efforts in consumers’ linking them with their owners’ 
products. 
Without the tool of ‘likelihood of harm to pro-competitive trade mark 
functions in proprietors’ product markets,’ scholars and courts have adopted 
diverse interpretations on liability requirements and exceptions in relation to use 
of trade marks as keywords. These include the concepts of ‘use of trade marks,’ 
‘likelihood of confusion,’ ‘likelihood of dilution,’ ‘fair use,’ ‘nominative fair use,’ 
and ‘functional use.’ I suggest here that they should be interpreted based on pro-
competitive trade mark functions. 
 
2. Various Interpretations  
 
1) Use of Trade Marks  
 
 There have been heated debates on whether actionable use of trade marks 
should be limited to ‘use as trade marks.’ In the USA, the Second Circuit which 
had strongly argued for ‘use as trade marks’ changed its position in 
Rescuecom,
519
 accepting that internal use can constitute use of trade marks. 
Nevertheless, there are still many in favour of so-called the trade mark use theory. 
Moreover, the ECJ found that a search engine’s use did not constitute actionable 
use of trade marks, stressing the technical and passive nature of the use. 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Korea has consistently interpreted the use 
requirement as meaning ‘use as trade marks.’  
 
(1) Use as Trade Marks 
 
 Proponents of the trade mark use doctrine construe ‘use of trade marks’ 
as ‘use as trade marks,’ on the grounds that i) requiring ‘use as trade marks’ 
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reduces consumer search costs by enabling consumers to access more relevant 
information,
520
 ii) it can eliminate threats to legitimate trade mark uses,
521
 iii) it 
can strike and maintain a careful balance of competing interests,
522
 iv) the 
confusion test is inappropriate for the settlement of modern trade mark disputes 
because of its circularity and reliance on facts,
523
 and v) the confusion test may 
impair competition.
524
 
According to almost all commentators in favour of this doctrine, in paid 
search marketing, the internal use of trade marks and/or the sale of keywords do 
not constitute trade mark use in the context of trade mark liability.
525
 Thus, 
advertisers may be responsible solely for false advertising where the text of 
advertisements does not include owners’ trade marks.526 Only where owners’ 
trade marks are used in advertisements, they may assume trade mark liability.
527
 
Moreover, search engines have nothing to do with direct trade mark liability. 
Only indirect trade mark liability concerns them.
528
 Looking at the relevant 
academic literature, there are several suggested rationales: i) there is no consumer 
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exposure to trade marks;
529
 ii) internet users do not expect that search engines 
return perfectly related search results;
530
 iii) consumers may input keywords to 
collect general information;
531
 iv) other search results on the website reduce 
search costs by delivering information and thus promote competition;
532
 and v) 
the prevention of internal use of trade marks as keywords will impair the 
development of search engine services.
533
  
At least one proponent of the trade mark use theory, however, maintains 
that use as keywords satisfies the use requirement. The grounds are that i) 
consumers perceive keywords as identifying products, ii) search results are 
displayed by “the simple motion of a keystroke or the click of a mouse,” and iii) 
keywords entered by consumers remain on the websites of search engines.
534
  
 As regards trade mark use in pop-up advertisements, district courts in the 
Fourth
535
 and the Sixth
536
 Circuits and the Second Circuit
537
 adopted the trade 
mark use doctrine. District courts in the Second Circuit
538
 also took the same 
attitude towards use of trade marks in metatags and as keywords. In 2009, 
however, the Second Circuit changed its position in Rescuecom,
539
 admitting that 
actionable use of trade marks need not be limited to use as trade marks. 
 Although the ECJ did not construe ‘use of trade marks’ as meaning ‘use 
as trade marks,’ it found in the Google joined cases that Google’s use of trade 
marks did not constitute actionable use, on the ground that Google’s use was only 
the creation of the technical conditions necessary for the use of trade marks and 
the receipt of the payment for that service.
540
 The ECJ denied both confusion-
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based and dilution-based liability on this ground.
541
  
 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Korea has interpreted ‘use of 
trade marks’ as ‘use of signs which indicate source of products and distinguish 
trade mark owners’ products from other products.’542 In a keyword case where a 
trade mark is used in the title of an advertisement displayed on a SERP, the 
Supreme Court also stated that the use of VSP NTC satisfied the use requirement 
because VSP NTC was used as a trade mark which identified the source of 
products.
543
 
 
(2) Use of Trade Marks 
 
  Those who argue against the trade mark use theory maintain that ‘use as 
trade marks’ should not be a prerequisite for trade mark liability.544 The grounds 
for the argument are that i) the use requirement would prevent trade mark law 
from controlling new fields such as keyword advertising, ii) the requirement will 
not boost the certainty that trade mark use theorists claim, and iii) it can interfere 
with the development of trade mark policy by categorising various non-infringing 
third party uses into non-trade mark use.
545
 
 As regards the first ground, they maintain that ‘non-use as trade marks’ 
can also cause likelihood of confusion even if it is admitted that use as trade 
marks is more likely to create consumer confusion.
546
 They also argue that 
allowing third party use of trade marks as keywords may increase search costs by 
generating information overload and forcing trade mark owners to purchase 
sponsored links keyed to their own trade marks.
547
 Moreover, according to them, 
the search cost theory which supports the trade mark use doctrine is not capable 
of explaining trade mark law comprehensively and prescriptively.
548
  
Their second ground stems from the fact that the concept of ‘use as trade 
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marks’ cannot be separated from consumer association.549  
In relation to the third ground, they emphasise the significance of factual 
context, along with the core role of confusion and the development of defences 
which reflect various policies.
550
 Thus, according to them, the liability of 
advertisers and search engine providers for use of trade marks in paid search 
marketing hinges on the context in which trade marks are employed.
551
 
 Almost all US federal courts
552
 have not required use as trade marks for 
trade mark liability since the decision of the Second Circuit in Rescuecom,
553
 
holding that advertisers’ or search engines’ use constitutes actionable use of trade 
marks.  
 
(3) Functional ‘Use as Trade Marks’ 
 
 McKenna, like other trade mark use theorists, maintains that use as trade 
marks is required for trade mark liability because theoretically non-trade mark 
use cannot cause actionable consumer confusion under trade mark law.
554
 He 
argues that “[b]ecause the only uses that can cause source confusion are uses that 
in some way indicate source, the infringement provisions implicitly require 
trademark use in the functional sense.”555 
 On the other hand, he puts much more emphasis on the functional 
meaning of ‘use as trade marks.’ Some proponents of the trade mark use doctrine 
argue that the notion of ‘use as trade marks’ does not rely on consumer 
understanding.
556
 Others construe the concept of ‘use as trade marks’ 
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functionally by defining it as indicating the source or sponsorship of products,
557
 
but they suggest that the evaluation of ‘use as trade marks’ depends on consumer 
perceptions “in some cases.”558 By contrast, McKenna maintains that trade mark 
use can be determined only in the light of consumer understanding.
559
 For this 
reason, he does not give much weight to the trade mark use requirement in 
limiting trade mark protection.
560
 
 According to this approach, search engines’ sale of trade marked 
keywords in paid search marketing does not constitute ‘use as trade marks’ 
because advertisers, who amount to consumers of keywords, would not believe 
that search engines use trade marks to indicate that trade mark proprietors are 
sponsors of search engine services.
561
 Search engines’ triggering of search results 
is also construed as not satisfying the use requirement unless consumers perceive 
search results as indicating that trade mark owners sponsor search engine 
services.
562
 
 
2) Likelihood of Confusion 
 
 Use of trade marks as keywords basically arises prior to the purchase of 
products since consumers would not make purchasing decisions solely on the 
basis of advertisements on SERPs. They would normally purchase products after 
visiting advertisers’ websites. Thus, initial interest confusion has been an issue in 
this context. Nevertheless, here it is suggested that initial interest confusion is not 
just about the timing of confusion. It is about both the subject and the timing of 
consumer confusion.  
Consumer sophistication is also an issue in paid search marketing. 
Whether average consumers are limited to internet users and how much attention 
they would pay in searching for information through search engines are important 
                                                                                                               
(emphasising that “[t]rademark use, properly defined, is an objective inquiry that does not turn on 
a case-by-case analysis of actual consumer understanding.”) 
557
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factors in determining likelihood of confusion.  
 
(1) Subject and Timing of Consumer Confusion 
 
a) Initial Interest Confusion  
 
 Initial interest confusion, usually explained as “confusion that creates 
initial customer interest, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a 
result of the confusion,”563 embraces two distinct meanings: i) initial interest or 
diversion regardless of likelihood of confusion and ii) likely confusion prior to, 
but not at the time of purchase of products.
564
 The former relates to the subject or 
degree of confusion and the latter the timing of confusion.  
Although the concept in its original meaning was just about the timing of 
confusion, it has expanded to encompass both senses.
565
 Since the Ninth Circuit 
adopted the broadened initial interest confusion doctrine in Brookfield 
Communications,
566
 many courts have found the liability of third parties where 
their uses divert consumer attention but do not bring about likelihood of 
confusion at the point of sale. Courts have come to recognise this type of 
confusion as actionable not only when it dissipates prior to the time of purchase 
so that consumers do not purchase third parties’ products in a confused condition, 
but also when there exists only the diversion of consumer mind which does not 
reach the level of actionable likelihood of confusion.  
In the same vein, use of trade marks as keywords was prevented based on 
initial interest confusion in some cases. In Australian Gold, the US Tenth Circuit 
found that a tanning lotion reseller’s use of a manufacturer’s mark in paid search 
marketing was infringing, on the ground that the use caused initial interest 
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confusion.
567
 The Circuit regarded initial interest confusion in the internet 
context as stemming from “the unauthorized use of trademarks to divert internet 
traffic, thereby capitalizing on a trademark holder’s goodwill.”568 Moreover, in 
American Blind & Wallpaper,
569
 a paid search marketing case, a district court in 
the Ninth Circuit found Google liable for its use of a mark on the ground of initial 
interest confusion. 
 
b) Wide Initial Interest Confusion  
 
 The US Ninth Circuit widened the scope of initial interest confusion in 
the context of online use of trade marks by combining it with the internet troika. 
Calling them “the three most important Sleekcraft factors in evaluating a 
likelihood of confusion” in the internet context, the Circuit emphasised “(1) the 
similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods and services, and (3) the 
parties’ simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing channel.”570 According to 
the Circuit, “[w]hen this controlling troika, or internet trinity, suggests confusion 
is … likely, the other factors must weigh strongly against a likelihood of 
confusion to avoid the finding of infringement.”571 On the other hand, “[i]f the 
internet trinity does not clearly indicate a likelihood of consumer confusion, a 
district court can conclude the infringement analysis only by balancing all the 
Sleekcraft factors within the unique context of each case.”572 
 In paid search marketing cases, likelihood of initial interest confusion 
was more easily found when combined with the internet troika. In 
Perfumebay.com, the Ninth Circuit found a likelihood of initial interest confusion 
on the ground of in-court demonstration and the troika.
573
 First, the 
demonstration showed that search results might lead consumers to regard 
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Perfumebay as “part of eBay’s web site or one of eBay’s internet stores.”574 
Second, based on the facts that two trade marks were similar, both parties sold 
perfumes, and they utilised the Internet as a marketing and advertising tool, the 
troika shifted the burden of proof as to the remaining Sleekcraft factors from the 
plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant Perfumebay, however, failed to prove 
that the remaining Sleekcraft factors weighed strongly against a finding of a 
likelihood of confusion.
575
 In Storus, a district court in the Ninth Circuit followed 
this suit.
576
  
 
c) Pre-sale Confusion  
 
Against the initial interest confusion doctrine, some scholars and courts 
require the same subject or degree for initial interest confusion or confusion prior 
to purchase as that of point of sale confusion. They argue that the only difference 
between the two lies in their timing, suggesting the word ‘pre-sale confusion’ in 
lieu of ‘initial interest confusion.’ They offer several rationales for their argument: 
i) the recognition of initial interest confusion as a separate claim would run 
counter to trade mark law which requires likelihood of confusion for trade mark 
infringement;
577
 ii) “[t]rue instances of initial interest confusion may affect 
consumer search costs and so may provide evidence of harm under traditional 
principles of trademark law”;578 iii) initial interest confusion is at odds with 
justifications for trade mark protection;
579
 iv) it is in conflict with the first sale 
doctrine of US trade mark law in that “[b]y limiting the ability of businesses to 
use trademarks in metatags, domain names, and even on their websites, courts 
have made it very difficult to resell goods online”;580 v) the initial interest 
confusion doctrine increases the probability of trade mark infringement findings 
by ignoring the value of disclaimers and the sophistication of consumers and by 
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often recognising initial interests as the evidence of actual confusion;
581
 vi) the 
doctrine collides with patent and copyright law in that it can prevent a third party 
from replicating products with no patent or copyright;
582
 and vii) it contravenes 
free speech.
583
 According to the pre-sale confusion argument, mere diversion 
does not necessarily lead to consumer confusion.  
Some keyword cases have been analysed based on pre-sale confusion. In 
J.G. Wentworth, a district court in the Third Circuit denied initial interest 
confusion, on the ground that there was no likelihood of confusion.
584
 It reasoned 
that “the links to defendant’s website always appear as independent and distinct 
links on the search result pages regardless of whether they are generated through 
Google’s AdWords program or search of the keyword meta tags of defendant’s 
website.”585 In Hearts on Fire, a district court in the First Circuit also elucidated 
the level of confusion required for actionable initial interest confusion by 
asserting that “[the] confusion must be more than momentary and more than a 
mere possibility,” and that “a genuine and substantial likelihood of confusion” 
should be demonstrated.
586
 In Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit, which had 
adopted the wide initial interest confusion approach, cast a doubt on the 
usefulness of the internet trinity analysis for all types of online commercial 
activity and found that “because the sine qua non of trademark infringement is 
consumer confusion, when we examine initial interest confusion, the owner of the 
mark must demonstrate likely confusion, not mere diversion.”587 
 The attitude of the ECJ can be understood as adopting pre-sale confusion, 
particularly in the context of paid search marketing, even if it has not dealt 
directly with the issue of initial interest confusion.
588
 In BergSpechte, the ECJ 
recognised that use of trade marks as keywords can cause confusion at the time 
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when consumers look at advertisements on SERPs without regard for the content 
of third parties’ websites.589 It held that “it will be for the national court to hold 
whether there is a likelihood of confusion when internet users are shown, on the 
basis of a keyword similar to a mark, a third party’s ad.”590 The ECJ made the 
same statement in Portakabin, concluding that “a trade mark proprietor is entitled 
to prohibit an advertiser from advertising … where that advertising does not 
enable average internet users, or enables them only with difficulty, to ascertain 
whether the goods or services referred to by the ad originate from the proprietor 
of the trade mark or from an undertaking economically linked to it or, on the 
contrary, originate from a third party.”591 
 The Supreme Court of Korea also appears to adopt pre-sale confusion. In 
VSP, the Court found no likelihood of confusion, on the ground that VSP NTC 
used as a title of advertising is not similar to an owner’s mark ‘VSP.’592 The 
Court, however, considered neither whether there was a likelihood of confusion at 
the time of purchase nor whether consumers were diverted to a defendant’s 
website. 
 
d) Narrow Concept of Pre-sale and Initial Interest Confusion 
 
 Some commentators and courts seek to limit the scope of pre-sale 
confusion or initial interest confusion. They submit that pre-sale confusion should 
be applied only to cases where parties are direct competitors.
593
 The reasoning is 
that i) non-competitive users will not divert consumers from a trade mark holder 
to them, ii) temporary confusion caused by non-competitive use cannot materially 
affect ultimate purchasing decisions, and iii) the application of the initial interest 
confusion analysis to non-competitive uses generates unreasonable results by 
preventing informative uses such as parodies, satires, and commentaries.
594
 
According to this argument, search engines’ use of trade marks would not be 
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likely to cause pre-sale confusion because search engines are not competitors of 
trade mark owners in the context of paid search marketing.
595
 
 Another commentator argues that initial interest confusion should be 
limited to instances where third party use does not engender point-of-sale 
confusion, post-sale confusion, and dilution but nevertheless adversely affects 
consumers’ decision-making ability and reduces the value of a trade mark as a 
source indicator.
596
 Sharrock reasons that initial interest confusion rarely arises 
“without a likelihood of point-of-sale or post-sale confusion simultaneously 
arising,” but it is very vulnerable to its misuse.597 Sharrock, however, emphasises 
that initial interest confusion should not be totally abandoned because it is 
capable of filling a doctrinal gap that cannot be supplied by point-of-sale 
confusion, post-sale confusion, and dilution.
598
 According to her, the initial 
interest confusion doctrine can justify trade mark protection where initial interest 
confusion is dispelled “only after [a] junior user has been able to take advantage 
of a period of confusion to convince consumers to make a purchase,” or where 
consumers decide to purchase a third party’s products in online or offline markets 
instead of a trade mark holder’s because of consumers’ transaction costs 
outweighing their benefits.
599
  
 
(2) Average Consumers and Their Level of Attention 
 
 The scope of actionable likelihood of confusion also depends on whose 
perspective is considered. Average consumers’ likely confusion cannot be the 
same as that of sophisticated consumers or inattentive consumers. It appears that 
US courts, the ECJ, and Korean courts take a similar position on this point. US 
courts asserted that the test for likelihood of confusion is about that of “a 
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reasonably prudent consumer in the marketplace,”600 “an appreciable number of 
ordinarily prudent consumers of the type of product in question,”601 or “an 
appreciable number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary 
care.”602 The ECJ held that, in assessing the global appreciation of likelihood of 
confusion, “the average consumer of the category of products concerned is 
deemed to be reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect.”603 Korean courts also pointed out that the similarity between trade 
marks should be decided on the basis of the average degree of consumer attention 
unless products are traded only by relevant experts.
604
  
Nevertheless, US federal courts, the ECJ, and Korean courts do not share 
a common position on the degree of consumer care in paid search marketing. This 
stems from the different evaluation of the ‘factual degree of consumer care.’ The 
real issue here, however, is the interpretation of ‘average consumers.’ Courts have 
normally limited ‘average consumers in paid search marketing’ to internet users.  
 
a) Internet Users’ Low Default Degree of Attention 
 
In some paid search marketing cases, a low default degree of consumer 
care was introduced by interested parties or accepted by courts. In Edina Realty, 
TheMLSonline.com claimed the high level of consumer care, on the ground that 
“real estate is a long-term expensive investment.”605 Against this claim, Edina 
Realty maintained the low level of care on the ground of “the effortless nature of 
surfing the web,” indicating a study which showed that “62 percent of consumers 
do not understand the difference between sponsored links and natural results.”606 
On this issue, a district court in the Eighth Circuit concluded that there was “a 
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dispute of fact as to the degree of purchaser care.”607 Moreover, in Network 
Automation, a district court in the Ninth Circuit held that internet consumers 
exercise a low degree of care
608
 based on the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in 
Brookfield
609
 and GoTo.com.
610
 In Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit stressed that 
“entering a web site takes little effort-usually one click from a linked site or a 
search engine’s list.”611 Citing this conclusion, the Circuit stated in GoTo.com 
that “[n]avigating amongst web sites involves practically no effort 
whatsoever.”612 
 
b) Internet Users’ Heightened Default Degree of Attention 
 
 In Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit altered its previous position as 
to the degree of consumer care, pointing out that its decisions in Brookfield and 
GoTo.com were made “more than a decade ago.”613 It appeared to adopt “an 
approach that look[s] beyond the medium itself [e.g., the Internet] and to the 
nature of the particular goods and the relevant customers [instead],”614 but it also 
emphasised a high default degree of consumer care in an online world on the 
basis of its decision in Toyota. 
In Toyota, the Ninth Circuit regarded an online marketplace as the 
relevant market and “a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping 
online” as a relevant consumer.615 Citing this case, the Circuit emphasised in 
Network Automation that “the default degree of consumer care is becoming more 
heightened as the novelty of the Internet evaporates and online commerce 
becomes commonplace.”616 Some scholars also asserted that consumer confusion 
becomes less likely as consumers get accustomed to new technology.
617
 
                                         
607
 Id. 
608
 Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 2011 WL 815806, 11-12 
(C.A.9(Cal.)) 
609
 Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999) 
610
 GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000)  
611
 Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1057  
612
 GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1209  
613
 Network Automation, 2011 WL 815806 at 11-12  
614
 iCall, Inc. v. Tribair, Inc., 2012 WL 5878389, 12 (N.D.Cal.) 
615
 Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) 
616
 Network Automation, 2011 WL 815806 at 11 
617
 Rothman, supra note 564, at 181 
141 
 
On the other hand, there was an argument that consumer confusion is 
likely in use of trade marks as keywords despite the high default degree of 
consumer care. According to it, the default level is high since online users can 
critically look through search results and distinguish between necessary and 
unnecessary information.
618
 Nevertheless, the argument suggests that use of trade 
marks in paid search marketing, unlike banner advertising, may cause initial 
interest confusion because consumers cannot easily perceive paid search results 
“as a form of advertising.”619 
 
c) Variable Degree of Consumer Care according to Products and 
Consumers 
 
 In Network Automation, despite its recognition of the high default level 
of consumer care, the Ninth Circuit stressed the nature and cost of products and 
the type of consumers in assessing the level of consumer care.
620
  
Likewise, in Rosetta Stone, a district court in the Fourth Circuit admitted 
the high degree of consumer care, on the grounds that “Rosetta Stone’s products 
cost approximately $259 for a single-level package and $579 for a three-level 
bundle” and that “[Rosetta Stone’s] target market [was] comprised of well-
educated consumers willing to invest money and energy in the time-intensive task 
of learning a language.”621  
Against this decision, however, the Fourth Circuit mentioned that the 
judgment of consumer care could also be based on deposition testimony and an 
internal Google study.
622
 Besides, the Fourth Circuit showed the possibility that 
well-educated consumers could not understand the mechanics of paid search 
marketing, stating that “[t]he evidence also include[d] an internal Google study 
reflecting that even well-educated, seasoned Internet consumers [were] confused 
by the nature of Google’s sponsored links and [were] sometimes even unaware 
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that sponsored links [were], in actuality, advertisements.”623  
 
d) Internet Users’ Reasonable Attention 
 
The ECJ has not ruled unequivocally as to average consumers’ level of 
attention. On the other hand, it regarded “normally informed and reasonably 
attentive internet users” as average consumers in the context of paid search 
marketing.
624
 In Interflora, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales construed 
this decision as meaning that “the average consumer has been replaced by the 
reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant internet user” in the 
particular context of paid search marketing.
625
 Thus, the degree of consumer care 
will not be decided from the perspective of average consumers of advertisers’ 
products; it will be the reasonable attention of ‘internet users’ among them. 
 
3) Likelihood of Dilution 
 
 There are some issues about dilution. First, it is not clear when dilution 
by blurring is likely to arise. This concerns the interpretation of ‘impairment of 
distinctiveness’ in the Lanham Act, ‘detriment to distinctive character’ in EU 
trade mark law, and ‘damage to distinctiveness’ in the Korean Unfair Competition 
Act. Second, there are also different interpretations as to the scope of tarnishment. 
Some focus on negative associations, while others on dissonance between 
products. Third, unlike US and Korean law,
626
 EU law prevents taking unfair 
advantage of the reputation or distinctiveness of others’ trade marks as a third 
type of actionable dilution. Since this type of dilution may occur when there is a 
lack of both ‘financial compensation’ and ‘users’ own efforts,’627 it could tilt the 
balance in favour of trade mark owners without considering legitimate interests of 
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competitors and consumers. 
These issues are also raised in cases of trade marks used in paid search 
marketing. Dilution-based liability hinges on the interpretation of the scope of 
blurring and tarnishment and the acceptance of dilution by unfair advantage.  
 
(1) Blurring 
 
 Schechter argued that third party use of uniquely distinctive trade marks 
on related or non-related products vitiates or impairs trade marks’ uniqueness or 
singularity and hence selling power;
628
 on the other hand, the Lanham Act, EU 
trade mark law, and the Korean Trade Mark Act, despite differences in legislative 
language and court rhetoric, commonly require ‘harm to the distinctive character 
of famous marks’ for blurring. Nevertheless, there is no consensus as to when 
third party use is likely to cause this harm. This is also an issue in paid search 
marketing cases. 
 
a) High Distinctiveness or Strong Association  
 
Search cost and cognitive psychology theories emphasise a delay or 
additional cognitive efforts in matching famous marks to owners’ products. The 
search cost theory argues that ‘more mental time and effort’ in consumers’ 
associating famous marks with particular products leads to an increase in 
consumer search costs that should be prevented by trade mark law.
629
 That is, 
third party use of famous marks will make consumers “think harder” to link the 
famous marks to owners’ products because consumers may think about products 
of both trade mark owners and third party users.
630
 This theory admits blurring 
even where third parties utilise famous marks on “equally fine products” since 
this use can also incur a higher imagination cost.
631
 It argues that “[e]ven if the 
association is completely neutral, there is a cost to the owner of the trade 
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mark.”632  
The cognitive psychology theory suggests that the possession of “two 
cognitive networks” for the same trade mark would require “additional cognitive 
effort to parse out just which network applied to the current circumstances” and 
reduce “the accuracy and, to some extent, the speed of retrieval from memory of 
first-user brand information.”633 They also maintain that the so-called ‘fan-effect’ 
supports blurring, explaining that with an increase in the number of spokes as a 
result of attaching to the hub additional spokes leading to other circles containing 
the information, for example, “an up-scale furrier,” “the speed and cognitive ease 
with which the individual is able to connect the hub (Tiffany) with the original 
information (“an up-scale retailer of silver, crystal and jewelry on New York’s 
Fifth Avenue”) decreases.”634  
These theories can justify the finding of dilution by blurring based on the 
high distinctiveness of famous marks or a strong association between marks. A 
strong association between marks would make it harder for consumers to 
immediately connect famous marks with owners’ products and increase search 
costs. The cognitive psychology theory also suggests that the focus of blurring is 
on “an association created between plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks.” 635 
Moreover, the high distinctiveness of famous marks would result in more search 
costs or cognitive efforts. 
Although not mentioning the search cost theory or the cognitive 
psychology theory, many courts have found blurring on the ground of highly 
distinctive famous marks or a strong association between marks. The US 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”) specifies six non-exhaustive 
factors for courts to consider in determining the existence of an actionable claim 
for blurring: i) the degree of similarity between a mark or trade name and a 
famous mark, ii) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous 
mark, iii) the extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in 
substantially exclusive use of the mark, iv) the degree of recognition of the 
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famous mark, v) whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an 
association with the famous mark, and vi) any actual association between the 
mark or trade name and the famous mark.
636
 These factors, however, only 
concern the strength of famous marks or association arising from the similarity 
between marks;
637
 no factor relates directly to harm to distinctiveness. Thus, this 
six-factor test appears to be premised on the assumption that where use of highly 
famous marks is likely to establish a strong association between marks, there 
could be harm to the distinctiveness of famous marks.     
Despite this limit, US courts have assessed likelihood of blurring in 
keyword cases based on this test. In Rosetta Stone, a district court in the Fourth 
Circuit denied likelihood of blurring, on the ground that “Rosetta Stone’s brand 
awareness has only increased since Google revised its trademark policy in 
2004.”638 Remanding this decision, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the district 
court considered only one factor of the test for likelihood of blurring—the degree 
of recognition of Rosetta Stone’s mark.639  
The EU General Court and Korean courts found blurring based mainly on 
highly strong famous marks. In BOTUMAX, the EU General Court held that 
there was detriment to the distinctive character of the earlier mark ‘BOTOX,’ on 
the ground that the word element ‘botox’ was so fanciful that use of the same or a 
similar element in other marks could lead to dilution by blurring.
640
 In 
HiTIFFANY, the Seoul District Court decided that use of HiTIFFANY for 
shopping centre sales damaged the distinctiveness of the famous mark 
‘TIFFANY’, stressing that the mark ‘TIFFANY’ was famous throughout the 
world.
641
 
In a keyword case, a US court also found blurring on the ground of high 
strength of famous marks without relying on the multifactor test. In 
Perfumebay.com, the US Ninth Circuit concluded that “[w]ith Perfumebay’s 
marks, consumers may no longer associate the usage of the “Bay” suffix with 
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eBay’s unique services, specifically the sale of products on an internet-based 
marketplace,” emphasising the strength of eBay’s mark.642  
Moreover, some courts regard ‘third party use of identical famous marks,’ 
which concerns a strong association between marks, as constituting circumstantial 
evidence of actual or likely dilution, or as creating a presumption of it. In 
Moseley, the US Supreme Court considered an identity of marks to be 
circumstantial evidence of actual dilution under the US Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”).643 In Horphag, a case about Garcia’s use of 
Horphag’s trade mark ‘Pycnogenol’ as a metatag and on Garcia’s website, the 
Ninth Circuit made the same statement, citing the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Mosely.
644
 Furthermore, in Savin, the Second Circuit held that an identity of 
marks generates “a presumption of actual dilution.”645 In Burberry, a case about 
use of the Burberry trade mark on products and as keywords, a district court in 
the Second Circuit stated that even likelihood of dilution can be presumed on the 
basis of use of identical marks.
646
  
 
b) Separate Likelihood of Harm to Distinctiveness 
 
McCarthy requires separate evidence to support probability of harm to 
distinctiveness,
647
 reading ‘to impair the distinctiveness of a famous mark’ as “to 
sap the strength of the famous mark.”648 He stresses that likelihood of association 
with famous marks cannot automatically lead to likelihood of harm to the 
distinctiveness and blurring should not be admitted “just by theoretical 
assumptions about what possibly could occur or might happen.”649 He reasons 
that the structure of the TDRA does not treat the association with famous marks 
as dilution by blurring
650
 and that the strength of famous marks “can cut both 
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ways on the injury question.”651 Similarly, in Miss Universe, a district court in 
the Second Circuit did not find dilution by blurring, on the ground that Miss 
Universe did not offer sufficient evidence in support of its dilution by blurring 
claim.
652
 
The ECJ also demands separate harm to distinctiveness. The Court 
construes ‘distinctive character’ within the meaning of blurring as a trade mark’s 
“ability to identify the goods or services for which it is registered and used as 
coming from the proprietor of that mark” and ‘detriment to this ability’ as 
resulting from the fact that third party use causes “dispersion of the identity and 
hold upon the public mind of the earlier mark.”653 Moreover, in order to prove 
blurring, the ECJ required evidence of an actual or serious likelihood of change in 
the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the products for which the 
earlier mark was registered as a result of use of the later mark.
654
  
Against this decision, Advocate General Sharpston and the General Court 
took a different position. Advocate General Sharpston supported in Intel that a 
change in economic behaviour is not necessary for the detriment to be present 
because there are cases where consumers do not change their purchasing 
decisions despite the lessened distinctiveness of trade marks consequent on use of 
marks on unrelated products.
655
 Moreover, in Environmental Manufacturing, the 
General Court evidently stated that evidence of a consequential change is not 
necessary for the finding of dilution by blurring.
656
 It also pointed out that the 
proof that the marks’ ability to identify the source of products is weakened will 
establish the change in the economic behaviour of consumers “since use of the 
later mark leads to dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the 
earlier mark.”657 
In the same vein, in Interflora, the ECJ admitted dilution by blurring 
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based on a risk of turning famous marks into generic terms without mentioning a 
change in economic behaviour.
658
 It asserted that if the advertisement triggered 
by the internal use of the INTERFLORA trade mark “did not enable the 
reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant internet user to tell that the 
service promoted by M&S is independent from that of Interflora,” Interflora 
could argue that “the word ‘Interflora’ has come to designate, in the consumer’s 
mind, any flower-delivery service.”659 
 
(2) Tarnishment 
 
 In tarnishment, US courts and those who argue for the search cost theory 
or the psychology-based theory focus on negative associations that third party use 
evokes, whether these associations stem from the nature of third parties’ products 
or the images of marks used on these products. At least one US court, the ECJ, 
and Korean courts, however, appear to put more emphasis on the nature of 
products in assessing tarnishment. 
 
a) Negative Associations 
 
 In the USA, the FTDA before the TDRA did not explicitly distinguish 
between blurring and tarnishment. The US Supreme Court even stated in Moseley 
that the FTDA arguably did not embrace tarnishment, on the ground that while 
the US state statutes expressly refer to both ‘injury to business reputation’ and 
‘dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trade mark,’ the FTDA did 
not provide for ‘injury to business reputation.’660 The TDRA, on the other hand, 
defines tarnishment as “association arising from the similarity between a mark or 
trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark” 
without providing any factors for courts to consider for it. ‘Harm to the reputation 
of the famous mark’ has been interpreted by US federal courts as occurring, for 
instance, when the famous mark is “linked to products of shoddy quality, or is 
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portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context such that the public will 
associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant’s goods with the 
plaintiff’s unrelated goods,”661 or when the famous mark “loses its ability to 
serve as a wholesome identifier” of the products bearing the mark.”662 That is, 
negative associations that third party use of famous marks evokes in consumers’ 
minds are considered to be “the sine qua non of tarnishment.”663 
 The supporters of the search cost theory interpret tarnishment as 
incurring a high negative premium because of hateful or offensive associations.
664
 
Moreover, tarnishment is regarded as “a subset of blurring” in that “it reduces the 
distinctness of the trademark as a signifier of the trademarked product or 
service.”665 
The cognitive psychology theory also emphasises negative associations. 
Unlike the search cost theory, however, it distinguishes between blurring and 
tarnishment in that “while blurring focuses on associations that are made, 
tarnishment focuses on the evaluative aspect of those associations (whether they 
are positive or negative, good or bad, liked or disliked).”666 It also suggests that 
tarnishment accords its attention to how third party use undermines the positive 
associations of famous marks.
667
 
 In at least one keyword case, a plaintiff’s tarnishment claim was rejected 
because there was no negative association. In Rosetta Stone, a district court found 
no tarnishment, on the ground that there was no evidence that the five individuals 
who “purchased the allegedly counterfeit software had a reduced opinion of the 
Rosetta Stone Marks.”668 
 
b) Use on Products with Negative Images   
 
 The US Sixth Circuit put more emphasis on the nature of products on 
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which third parties use famous marks when assessing harm to the reputation of 
the marks. In V Secret Catalogue, the Circuit pointed out that a clear semantic 
association between a famous mark and a mark used on sex-related products 
creates “a rebuttable presumption, or at least a very strong inference,” that the use 
is likely to tarnish the famous mark.
669
 Hence, a user of the mark has to offer 
evidence such as expert testimony, surveys, polls, or customer testimony in order 
to prove that there is no probability of tarnishment.
670
 This decision is premised 
on the assumption that use of famous marks on sex-related products leads to harm 
to the reputation of famous marks in most cases.   
In the EU, ‘detriment to the repute of the trade mark’ in EU trade mark 
law is regarded as the equivalent of tarnishment in the TDRA.
671
 Nevertheless, 
the understanding of Advocate General Jacobs and the ECJ as to tarnishment is 
different from that of most US courts. In Adidas-Salomon,
672
 Advocate General 
Jacobs interpreted it as arising solely from the nature of products on which third 
parties use famous marks. He defined it as the case where “the goods for which 
the infringing sign is used appeal to the public’s senses in such a way that the 
trade mark’s power of attraction is affected,” mentioning a Benelux case about 
the trade marks ‘Claeryn’ for a Dutch gin and ‘Klarein’ for a liquid detergent.673  
 The ECJ also focused on products on which third parties use famous 
marks. In L'Oréal, the Court regarded tarnishment as arising “when the goods or 
services for which the identical or similar sign is used by the third party may be 
perceived by the public in such a way that the trade mark’s power of attraction is 
reduced.” 674  Moreover, the ECJ emphasised that “[t]he likelihood of such 
detriment may arise in particular from the fact that the goods or services offered 
by the third party possess a characteristic or a quality which is liable to have a 
negative impact on the image of the mark.”675  
 In Korea, the Seoul District Court took a similar position in 
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SONYBANK.COM
676
 and HiTIFFANY.
677
 In these cases, the district court 
described ‘an act of doing damage to the reputation of famous marks’ within the 
reach of tarnishment as ‘an act of impairing good images or values of famous 
marks by using the marks on goods or services with negative images.’678 
 
(3) Unfair Advantage 
 
 In contrast to US and Korean law, EU trade mark law prevents the taking 
of unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of famous marks: it 
is a third type of dilution which amounts to trade mark infringement. In Korea, 
the taking of unfair advantage does not infringe trade mark rights, although use of 
trade marks for the purpose of taking unfair advantage constitutes a ground for 
refusal, opposition, and invalidation. According to the ECJ, dilution by the taking 
of unfair advantage arises, in particular, when “a transfer of the image of [a] mark 
or of the characteristics which it projects to the goods identified by the identical 
or similar sign” leads to “clear exploitation on the coat-tails of the mark with a 
reputation.”679 The ECJ also stressed that dilution by unfair advantage differs 
from other types of dilution in that the injury of unfair advantage does not lie in 
harm to the distinctive character or the repute but in unfair benefits of a third 
party, and thus the presence of injury should be assessed from the perspective of 
reasonably well informed and reasonably observant average consumers of 
products for which the later mark is registered.
680
 Moreover, the Court found 
unfair advantage when a third party did not pay for the advantage. It held that 
where the third party attempts “to exploit, without paying any financial 
compensation and without being required to make efforts of his own in that 
regard, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of [a famous mark] in 
order to create and maintain the image of that mark,” the advantage gained from 
the third party use of a mark similar to the famous mark should be deemed to be 
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unfair.
681
 
 The taking of unfair advantage was an issue in some keyword cases. In 
the Google joined cases, the ECJ decided that unfair advantage could arise where 
advertisers offer for sale imitations of products bearing a famous mark on the 
internet.
682
 In Interflora, the Court also stated that a competitor’s selection of a 
famous mark as an internet keyword without payment of compensation to an 
owner can be construed as a use for unfair advantage unless there is any ‘due 
cause’ as referred to in EU trade mark law.683  
 
4) Limits of Trade Mark Rights 
 
 Advertisers and search engines have argued for a fair use, nominative fair 
use, or functional use defence in paid search marketing cases. In particular, they 
have claimed that use of trade marks as keywords itself constitutes these defences. 
Courts, however, have not shown a consistent position as to whether use of trade 
marks in paid search marketing constitutes defences and the relationship between 
the use requirement, likelihood of confusion or dilution, and defences.  
 
(1) Possible Defences 
 
a) Classic Fair Use 
 
 Some US courts decided that advertisers’ use of trade marks as metatags 
is classic fair use. In Brookfield, the US Ninth Circuit did not accept a classic fair 
use defence, on the ground that ‘MovieBuff,’ which was different from ‘movie 
buff’ “by only a single space,” was not an appropriate descriptive term.684 This 
court, however, implied that use of a descriptive mark as a metatag can constitute 
fair use.
685
 On the other hand, in Bihari,
686
 a district court in the Second Circuit 
                                         
681
 L'Oréal, [2009] E.T.M.R. 55 at 1032; Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier (Joined Cases 
C-236/08, C-237/08 and C-238/08) [2010] E.T.M.R. 30, 557-558  
682
 Google France, [2010] E.T.M.R. 30 at 558  
683
 Interflora Inc v. Marks & Spencer Plc (C-323/09) [2012] E.T.M.R. 1, 45-46 
684
 Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) 
685
 Id. (asserting that “[t]he proper term for the “motion picture enthusiast” is “Movie Buff,” 
which West Coast certainly can use.”)  
153 
 
accepted a fair use defence even where a mark could not be classified as 
descriptive. The court decided that “the websites provide[d] information about 
Bihari Interiors and Marianne Bihari” and thus “Gross [did] not us[e] the terms 
“Bihari Interiors” and “Bihari” in the metatags as a mark, but rather, to fairly 
identify the content of his websites.”687 According to the court, use of a mark in 
an index or catalogue constitutes ‘use of a mark in its descriptive sense.’688 It 
appears that the Bihari court interpreted fair use more broadly than the Brookfield 
court. These cases show that a classic fair use defence can be used also in paid 
search marketing cases. 
 Unlike US courts, the ECJ denied the general idea that a descriptive fair 
use defence is accepted in use of trade marks as keywords. In Portakabin, the ECJ 
found that use of a trade mark as a keyword “is not intended to provide an 
indication of one of the characteristics of the goods or services offered by the 
third party in that use, with the result that that use does not come within art.6(1)(b) 
of Directive 89/104.”689 The Court only suggested that a contrary conclusion can 
be made in special circumstances by national courts.
690
 The Court also 
mentioned that the fact that the term ‘portakabin’ was not used as a generic term 
should be taken into account in determining whether the use constituted fair use 
within the meaning of article 6(1)(b).
691
 
 
b) Nominative Fair Use 
 
 Nominative fair use is use of trade marks to describe trade mark 
proprietors’ products. It is mainly discussed among US courts because a 
nominative fair use doctrine is developed by the US Ninth Circuit
692
 and the 
Lanham Act includes nominative fair use as one type of a fair use defence to 
dilution-based liability.
693
  
 Some US courts suggest that advertisers’ use of trade marks as metatags 
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or keywords can constitute nominative fair use. In Playboy, the Ninth Circuit 
considered advertisers’ use of a trade mark in a metatag to be nominative based 
on the fact that the trade mark was used to describe the content of a defendant’s 
website.
694
 This decision is in contrast with the decision of the Bihari court 
which accepted a classic fair use defence based on a similar fact. A district court 
in the Fifth Circuit pointed out in Mary Kay that advertisers’ use of trade marks 
in paid search marketing can be nominative fair use.
695
 In Designer Skin, a 
district court in the Ninth Circuit also found that the nominative fair use doctrine 
protected S&L Vitamins’ use of Designer Skin’s trade marks in its metatags and 
as keywords from dilution-based liability since the use satisfied all three elements 
of a nominative fair use test.
696
  
Search engines’ use of trade marks as keywords was also considered 
nominative fair use. A district court in the Third Circuit noted in 800-JR Cigar 
that a search engine’s use of trade marks as keywords can be fair in terms of its 
business unless it “wrongfully participate[s] in someone else’s infringing use.”697 
Moreover, some commentators argue that search engines’ use should be regarded 
as nominative fair use in the nature of comparative advertising insofar as search 
engines take reasonable steps to clearly separate paid search results from natural 
results.
698
 
 In other cases, however, a nominative fair use claim was rejected because 
use of trade marks in metatags or as keywords did not survive the test for 
nominative fair use. The Ninth Circuit did not accept a nominative fair use claim 
in Horphag Research, on the grounds that “Garcia’s references to Pycnogenol 
spawn[ed] confusion as to sponsorship and attempt[ed] to appropriate the cachet 
of the trademark Pycnogenol to his product.”699 In Netscape Communications, 
the Ninth Circuit also found defendants’ use of PEI’s marks unfair because they 
could use other keywords to make adult-oriented banner advertisements appear 
and thus did not satisfy the first requirement for nominative fair use.
700
 In Edina 
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Realty, a district court in the Eighth Circuit, adopting the nominative fair use test 
of the Third Circuit, held that use of the EDINA REALITY mark as a search term 
did not constitute nominative fair use because a defendant could use other terms 
such as Twin Cities real estate to trigger its advertisements and thus the use was 
not necessary to describe the defendant’s service.701 
 Some courts denied a likelihood of confusion claim based on the same 
factual context that could form the basis of nominative fair use. The Designer 
Skin court, which accepted a nominative fair use defence to dilution-based 
liability, did not rely on nominative fair use to protect advertisers’ use from 
confusion-based liability. Rather, the court concluded that “S & L Vitamins’ use 
of Designer Skin’s trademarks to accurately describe the contents of its websites 
[did] not cause initial interest confusion.”702 A similar decision was also made in 
a metatag case. In Standard Process, a district court in the Seventh Circuit found 
no likelihood of confusion because consumers could purchase unaltered SP 
Products on Dr. Banks’s website.703 
 On the other hand, nominative fair use is not adopted by some US courts, 
the ECJ, and Korean courts. The US Fourth Circuit stressed in Rosetta Stone that 
it did not adopt “a position about the validity of nominative fair-use doctrine as a 
defense to trademark infringement or whether this doctrine should formally alter 
our likelihood-of-confusion test in some way.” The decision of the ECJ in Adam 
Opel
704
 can be construed as meaning that “there is no defence for nominative use” 
in that the ECJ rejected the applicability of article 6(1)(b) to Autec’s use of a 
Opel logo on its scale models which delivered information that scale models were 
models of the Opel vehicles.
705
 There is no Korean case that adopts nominative 
fair use. 
  
c) Functional Use  
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 In some US cases,
706
 search engines claimed that trade marked keywords 
performed an essential indexing function by enabling them to identify relevant 
information to users and thus constituted functional use. A district court accepted 
this functional use claim in Rosetta Stone because i) keywords made it possible 
for Google to “identify in its databases relevant information” in response to the 
query of internet users, ii) they had an effect on “the cost and quality of Google’s 
AdWords Program,” and iii) they offered benefits to consumers from the 
perspective of competition.
707
  
 Amici curiae criticised the district court’s decision, arguing that the court 
did “an end-run around to bring back Google’s non-trademark use argument.”708 
The Fourth Circuit rejected the functionality doctrine as a defence, reasoning that 
Rosetta Stone’s use of its own mark was “not essential for the functioning of its 
language-learning products” and the improvement in the function of Google’s 
Adwords programme caused by Rosetta stone’s non-functional mark was 
irrelevant to the functionality doctrine.
709
 The Ninth Circuit already made a 
similar decision in Netscape Communications.
710
 
  
(2) Relationship between Defences and Requirements  
 
a) Fair Use and ‘Use of Trade Marks’  
 
 As regards the relationship between a classic fair use defence and the use 
requirement, scholars in favour of the trade mark use doctrine regard descriptive 
fair use as “one category of non-trademark use that falls explicitly beyond the 
purview of trademark infringement law.”711 Critics of the trade mark use theory, 
however, argue that the theory renders a statutory fair use defence superfluous.
712
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 A district court in Rosetta Stone
713
 is in a similar position as that of 
proponents of the trade mark use theory. The district court relied on fair use under 
the Lanham Act to endorse the conclusion that Google did not use the Rosetta 
Stone Marks to identify its own products and thus there was no liability for trade 
mark dilution.
714
  
 This decision, however, was reversed by the Fourth Circuit.
715
 The 
Circuit held that the district court had not analysed whether Google had used the 
Rosetta Stone marks in good faith, reasoning that if non-trade mark use is 
construed as coextensive with a fair use defence, the defence would be 
unnecessary.
716
 
  
b) Fair Use and Likelihood of Confusion  
 
In the USA, classic fair use and likelihood of confusion are closely 
connected. Before the Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent Make-Up, the 
Ninth Circuit had found that fair use cannot be recognised where there is a 
probability of any confusion.
717
 The Ninth Circuit also asserted in Netscape 
Communications that “[a] fair use may not be a confusing use.”718  
 Even after the US Supreme Court’s decision, likelihood of confusion still 
plays a role in determining fair use.
719
 The US Supreme Court held in KP 
Permanent Make-Up that “some possibility of consumer confusion must be 
compatible with fair use” because “the burden of proving likelihood of confusion 
rests with the plaintiff, and the fair use defendant has no free-standing need to 
show confusion unlikely.”720 It also stated that “the extent of any likely consumer 
confusion” can be relevant in the assessment of the objective fairness of using a 
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term.
721
 Based on this decision, the Ninth Circuit further asserted that “the degree 
of customer confusion remains a factor in evaluating fair use,” reversing again a 
district court’s grant of KP’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of fair 
use.
722
 It held that there were genuine issues of fact, listing relevant factors the 
first of which was “the degree of likely confusion.”723 
 A broad interpretation of requirements for classic fair use could make the 
relationship between fair use and confusion much closer. Requirements such as 
non-trade mark use and good faith are closely related to the likelihood of 
confusion analysis.
724
 Non-trade mark use can be interpreted as a lack of 
likelihood of confusion.
725
 As the Ninth Circuit suggested in Fortune Dynamic, 
concurring with the Second Circuit, good faith and the intent element in the 
assessment of likelihood of confusion have a common issue.
726
 Thus, the broad 
interpretation could make the fair use test almost the same as the analysis of 
likelihood of confusion.  
 In Portakabin, the ECJ also counted on the presence of likelihood of 
confusion in determining whether use is made ‘in accordance with honest 
practices in industrial or commercial matters.’ 727 The ECJ held that where 
advertisers’ use of trade marks as keywords can be prevented by article 5(1) of 
the Trade Mark Directive, advertisers “cannot claim that [they] [acted] in 
accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters, and cannot 
therefore validly rely on the exception provided for in art.6(1) of that 
directive.”728  
In the USA, as regards the relationship between nominative fair use and 
likelihood of confusion, there are two different attitudes: the Ninth Circuit and the 
Third Circuit. The Ninth Circuit crafted the so-called nominative fair use doctrine 
in New Kids on the Block, suggesting a three part test: “[f]irst, the product or 
service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the 
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trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is 
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must 
do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder.”729 The third part of the test, as Dinwoodie 
points out, “looks very much a proxy for an assessment of likely confusion as to 
association, sponsorship or endorsement.”730  
Moreover, in Horphag Research, the Ninth Circuit stressed that the 
likelihood of confusion analysis is a core in the nominative fair use test. The court 
asserted that “the nominative fair use defense is available only if ‘the use of the 
trademark does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate 
the cachet of one product for a different one’” because likelihood of confusion is 
essential in trade mark infringement.
731
 The Second Circuit, which adopted a 
similar nominative fair use test, also stated in Tiffany that the doctrine of 
nominative fair use permits a defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s trade mark “so long 
as there is no likelihood of confusion.”732 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit emphasised in Playboy that this three-
factor test should replace the likelihood of confusion test where a defendant 
claims nominative fair use.
733
 It reasoned that because nominative fair use is 
normally made of marks identical with proprietors’ trade marks, the application 
of the likelihood of confusion test, which places its focus on the similarity of 
marks at issue, could lead to “the incorrect conclusion” that all nominative fair 
use is likely to cause confusion.
734
 Thus, under the nominative fair use doctrine 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit, likelihood of confusion cannot coexist with 
nominative fair use.  
 On the grounds of i) the thin difference between descriptive fair use and 
nominative fair use, ii) the Supreme Court’s decision on KP Permanent that the 
burden of proving likelihood of confusion should rest with a plaintiff, and iii) the 
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statutory framework where likelihood of confusion is a core element,
735
 the Third 
Circuit adopted a bifurcated approach which distinguishes the likelihood of 
confusion test from a nominative fair use test.
736
 In Century 21 Real Estate, the 
court pointed out that the burden of proof shifts to a defendant to show that 
nominative use is “nonetheless” fair, once a plaintiff proves likelihood of 
confusion.
737
 In this vein, the Third Circuit adopted another three-factor test 
different from the Ninth Circuit’ test: “(1) Is the use of the plaintiff’s mark 
necessary to describe both plaintiff’s product or service and defendant’s product 
or service? (2) Is only so much of the plaintiff's mark used as is necessary to 
describe plaintiff’s products or services? (3) Does the defendant’s conduct or 
language reflect the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant’s products or services?” 738  Under this test, confusion can be 
compatible with nominative fair use. In a keyword case, a district court in the 
Eight Circuit that adopted the nominative fair use test of the Third Circuit 
clarified that “[f]air use can occur along with some degree of confusion.”739 
 Some are sceptical of nominative fair use as a defence because of its 
relationship with confusion. As regards the nominative fair use tests of both the 
Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit, McKenna argues that these tests cannot be 
regarded as defences because they are not independent of the likelihood of 
confusion analysis.
740
 Justice Fisher, concurring in part with the decision of the 
Third Circuit, also opined in Century 21 Real Estate that three parts of the 
nominative fair use analysis suggested by the Third Circuit is “nothing more than 
an inquiry into the likelihood of confusion, specifically, whether the use is with 
the intent to confuse due to a presence or lack of good-faith purpose, prominence, 
and truthfulness.”741 
 
c) Fair Use and Likelihood of Dilution 
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 The Ninth Circuit regards nominative use as not creating likelihood of 
dilution. The Circuit held in Playboy that nominative use, which “refers to [a] 
trademark holder’s product,” does not cause “an improper association in 
consumers’ minds between a new product and the trademark holder’s mark.”742 
A district court in the Ninth Circuit also asserted in Designer Skin that 
“[n]ominative uses, by definition, do not dilute the trademarks,” citing the 
decision in Playboy.
743
 
 Moreover, the Second Circuit showed that likelihood of dilution can have 
a bearing on nominative fair use. In Tiffany, it concluded that eBay’s use of the 
Tiffany mark did not cause likelihood of dilution on the ground of nominative 
use.
744
 According to the Second Circuit, eBay used the mark “directly to 
advertise and identify the availability of authentic Tiffany merchandise on the 
eBay website” and no mark or product to blur or tarnish the Tiffany mark was 
found.
745
 
 On the other hand, some commentators cast doubt on whether nominative 
use is capable of generating likelihood of blurring, while recognising that it is 
likely to tarnish a famous mark.
746
 The reasoning is that nominative use would 
strengthen the distinctiveness of the famous mark while it could generate 
tarnishment where it is made “in the context that criticizes senior goods.”747  
 
3. Analysis of Interpretations  
 
1) Interpretation based on Pro-Competitive Functions 
 
This thesis suggests that, in order for trade mark protection to reach a 
balance between interested parties, requirements for and exceptions from trade 
mark liability should be interpreted in terms of pro-competitive trade mark 
functions. For this, at least two main factors should be defined: i) the roles that 
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the requirements and exceptions should take in protecting pro-competitive 
functions against unfair use of trade marks and ii) the scope of pro-competitive 
functions.  
Above all, ‘use of trade marks,’ ‘likelihood of confusion,’ ‘likelihood of 
dilution,’ and ‘exceptions including fair use’ should play distinct roles. If they 
play similar roles, one would make the other redundant and in the end 
unnecessary. When positioned distinctively against the ‘protecting pro-
competitive functions’ context, every requirement and exception would be 
indispensable for furthering fair and efficient competition and thus finding the 
balancing point. 
 The use requirement relates to the argument that pro-competitive 
functions should be protected against unfair ‘use of trade marks.’ Without use of 
trade marks identical with, or similar to, owners’ trade marks, pro-competitive 
trade mark functions could not be harmed because consumers could still identify 
the position of product quality and brand image ‘through owners’ trade marks.’ 
Advertising that does not include use of marks cannot confuse consumers as to 
who controls product quality and brand image (“controllers of product quality and 
brand image”). Neither can it be detrimental to product quality or brand image 
that famous marks identify. 
 The use requirement itself, however, has its limits in separating fair use 
from unfair use and thus it should not take this role. Use of trade marks may or 
may not cause likelihood of confusion or dilution. Therefore, the use cannot be 
considered fair or unfair until it is evident whether or not confusion or dilution is 
likely. Moreover, the use requirement cannot sift out a use that is not likely to 
harm pro-competitive functions. The likely harm can be seen only after it is 
shown that confusion or dilution leads to it. Hence, if the use requirement is 
interpreted as determining the destiny of liability claims, other requirements or 
exceptions could lose their place in protecting pro-competitive functions. 
 Unfairness and harm to pro-competitive functions are directly related to 
confusion and dilution rather than ‘use of trade marks.’ Given that the definition 
of ‘unfairness’ is uncertain, and that Article 10bis(2) of the Paris Convention 
defines “an act of unfair competition” as “any act of competition contrary to 
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honest practices in industrial or commercial matters,”748 a use that is likely to 
generate any type of confusion or dilution may constitute ‘an unfair act.’ In this 
sense, both confusion and dilution delimits the scope of ‘unfairness’ in use of 
trade marks.  
 At the same time, confusion and dilution need to be demarcated by ‘harm 
to pro-competitive trade mark functions.’ Not all uses that are likely to cause 
confusion or dilution lead to likely damage to these functions. Not all confusing 
or dilutive uses are anti-competitive. Nevertheless, trade mark law does not 
require the condition of ‘likely harm to pro-competitive functions’ for trade mark 
liability so that this condition cannot be interpreted as a separate requirement for 
trade mark liability; rather, it should serve to delineating what type of confusion 
and dilution generates anti-competitive and thus materially inefficient effects on 
product markets. In short, confusion and dilution are essentials in assessing trade 
mark liability. They are able to fix the boundary of use of trade marks that is 
‘unfair,’ ‘anti-competitive,’ and ‘materially inefficient.’  
 Despite this core role of confusion and dilution, their individual ways of 
affecting pro-competitive functions should be understood differently. First, 
confusion affects consumer perception as to ‘controllers’ of product quality and 
brand image while dilution by blurring and tarnishment directly affects consumer 
perception as to ‘product quality’ or ‘product brand image.’ When use of trade 
marks causes consumer confusion, consumers could mistakenly believe that the 
product quality and brand image that the marks indicate are consistent with what 
owners’ marks denote and connote; even where consumers decide to change their 
preferences or purchasing decisions from owners’ products to other competitors’ 
because the quality of users’ products is low, or because experiences over users’ 
products give them inferior brand images, it is not dilution but confusion that 
causes the change in preferences or purchasing decisions. 
Second, likelihood of confusion occurs in users’ product markets while 
likelihood of dilution by blurring and tarnishment arises in trade mark owners’ 
product markets. Although both confusion and dilution (blurring and tarnishment) 
result from use of trade marks in users’ product markets, the markets where 
confusion or dilution occurs are different unless user’ product markets are the 
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same as owners’ product markets. For instance, where a company uses another 
company’s trade mark for instant coffee on its coffee syrup, a use is made in a 
coffee syrup market and it is likely to cause confusion in this market. On the other 
hand, where a company uses a trade mark for instant coffee on its laundry 
bleaches, a use is made in a bleach market but the use could tarnish the reputation 
of the trade mark in an instant coffee market.  
Third, and relatedly, the relationship between confusion and harm to pro-
competitive functions is not the same as that between blurring or tarnishment and 
this harm. In the case of non-competing use, the former relationship is not as 
direct as the latter because pro-competitive functions concern trade mark owners’ 
and competing product markets. This difference requires different analysis 
between confusion and dilution by blurring or tarnishment. Confusion arising 
from non-competing use needs additional explanation as to why confusion in 
users’ markets would have adverse effects on trade mark functions in owners’ 
product markets. Moreover, average consumers whose perspective is the 
standpoint in assessing likely confusion and dilution cannot be identical. 
In relation to the above points, the taking of unfair advantage, a third type 
of actionable dilution in EU trade mark law, is divorced from dilution by blurring 
and tarnishment. Because it occurs in users’ product markets, not in owners’ 
product markets, it should be discussed how unfair advantage in users’ markets 
can affect pro-competitive functions of famous marks. From the perspective of 
fair and efficient competition, the third type of dilution cannot be recognised as 
such if it can hardly explain the mechanism of its effects on the information and 
differentiation functions of famous marks. 
 Defences or exceptions from liability act as tools to properly limit trade 
mark protection based on internal or extraneous values of trade mark law. 
Exceptions such as descriptive fair use, nominative fair use, and functional use 
are based ‘principally’ on internal values of trade mark law: ‘fairness,’ 
‘competitiveness,’ and ‘immaterial inefficiency.’ Even where use of trade marks 
appears to be likely to cause confusion or dilution which leads to damage to pro-
competitive functions, the use should be permitted if trade mark protection brings 
about anti-competitive effects on product markets. Exceptions such as non-
commercial expression provided for in the Lanham Act and the Korean Unfair 
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Competition Act stem from freedom of expression. Unlike the EU Trade Mark 
Directive and the Community Trade Mark Regulation, section 43(c)(3) of the 
Lanham Act and article 2(1)(iii) of the Korean Unfair Competition Act provide 
explicitly that non-commercial expression is beyond the reach of dilution-based 
liability. 
 According to the Lanham Act and the Korean Unfair Competition Act, 
each group of exceptions has a different position in protecting trade mark 
functions. Exceptions based on internal values can turn seemingly actionable 
confusion or dilution into non-actionable confusion or dilution. That is, they can 
transform ostensible likelihood of harm to possible or no harm to pro-competitive 
trade mark functions. In this sense, some degree of confusion or dilution can be 
compatible with classic fair use, nominative fair use, and functional use. On the 
other hand, exceptions based solely on free speech values in both laws have 
nothing to do with non-actionable harm to pro-competitive functions. Thus, it 
appears that both laws allow actionable dilution to coexist with these exceptions. 
As will be discussed in detail in part III, however, insofar as actionable likelihood 
of dilution in non-commercial context is limited to ‘explicit harm to pro-
competitive functions,’ free speech values have much to do with harm to these 
functions and non-commercial speech exceptions are unnecessary.  
In addition to the positions of requirements and exceptions, the scope of 
protectable trade mark functions discussed in chapter 2 is significant in 
interpreting them. First, pro-competitive functions only concern information as to 
controllers of product quality and brand image. Information on other kinds of 
relationship between owners and users is unclear. This vague information is likely 
to complicate the decision making of competitors and consumers rather than help. 
On the other hand, brand image is included in the information that trade marks 
convey for fair and efficient competition. Competitors can impregnate their trade 
marks with their own product brand images. Consumers can form their preference 
for certain products because of the utility that these brand images possess. This is 
important in determining the subject of confusion and the meaning and scope of 
dilution by blurring and tarnishment. 
Second, the differentiation function not only relates to the ability of 
consumers to distinguish between products, but it also concerns the creation, 
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alteration, or removal of consumer preference. Even if third party use does not 
interfere with consumers’ purchasing decisions, it can damage the differentiation 
function by unfairly changing consumer preference. The timing of confusion is a 
relevant issue. 
Third, since the information and differentiation functions can only reach 
competing product markets, third party use in non-competing product markets 
does not affect these functions in the same way as use in competing product 
markets does. For example, where third parties use trade marks on competing 
products, confusion as to controllers of product quality is directly linked to harm 
to trade mark functions of owners’ trade marks. Consumers in owners’ product 
markets, who are keen to competing products, cannot distinguish between 
products based on the information that trade marks deliver. Trade mark owners 
cannot differentiate their products from competitors’ through use of trade marks. 
On the other hand, use in non-competing product markets cannot easily justify 
trade mark liability. There should be likelihood of adverse effects on the 
information and differentiation functions of owners’ trade marks in owners’ 
product markets. This difference concerns the meaning of ‘likelihood of 
confusion.’  
 In sum, requirements and exceptions, at issue in keyword cases, should 
be interpreted on the basis of their positions in protecting pro-competitive 
functions and the scope of these functions. This interpretation will conform to the 
purpose of trade mark protection. 
 
2) Use of Trade Marks 
 
Here the thesis suggests that the use requirement should not play a role 
beyond its capability in determining trade mark liability: it cannot distinguish 
between fair and unfair use and cannot decide whether adverse effects on pro-
competitive trade mark functions are likely until the absence or presence of 
likelihood of confusion or dilution is obvious. Rather, the role should be limited 
to excluding the case where consumers cannot ‘perceive’ any use of trade marks. 
In this sense, ‘use of trade marks’ within the reach of trade mark liability should 
be construed as meaning use of trade marks in a manner that can be perceived by 
167 
 
consumers.  
 The trade mark use theory, which interprets ‘use of trade marks’ as ‘use 
as trade marks,’ has its limits in properly delimiting the scope of trade mark 
protection and considering the peculiarities of paid search marketing.  
First, it cannot maintain a proper balance between interested parties. It is 
predicated on the assumption that confusion and dilution tests cannot sufficiently 
contribute to finding the proper scope of trade mark protection.
749
 Hence, it seeks 
to curb the expansion of trade mark protection by interpreting ‘use of trade marks’ 
as ‘use as trade marks.’ It further suggests that this interpretation could keep a 
balance by “prohibiting actions that undercut the ability of consumers to rely on 
marks for reliable product information, while allowing references to marks that 
simply enhance the flow of information to consumers and foster competition.”750 
Authors who argue for the theory maintain that “[t]he appropriate cause of action 
… may be a false advertising claim” rather than a trade mark infringement claim 
where trade marks are not used as such.
751
  
This theory, however, erects another barrier to competition by permitting 
use of trade marks that is likely to harm pro-competitive trade mark functions. 
False advertising cannot be the grounds for preventing invisible use of trade 
marks as keywords, which, in combination with advertisements on SERPs, could 
confuse consumers or dilute trade marks without using false or misleading 
expressions. For example, where a keyword identical with a famous mark for 
instant coffee triggers an advertisement for laundry bleaches and the 
advertisement neither include the mark nor misleading words, courts would not 
accept a false advertising claim. After all, the balance will tip in favour of third 
party users under the trade mark use theory. 
 Second, in paid search marketing, the trade mark use theory almost 
ignores the fact that trade marks are employed in software programmes. The main 
characteristic of paid search marketing, ‘internal use’ of trade marks as keywords 
that triggers advertisements, is treated as not existing in assessing trade mark 
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liability. Paid search marketing is equated with run-of-the-mill advertising in that 
advertisers can be responsible for trade mark infringement only where marks are 
used in advertisements. The trade mark use theory does not put much weight on 
the triggering effect of internal use. 
 These limits of the theory stem basically from the relative position of the 
use requirement in protecting trade mark functions. The use requirement itself 
cannot decide whether the use is fair or unfair, pro-competitive or anti-
competitive, and materially inefficient or not. In relation to this, the theory can 
argue that only use as trade marks can cause actionable likelihood of confusion or 
dilution. This, however, is an assumption rather than a fact. Advertisers’ invisible 
use of trade marks in paid search marketing can cause actionable likelihood of 
confusion or dilution. The argument also makes defences such as fair use 
redundant and unnecessary. It assigns roles of other requirements and defences to 
the use requirement. In the same vein, ‘use as trade marks in a more functional 
sense’ also does not place the use requirement on a proper position because it 
connects the interpretation of the use requirement with confusion more strongly 
than the trade mark use theory.  
Therefore, the role of ‘use of trade marks’ should be limited to separating 
the use of trade marks that consumers can perceive from the use that consumers 
cannot because the latter use cannot cause consumer confusion or dilution at all. 
Consumers’ perceptibility of use of trade marks, however, does not always match 
the visibility of trade marks. Consumers can detect use of trade marks based on 
context and circumstances. For example, internet users, who input a trade mark in 
a search box, can perceive that the mark is somehow used in a programme based 
on the fact that a search engine triggers relevant advertisements some of which do 
not include the mark. On the other hand, use of trade marks visible to some 
consumers may not be recognised by consumers in different contexts. For 
instance, internet users are unable to know whether trade marks are used on 
advertisers’ websites until they visit those sites. In this sense, use of trade marks 
should be construed as meaning ‘use of trade marks that consumers can perceive.’ 
 
3) Likelihood of Confusion 
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(1) Subject of Confusion 
 
 Trade mark law does not always provide clearly for the subject of 
consumer confusion. The EU Trade Mark Directive, the Community Trade Mark 
Regulation, and the Korean Trade Mark Act do not delineate it. In the Lanham 
Act, section 32(1) for registered trade marks does not have any mention about it, 
whereas section 43(a)(1) for unregistered trade marks provides that likelihood of 
confusion covers “the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [a person’s] goods, 
services, or commercial activities by another person.” Nevertheless, the concepts 
of ‘approval’ and ‘sponsorship’ can be difficult to delimit. 
 This thesis suggests that the subject of consumer confusion should be 
‘controllers of product quality and brand image.’ First, it should be ‘about product 
quality and brand image’ because only likelihood of confusion that could harm 
the information and differentiation functions is actionable and only information 
on product quality and brand image falls within the scope of these functions. If 
use of trade marks could cause confusion as to some kind of relationship between 
trade mark owners and users, it is not likely that this confusion harms the 
functions of owners’ trade marks. Even if consumers purchase users’ products 
because of this relationship, this purchasing decision does not interfere with the 
functions:
752
 consumers can detect the position of product quality and brand 
image through trade marks, and trade mark owners still can differentiate their 
products from competitors’ through their own trade marks. Competitors can 
establish their marketing strategies in the light of the information that the trade 
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marks convey. 
Second, consumer confusion should not be about ‘the same product 
quality and brand image’ but, instead, about ‘who controls’ product quality and 
brand image. This is because the transfer of rights, competitors’ products, market 
conditions, and owners’ marketing strategies can change the product quality and 
brand image that trade marks denote or connote. The transfer of trade mark rights 
to others cannot guarantee the consistency of product quality and brand image. 
Competitors’ products and other market conditions can alter the relative level of 
the quality and brand image of owners’ products. Owners may want to change 
quality or brand image to make their products more competitive. Rather, trade 
marks convey information to consumers and competitors that their product 
quality and brand image are controlled by trade mark owners: owners assume 
ultimate responsibility for product quality and brand image. Thus, third party use 
may mislead consumers into believing that the product quality and brand image 
of users’ products are ‘under the control of trade mark owners.’ 
Looking in detail at the meaning of confusion as to ‘controllers of 
product quality and brand image,’ there is a subtle difference, depending on the 
markets where third party use of trade marks is made. In the case of competing 
use, confusion means simply ‘consumers’ mistaken belief that trade mark owners 
control the quality and brand image of users’ products.’ Based on this incorrect 
information and identification, consumers form their preferences, or make 
purchasing decisions. As a result, trade mark owners cannot differentiate their 
products efficiently from competitors’ products through their trade marks because 
the information conveyed by third parties’ trade marks is conceived as that 
delivered by the owners’ marks. Obviously the information and differentiation 
functions are not entirely in the owners’ hands.  
In double identity cases, this consumer misconception is much more 
likely to harm the information and differentiation functions of owners’ trade 
marks. The first reason is that the identity between trade marks ‘mistakenly 
assures’ consumers that both trade marks deliver the same information on product 
quality and brand image. The second is that the adverse effects of the consumer 
misconception on the functions of owners’ trade marks in this context are much 
more direct and immediate than those in use of trade marks on similar and 
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competing products because consumers of owners’ products are the same as those 
of users’ products. Where, for example, a coffee company B uses another 
company A’s trade mark for coffee, consumers would ‘mistakenly believe’ that 
the company A controls the quality and brand image of B’s coffee. As a result, 
direct and indirect experiences, whether positive or negative, from the use of B’s 
coffee, word of mouth, or B’s marketing affect consumer understanding as to the 
quality and brand image of A’s coffee. This consumer understanding ‘directly and 
immediately’ interferes with the functions of A’s trade mark since A’s and B’s 
consumers are identical. Even where the quality of B’s coffee is superior to that 
of A’s coffee, use of A’s trade mark on B’s coffee adversely affects the functions 
of A’s trade mark because consumers and other competitors can hardly recognise 
the quality and brand image of A’s coffee. The functions of A’s trade mark is no 
more in the hand of the company A. This confusion could even lead to so-called 
reverse confusion.
753
 Consumers could have the misconception that B owns the 
trade mark and the quality and brand image of B’s coffee are what the trade mark 
‘really’ stands for. 
Because of the increased likelihood of harm, some trade mark laws such 
as the EU Trade Mark Directive, the Community Trade Mark Regulation, and the 
Korean Trade Mark Act do not require likelihood of confusion for trade mark 
infringement in double identity cases. This, however, should not be interpreted as 
meaning that double identity in itself would always cause confusion-based 
liability. For example, many courts and commentators do not suggest that use of 
the identical marks as keywords for the same products always causes likelihood 
of confusion. Similarly, the fact that likelihood of confusion is not required in 
double identity cases should not lead to the conclusion that more or wide trade 
mark functions are protected, or that quasi-dilution-based liability is adopted. As 
in other cases, trade mark liability in double identity cases can arise only where 
the information and differentiation functions of owners’ marks are likely to be 
harmed. At least insofar as there is no real ‘likelihood of dilution’ in a double 
identity provision, quasi-dilution-based liability should not be adopted.  
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 In the context of non-competing use, ‘confusion as to controllers of 
product quality and brand image’ consists of two misconceptions: the 
misconception that trade mark owners entered users’ product markets and the 
misconception that trade mark owners control the quality and brand image of 
users’ products. The former misconception is a prerequisite for actionable 
likelihood of confusion in non-competing use. Without this misconception, 
consumers in non-competing product markets cannot be confused into believing 
that trade mark owners control the quality and brand image of users’ products. 
For instance, consumers for coffee syrup would mistakenly believe that a coffee 
company controls the quality of coffee syrup only when they think that the 
company entered a coffee syrup market. In this sense, evaluating this 
misconception is significant in the likelihood of confusion test. 
In relation to this, courts in different jurisdictions have suggested similar, 
but not identical, factors in assessing similarity of products. In Network 
Automation, the US Ninth Circuit stated that “[t]he proximity of goods is 
measured by whether the products are: (1) complementary; (2) sold to the same 
class of purchasers; and (3) similar in use and function.”754 In Canon, the ECJ 
held that relevant factors “include, inter alia, their nature, their end users and 
their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are 
complementary.”755 The General Court additionally considered other factors such 
as the distribution channels of products.
756
 In Mania, the Supreme Court of 
Korea indicated that the nature, shape, and use of products, production sector, 
sales sector, and the scope of consumers should be considered in assessing 
similarity of products.
757
 These relevant factors directly concern consumer 
misconception as to the expansion of trade marks into non-competing markets.  
US federal courts include some other elements, which relate to this 
misconception, in their likelihood of confusion tests. The Pignons factors of the 
First Circuit include i) “the relationship between the parties’ channels of trade,” ii) 
“the relationship between advertising,” and iii) “the likelihood that the prior 
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owner will bridge the gap.”758 The Polaroid test of the Second Circuit contains 
“the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap.”759 The Third Circuit 
embraces “whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed through the 
same channels of trade and advertised through the same media” and “other facts 
suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior owner to 
manufacture a product in the defendant’s market, or that he is likely to expand 
into that market” in its Lapp factors.760 One factor of the Sleekcraft test adopted 
by the Ninth Circuit is “likelihood of expansion of the product lines.”761  
This thesis, however, suggests that ‘likelihood of expansion’ should not 
be considered in assessing likelihood of confusion. It is because, without the 
belief that trade mark owners ‘already’ entered users’ markets, consumers would 
not mistakenly believe that trade mark owners control the quality and brand 
image of users’ products. 
 As is the case in competing use, consumers’ mistaken belief that trade 
mark owners control the quality and brand image of users’ products is also 
necessary for actionable confusion. Even though consumers conceive that trade 
mark owners already expanded into users’ product markets or licensed trade 
marks to users, there would be no actionable confusion if consumers are not 
confused as to who controls the quality and brand image of users’ products. For 
example, consumers of coffee syrup can be misled into thinking that a coffee 
company owns shares of a coffee syrup company because the syrup company’s 
trade mark includes the same suffix used in the coffee company’s trade mark. 
Nevertheless, this is not sufficient to affect the functions of the coffee company’s 
trade mark. Consumers of coffee are still able to identify product quality and 
brand image via trade marks in the market for coffee. They, whether consumers of 
coffee syrup or not, would not think that the coffee syrup company’s trade mark 
indicates the quality and brand image of coffee, based merely on the 
misconception as to the coffee company’s ownership of shares.  
 Additionally, non-competing use needs an explanation as to how 
likelihood of consumer confusion in non-competing product markets could harm 
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the information and differentiation functions of owners’ trade marks in owners’ 
product markets. Where consumers of users’ products are confused as to both the 
extension of trade marks and trade mark owners’ control over quality and image, 
consumers of owners’ products, who are also consumers of users’ products, would 
regard the quality and image indicated by users’ trade marks as those by owners’ 
marks. Similarly, consumers of owners’ products, who do not constitute 
consumers of users’ products, would do the same. First, like consumers of users’ 
products, they are likely to be confused as to the extension of trade marks; that is, 
factors, which form the basis of confusion as to the entry of trade mark owners 
into users’ product markets, affect both sets of consumers. Second, considering 
the proximity between markets which is close enough to cause likelihood of 
confusion as to the extension of trade marks, they are usually exposed directly or 
indirectly to consumer confusion and evaluation in users’ product markets: i) 
confusion as to trade mark owners’ control over quality and image and ii) 
evaluation of quality and image as a result of experiencing users’ products. After 
all, consumers of owners’ products, whether consumers of users’ products or not, 
could not identify the quality and brand image of owners’ products. Owners could 
not steer their trade marks in the direction where they want them to go. Thus, the 
pro-competitive functions of trade marks are likely to be harmed by consumer 
confusion in non-competing product markets. 
 
(2) Timing of Confusion  
 
 The timing of confusion in keyword cases relates to three questions. The 
first question is whether confusion as to controllers of product quality and brand 
image prior to purchase could harm pro-competitive functions. The second is 
whether the fact that confusion dissipates at the time of purchase can restore 
damaged functions. And, relatedly, whether very short duration between the point 
when initial confusion occurs and the time of purchase before which initial 
confusion dissipates makes confusion non-actionable is the third question. 
 As to the first question, confusion as to controllers could harm the 
information and differentiation functions of trade marks, even before consumers’ 
purchase of products, in that it could make consumers form, alter, and dispose of 
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their preference for owners’ products based on incorrect information. It would not 
be likely that consumer confusion is just locked deep within consumers’ minds 
and has no effect until consumers buy products. Where, for example, a company 
A’s trade mark for coffee is used in newspaper advertising for another company 
B’s coffee, A’s trade mark cannot indicate the quality and brand image of A’s 
coffee which A wants to show. It is because consumers mistakenly believe that 
the mark used by B in advertising also indicates the same. As a result, consumers 
of coffee would decide whether they maintain or change their preference for A’s 
coffee based on confusing information. Even when B maintains the same quality 
and brand image as what A’s mark indicates, there still exists a high possibility 
that A cannot use its trade mark as it wishes. 
 Second, the fact that confusion is debilitated or dispelled at the time of 
purchase does not change these effects. The impaired trade mark functions cannot 
be restored retroactively. Only from the point when confusion is debilitated or 
dispelled do trade marks start to perform their normal functions. 
 Third, even when the duration between initial confusion and dissipation 
is very short, there could be harm to trade mark functions. Some deny pre-sale 
confusion by use of trade marks on the Internet because of this very brief 
duration.
762
 In GEICO II, a district court in the Fourth Circuit also stated that 
“the risk of losing customers who are initially confused is lessened on the Internet 
as compared, for example, to when a billboard employs initial interest confusion 
to entice a customer down the wrong road because a customer can retrace his 
steps almost instantaneously online.”763  
Consumers, however, can form, alter, and dispose of their preferences for 
products based solely on online advertisements without visiting the advertised 
websites, just as they do the same relying merely on newspaper or TV advertising. 
Huge amounts of information on the Internet may make it almost impossible for 
consumers to decide even after visiting advertisers’ websites. Rather, consumers 
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may prefer more concise information for their choices. Moreover, third party use 
can have an adverse influence on the trade mark functions within a very short 
period of time through the Internet. Thus, pre-sale confusion can also arise in paid 
search marketing. 
 
(3) Average Consumers in Product Markets 
 
In paid search marketing, the level of consumer attention has two aspects. 
It can affect consumer understanding as to both the similarity of trade marks and 
the mechanics of paid search marketing. If consumers are well-versed in the 
mechanics and thus think that advertisements irrelevant to trade marked keywords 
also appear in response to the entry of the keywords, consumers would not be 
easily confused as to controllers of product quality and brand image.  
  Basically, consumer care in paid search marketing, irrespective of 
whether it is about the similarity between trade marks or about the mechanics, 
should depend on the price and nature of users’ products and the type of 
consumers of these products because consumer confusion arises in users’ product 
markets. The fact that paid search marketing takes place solely in an online world 
cannot lead to the conclusion that relevant marketplaces are limited to online 
product markets. The effects on protectable trade mark functions do not vary, 
depending on whether the effects are generated by use of trade marks in an online 
or offline world. From the perspective of trade mark protection, the Internet is 
just a marketing channel that is broadly used by producers or distributors, not a 
tool to create separate product markets independent of off-line product 
markets.
764
 Therefore, relevant markets should be product markets which include 
online and offline markets, and relevant consumers in the context of paid search 
marketing should not be limited to internet users or consumers who understand 
well online shopping and marketing; consumer sophistication varies, depending 
on the category of products or consumers.
765
 In this vein, it cannot be said that 
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the default degree of consumer care is either high or low.  
 Consumer care about the similarity between trade marks, however, is not 
the same as that about the mechanics of paid search marketing. For example, 
consumers of luxury watches could compare the similarity of trade marks very 
carefully because of their price. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that they are able to 
understand the mechanics of paid search marketing. Even experts such as doctors, 
when buying medical equipment, could be misled into believing that triggered 
advertisements are connected with trade mark owners. A high degree of consumer 
care about the mechanics would be expected where products are search engine 
services, or consumers are experts in online marketing. 
 
4) Likelihood of Dilution  
 
(1) Blurring 
 
 It is suggested here that ‘harm to distinctiveness’ could arise when use of 
marks identical with, or similar to, famous marks is likely to make consumers of 
owners’ products associate famous marks with inconsistent but not negative 
product quality or images. It is because this association could obscure the strong 
position of product quality or brand image and hence harm the information and 
differentiation functions of famous marks. First, use of identical or similar marks 
on products of quality inconsistent with the quality of products bearing famous 
marks could gradually weaken the entrenched position of product quality that 
famous marks identify. Associations between famous marks and identical or 
similar marks and thus between famous marks and inconsistent product quality 
could slowly but surely make it difficult for consumers to link famous marks with 
the product quality that these marks indicate. For example, if a clothing 
manufacturer uses the mark ‘Rolex’ on its T-shirts of average quality, an 
association between ‘Rolex’ for watches and ‘Rolex’ for T-shirts could slowly 
make consumers of watches lose their belief as to the solid position of the quality 
of ‘Rolex’ watches. Although ‘Rolex’ for watches still can indicate the position of 
their product quality and serve to differentiate Rolex watches from other watches, 
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consumers would not have the same degree of firm belief as to this position 
because of the association between ‘Rolex’ and T-shirts of average quality. 
Consumers would not come to possess negative associations as to ‘Rolex’ 
watches, but they could have a much less clear perception as to Rolex’s quality 
position in a watch market. 
 Second, blurring could also occur when identical or similar marks are 
used on products with inconsistent images or they convey inconsistent brand 
images. As Anne Gundelfinger, former President of the International Trademark 
Association, asserted in her testimony before US Congress, third party use of 
Intel’s ‘PENTIUM’ mark for un-high-tech real estate brokerage services or 
sportswear would ‘blur and dampen’ the ‘PENTIUM’ mark’s image of ‘cutting-
edge technology, premium performance, and integrity’ “even if the impairment to 
the PENTIUM mark takes years to manifest.”766 That is, Intel gradually could 
not deliver to consumers the image that it wishes to embody in PENTIUM to 
differentiate its products from others, and consumers could not enjoy the utility 
that this image offers to them. A gap between the image which Intel wants to 
convey and the image which consumers perceive would become too wide to be 
bridged because of the interference of use of the Intel mark on real estate 
brokerage services or sportswear.  
Third, use of famous marks as generic names can cause dilution by 
blurring. Some US courts
767
 and authors
768
 argue against use of anti-dilution law 
for the purpose of preventing use as generic names, while other US courts
769
 and 
the ECJ
770
 do not. It is suggested here that use as generic names can harm 
distinctiveness by putting famous marks in danger of malfunction. The use could 
gradually make it ‘impossible’ for the marks to denote the position of both 
product quality and brand image and hence hamper the information and 
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differentiation functions. Since competitors have neither competitive interests nor 
free speech interests to use famous marks as generic names until they become 
generic names, this use cannot be justified from the perspective of competition or 
freedom of expression. Use as generic names is not the same as other blurring 
uses in that it could totally harm trade mark functions, but it can still be 
categorised into blurring because this use does not give negative impressions to 
consumers as to product quality and brand image.  
Blurring arising from degeneration, however, should not be admitted 
based on conjecture or assumption. Blurring should be limited to cases where use 
of trade marks and its context evidently show the risk of turning famous marks 
into generic names. Mere use of famous marks or the triggering effect of internal 
use of famous marks alone should not be interpreted as causing the risk of 
degeneration, on the assumption that this use or effect will change famous marks 
into generic names in the long run. This meagre possibility of blurring is not what 
trade mark law prevents. It is the probability of blurring that trade mark law 
prohibits. 
 
(2) Tarnishment 
 
 This thesis suggests that ‘harm to reputation’ could occur when use of 
marks identical with, or similar to, famous marks is likely to lead consumers to 
associate famous marks with negative product quality or brand images. The 
rationale behind this is that the association could damage the strong position of 
product quality or brand image and thus harm the information and differentiation 
functions. First, use of famous marks on poor quality products would be 
detrimental to the strong position of the quality of owners’ products. This use 
would make consumers of owners’ products call to mind poor quality whenever 
they think of famous marks. For example, use of ‘Rolex’ for T-shirts of very poor 
quality could make consumers of watches start to undervalue the quality of Rolex 
watches by associating ‘Rolex’ with T-shirts of poor quality; consumers could no 
more feel the same utility as before. At the same time, the Rolex watch company, 
despite its control over the functions of the ‘Rolex’ mark in a watch market, 
cannot deliver to consumers information on the position of the quality of ‘Rolex’ 
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watches that it wants to. 
 Second, where third parties use famous marks on their products and 
advertise unwholesome or undesirable images, the images of famous marks could 
be harmed. An association between trade marks could lead consumers to conjure 
up images harmful to famous marks. In the above example, if a T-shirt 
manufacturer emphasises sexuality or cheapness in its advertising, the 
manufacturer’s use would negatively affect the image of ‘Rolex.’ Consumers of 
watches would not feel the same degree of ‘prestige’ about Rolex watches. The 
brand image that consumers perceive becomes more and more remote from the 
image that owners seek to deliver to consumers. 
The assessment of whether images are ‘detrimental’ to the positive 
images of famous marks is relative. Use of a famous mark in a sexual context 
would not harm the functions of the famous mark if the image of the famous 
mark conveys sexuality. To take an example, the famous mark Playboy, which has 
been neither used nor registered for computers, would not be tarnished just 
because a third company uses Playboy on its computer, emphasising sexuality in 
its advertising. Therefore, “a kind of rebuttable presumption, or at least a very 
strong inference, that a new mark used to sell sex-related products is likely to 
tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear semantic association between the two”771 
should not be adopted in determining dilution by tarnishment. 
 In assessing brand image, the literal meaning of trade marks is not 
significant; rather, brand image should be evaluated globally. In this vein, the US 
Second Circuit found that ‘Charbucks’ did not communicate an unfavourable 
image although the name of ‘Charbucks’ could indicate an over-roasted type of 
coffee.
772
 The Circuit reasoned that the owner of ‘Charbucks’ mark promoted a 
positive image for ‘Charbucks’ rather than a negative meaning and marketed the 
Charbucks line of coffee as a product of ‘very high quality.’773 
 Third, dissonance between the nature of famous mark owners’ products 
and that of third party users’ products could negatively influence the position of 
product quality or product brand image. The reason for this is that the 
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characteristics of some products may amount to the poor quality or detrimental 
images of other products. For instance, if a famous mark for coffee is used on 
laundry bleaches, consumers of coffee could associate the famous mark with 
bleaches. As a result, the famous mark for coffee would not maintain its strong 
position in a coffee market. This kind of tarnishment is irrespective of the quality 
and brand image of bleaches. 
 
(3) Limits of Dilution 
 
Delayed responses or additional cognitive efforts in linking trade marks 
to owners’ products alone cannot justify trade mark liability. Blurring and 
tarnishment generate a delay or additional cognitive efforts, but the opposite is 
not always the case. First, in practice, an instant association between trade marks 
would not interfere with the link between famous marks and products at all times. 
Since consumers normally depend on trade marks ‘for a specific product,’ what 
consumers have to recall is not both trade marks and products, but trade marks for 
the product. Thus, even if uses of a famous mark result in various kinds of 
products bearing the same mark, focusing on a specific product would enable 
consumers to readily call to mind the famous mark.
774
 Where, for example, a 
restaurant owner uses the famous mark ‘Rolex’ for its restaurant and another 
company uses the same mark for its ice cream, these uses do not make it difficult 
for consumers to match watches to the mark ‘Rolex’ in a watch shop. 
Second, an association between trade marks, which causes more mental 
time or additional cognitive efforts, could strengthen the functions of famous 
marks
775
 by facilitating an association between famous marks and product 
quality or evoking positive brand images. As the US Fourth Circuit pointed out, 
use of famous marks in a parody would make consumers think harder, but at the 
same time it would strengthen the link between famous marks and products. The 
Circuit asserted in Haute Diggity Dog that “by making the famous mark an object 
of the parody, a successful parody might actually enhance the famous mark’s 
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distinctiveness by making it an icon.”776 Where famous marks used by third 
parties for non-competing products convey a ‘luxury’ brand image, an association 
between trade marks would intensify consumers’ impressions about famous 
marks. For instance, the ‘Rolex’ restaurant, which is famous for its exclusive 
design and food, would help the Rolex mark to deliver an elegant and luxurious 
image of its watches. 
Third, brand extension also shows that increased time and efforts do not 
always impair trade mark functions. In the case of brand extension, a link 
between famous marks and specific products may need more time because the 
same trade marks are used for many kinds of products. Nevertheless, the mere 
existence of different sorts of products bearing the same marks would not 
influence consumer preference for specific products.  
For these reasons, the assessment of dilution should not depend solely on 
the amount of mental time or cognitive efforts in matching famous marks to 
products on which these marks were originally used. It should hinge on likelihood 
of harm to the information and differentiation functions of famous marks arising 
from obscuring or damaging the strong position of either product quality or 
product brand image. In the same vein, the US Second Circuit emphasised in 
Starbucks that blurring claim “must ultimately focus on whether an association, 
arising from the similarity between the subject marks, impairs the distinctiveness 
of the famous mark.”777 More mental time or extra cognitive efforts ‘may or may 
not’ be detrimental to pro-competitive trade mark functions.  
 From the same standpoint, unfair advantage of the distinctive character or 
the repute of marks with a reputation, a third type of dilution that constitutes 
infringing use in EU trade mark law, hardly explains likely harm to the functions 
of famous marks. Insofar as injury in this type of dilution is interpreted as unfair 
benefits of third parties
778
 and ‘unfair’ is construed as meaning ‘lack of payment 
to proprietors of famous marks,’779 third parties’ taking unfair advantage could 
not prevent consumers of proprietors’ products from determining their 
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preferences based on product quality or product brand image. Famous marks 
would still fulfil their functions properly. Therefore, dilution in the form of unfair 
advantage should not be accepted.  
 
(4) Average Consumers in Product Markets 
 
 In contrast to confusion, blurring and tarnishment should be assessed 
from the viewpoint of average consumers of owners’ products since both of them 
arise in owners’ product markets. In Intel, the ECJ pointed out that dilution by 
blurring and tarnishment should be determined “by reference to average 
consumers of the goods and services for which that mark is registered, who are 
reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect.”780  
Moreover, where third parties use famous marks in an online world, 
average consumers of owners’ products should not be limited to internet users. 
Where, for example, a famous mark for instant coffee is used for laundry 
bleaches sold exclusively in an online shop, trade mark liability should hinge on 
likely harm to the functions of the famous mark assessed from the perspective of 
average consumers of coffee. Whether third parties use famous marks in an online 
or offline world should not change ‘average consumers of owners’ products.’ 
 Just as average consumers in the assessment of dilution are different from 
those in the evaluation of confusion, the degree of consumer care should also be 
different. In assessing consumer perception as to the similarity between trade 
marks and the mechanics of paid search marketing, consumer sophistication 
should depend on the type of consumers of owners’ products and the price and 
nature of owners’ products. In cases where products bearing famous marks are 
expensive, consumers could be sophisticated enough to define the scope of ‘the 
similarity between marks’ narrowly. 
 
5) Limits of Trade Mark Rights 
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(1) Scope of Defences 
 
 Defences such as fair use and functional use could expand unless their 
underlying values do not delimit their scope. Defendants in keyword cases may 
insist that their use is just to describe the content of websites even where the 
content is not considered in assessing confusion or dilution. They may argue for 
functional use, interpreting the meaning of functional use as encompassing ‘use 
that is necessary only for the functioning of defendants’ business.’ Just as the 
expansion of confusion and dilution unnecessarily strengthens the competitive 
interests of trade mark owners, a too broad interpretation of fair use and 
functional use could result in the owners’ competitive disadvantage. 
 It is suggested here that fair use and functional use should also be based 
on fair and efficient competition and the scope of the information and 
differentiation functions. Whilst confusion and dilution claims support the fact 
that ‘pro-competitive’ trade mark functions are likely to be harmed, fair use and 
functional use defences indicate that the protection of trade marks could cause 
anti-competitive results. Thus, fair use and functional use should be permitted 
only in this case. 
A fair use defence should not be accepted on the basis of facts irrelevant 
to anti-competitive effects that could result from the prevention of defendants’ 
use of owners’ marks. For example, the content of advertisers’ websites would 
not be adversely affected when use of trade marks as metatags is prevented. First, 
advertisers can still maintain the same content unless the content itself causes 
likelihood of confusion or dilution. Second, they can use other words as metatags 
to describe their websites. Thus, fair use should not be accepted only because use 
of trade marks is intended to describe the content of websites. Even where trade 
marks are used as domain names in the text of advertisements, websites that these 
domain names indicate should not be taken into account in assessing whether ‘the 
text of advertisements’ constitutes fair use; whether ‘use of trade marks as domain 
names’ in combination with the content of websites and products sold on the 
websites is fair or not is another issue.  
 Functional use should also concern anti-competitive effects that could 
stem from the prevention of defendants’ use of owners’ marks. ‘Functionality’ 
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may not be defined solely in terms of effective competition.
781
 Nevertheless, 
where third parties use trade marks on non-competing products, these marks, 
albeit essential to the use or purpose of the products, cannot be functional in 
owners’ product markets. This is because preventing the use does not lead to the 
competitive advantage of trade mark owners at the cost of neglecting users’ need 
to compete effectively with them. Where, for example, a guitar company uses a 
coffee company’s guitar body shape trade mark, this mark cannot be functional in 
relation to coffee even if the shape is essential for the use of guitars. Functionality 
should not be based solely on the use or purpose of ‘users’ products.’  
 
(2) Defences and Requirements  
 
 Fair use and functional use defences play a role that ‘use as trade marks’ 
cannot. The trade mark use theory is based on the assumption that only use as 
trade marks can cause actionable likelihood of confusion or dilution and hence 
‘non-use as trade marks’ could not be claimed when there is actual consumer 
confusion. On the other hand, since fair use and functional use are not necessarily 
based on this assumption, defendants could counterclaim either of them in this 
situation.  
These defences are also distinguished from confusion or dilution tests. 
Defences do not mean the non-existence of confusion and dilution. The confusion 
and dilution tests intend to prove harm to pro-competitive functions. By contrast, 
fair use and functional use defences aim to prove that trade mark protection could 
cause anti-competitive effects and third party use could only harm trade mark 
functions that are beyond the scope of anti-competitive functions. Because of this 
peculiar position, fair use and functional use defences should not collapse into the 
analysis of confusion or dilution and the absence of confusion or dilution should 
not be a condition for these defences. As the US Third Circuit stated in Century 
21 Real Estate, “[i]f the factors for determining fairness were incorporated into 
the likelihood of confusion test, a plaintiff's showing of confusion might well 
overwhelm a defendant's showing of fair use” and that “[t]his would essentially 
force a defendant asserting nominative fair use to negate all likelihood of 
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confusion to succeed.”782 
 
(3) Safe Harbour  
 
 Some may maintain the introduction of a new safe harbour that 
eliminates the liability of search engines for their use of trade marks as keywords. 
From the perspective of search engines, it is very tempting for trade mark law to 
include a new safe harbour because the safe harbour can offer predictability. 
Nevertheless, without firm proof that a new safe harbour can protect values which 
outweigh fair and efficient competition, trade mark law should not embrace it.  
 
4. Conclusion: Liability of Advertisers and Search Engines 
 
1) Relevant Context and Circumstances 
 
 The relevant context and circumstances are particularly significant in 
evaluating facts in keyword cases. The evaluation can vary, depending on whether 
the scope is limited to visible paid search results, whether it includes actual and 
directly relevant context and circumstances, or whether it encompasses all 
relevant context and circumstances. If, for example, trade marks used internally in 
software programmes are regarded as just links to paid results and as having 
nothing to do with adverse effects on trade mark functions, only advertising text 
would be considered in determining trade mark liability. Some commentators 
suggest that it is only the text of advertisements that can cause consumer 
confusion in paid search marketing.
783
 On the other hand, if the scope embraces 
indirectly relevant context and circumstances such as the content of advertisers’ 
websites, they will be considered in determining liability.  
It is submitted here that courts should consider only actual context and 
circumstances germane directly to the use of trade marks as keywords. It is 
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because context and circumstances that consumers cannot perceive as relevant to 
use as keywords are not capable of influencing consumer perception or consumer 
association and thus the pro-competitive trade mark functions. Unless consumers 
are omnipotent, they cannot perceive non-actual or just indirectly related context 
and circumstances. Average consumers of products are unable to understand what 
they cannot see, hear, or feel. The ECJ also asserted in O2 Holdings that “the 
referring court was right to limit its analysis to the context in which the sign 
similar to the bubbles trade marks was used by H3G, for the purpose of assessing 
the existence of a likelihood of confusion” and that “the assessment must be 
limited to the circumstances characterising that use.”784  
Thus, courts should not take into account the content of advertisers’ 
websites since consumers who input trade marks into search boxes cannot 
perceive it. Neither should they consider the recommendation, sale, and purchase 
of trade marked keywords because the consumers cannot perceive these uses 
which were made before the input of search terms. Nevertheless, at the stage 
when search engines recommend and sell keywords, the recommendation, sale, 
and purchase amount to directly relevant context and circumstances. At this stage, 
advertisers constitute consumers of trade marked keywords and, unlike 
consumers who input trade marks into search boxes, can easily recognise them.  
The thesis also suggests that internal use of trade marks should be 
included in actual context and circumstances. First, advertisers, consumers of 
keywords, can readily perceive the internal use since it is the result of the sale and 
purchase. Second, consumers who use the Internet can also sense it based on the 
fact that trade marks as keywords trigger paid search results that may or may not 
include the marks. Third, trade mark use in paid search marketing cannot be 
deemed to be the same as that in run-of-the-mill advertising. Excluding the 
internal use from the scope of relevant context and circumstances oversimplifies 
paid search marketing and ignores its core characteristic of triggering 
advertisements.  
 Given all these considerations, actual context and circumstances in use of 
trade marks as keywords are broken into two stages: the stage of the sale and 
purchase of trade marked keywords (“stage I”) and the stage when search engine 
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users input trade marks as search terms (“stage II”). At stage I, advertisers 
constitute both consumers of trade marked keywords
785
 and users of trade marks 
on their products: they amount to consumers in that they select and purchase 
keywords from search engines and at the same time users on their products in that 
they select and purchase keywords and generate advertising text in order to 
promote their products or websites. The existing context at this stage is that 
search engines ‘recommend and sell’ trade marked keywords to advertisers in an 
online world and advertisers select and purchase them, submitting their maximum 
bid amounts and creating advertising text.  
 The peculiar features of use as keywords appear at stage II. Trade marks 
entered by computer users into search boxes remain there. Service marks of 
search engines also appear on SERPs and advertisers’ marks may or may not be 
included in their advertisements. Internalised trade marks trigger all relevant paid 
search results to appear on the SERPs. Search engines’ effort arguably is not 
enough to distinctly separate paid results from organic results. 
 In sum, courts should assess liability of advertisers and search engines 
based on the context and circumstances that consumers can perceive, recognising 
their difference between two stages. Courts should also acknowledge that there 
are context and circumstances that belong to advertisers and those that are 
ascribed to search engines.  
 
2) Liability of Advertisers 
 
(1) Use of Trade Marks 
 
The selection and purchase of trade marks as keywords, the inclusion of 
trade marks into software programmes, and visible use of trade marks in 
advertisements have been discussed by courts and commentators in relation to 
advertisers’ trade mark liability. Among them, the selection and purchase is made 
at stage I, whereas visible use of trade marks is made at stage II. Concerning 
inclusion, trade marks are incorporated into programmes at stage I, but they are 
still included there at stage II. Whether these uses satisfy the use requirement 
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hinges on whether consumers at each stage perceive them as ‘use of trade marks.’ 
At stage I, consumers of owners’ or advertisers’ products cannot notice 
selection, purchase, and internal use. On the other hand, advertisers, who 
constitute consumers of keywords, are able to perceive these uses since it is 
advertisers that select and purchase keywords to include them in software 
programmes. Thus, these uses constitute ‘use of trade marks’ within the meaning 
of trade mark liability.  
At stage II, the selection and internal use of trade marks as keywords and 
visible use of trade marks in advertising text should be regarded as constituting 
‘use of trade marks.’ There would be no argument about the fact that consumers 
of advertisers’ or owners’ products can evidently see trade marks used in the text 
of advertisements. In the case of the selection and internal use, consumers cannot 
see trade marks selected and incorporated in software programmes. Nevertheless, 
they can feel that somehow advertisers select and use trade marked keywords in 
software programmes based on the fact that these keywords trigger 
advertisements which do or do not include trade marks along with relevant 
natural results. On the other hand, these consumers cannot perceive advertisers’ 
purchase of trade marked keywords because no direct context indicates or implies 
it. It can only be perceived by consumers who are well aware of the mechanics of 
paid search marketing because of their expertise in online marketing. Thus, in 
determining advertisers’ trade mark liability at stage II, in principle, the purchase 
of keywords should not be considered to be ‘use of trade marks.’  
 
(2) Likelihood of Confusion 
 
 At stage I, advertisers’ selection, purchase, and internal use would not 
mislead consumers into believing that trade mark owners control the quality and 
brand image of trade marked keywords. First, advertisers, who amount to 
consumers of trade marked keywords, could know well about the mechanics of 
paid search marketing when purchasing trade marked keywords. Second, 
consumers of advertisers’ or owners’ products cannot even perceive advertisers’ 
use before stage II.  
For the purpose of determining the existence of likelihood of confusion at 
190 
 
stage II, at least two opposite cases should be explored: the case where 
proprietors’ trade marks are included in advertisers’ advertisements and the case 
where they are not. 
In the first case, actionable confusion would be likely without 
considering the triggering effect of trade marked keywords. From the perspective 
of average consumers of advertisers’ products, use of trade marks in 
advertisements could cause confusion as to controllers of product quality or 
product brand image. The fact that confusion dissipates at the time of purchase 
does not affect this conclusion. The triggering effect of trade marked keywords in 
software programmes and other relevant context and circumstances would 
contribute to strengthening consumer confusion. 
 Where, however, owners’ trade marks are not used in advertisements, 
advertising text, the triggering effect of trade marked keywords, or other context 
‘individually’ cannot cause actionable confusion. Advertisements, which do not 
include owners’ trade marks, may be false or misleading, but they alone cannot 
cause consumer confusion; there is no use of trade marks. Neither can internal use 
of trade marks alone; there is no confusion as to controllers of product quality and 
brand image. The fact that trade marked keywords trigger advertisements can 
generate the consumer perception that there is a certain kind of relationship 
between trade mark owners and advertisers, but the fact in itself cannot mislead 
average consumers into believing that trade mark owners assume the ultimate 
responsibility for the quality and brand image of advertisers’ products. A district 
court in the Fifth Circuit also asserted in Mary Kay that the relationship existing 
between search terms and sponsored links is much weaker than the one connoted 
by the word affiliation.
786
 Likewise, context and circumstances including trade 
marks that remain in search boxes, search engines’ service marks, the location of 
advertisements, and arguably insufficient separation of paid search results from 
organic results just strongly show a certain kind of relationship. Recognising that 
search engines display all relevant organic results in the order of relevance and 
popularity, consumers exercising ordinary care would not think that paid search 
results just consist of advertisements of trade mark owners and licensees.  
This, however, does not mean that the link between trade marked 
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keywords and advertisements and other context and circumstances do not play 
any role in assessing likelihood of confusion. The combination of the link, 
surrounding context and circumstances, and the text of advertisements can cause 
likelihood of confusion. Where, for instance, M&S purchases a keyword identical 
with Interflora’s mark but it only uses the ‘Marks & Spencer’ mark in its online 
advertisement for the sale and delivery of flowers, the use of the ‘Marks & 
Spencer’ mark in itself does not cause average consumers to believe that 
Interflora is responsible for the quality and brand image of a flower delivery 
service. Nevertheless, considering that the advertisement is triggered by the entry 
of the mark ‘Interflora’ in a search box and the mark ‘Interflora’ still remains in 
the search box, consumers would be misled into thinking that M&S is a network 
member of Interflora and hence Interflora controls the quality and brand image of 
a flower delivery service.
787
 The ECJ followed a similar path despite the fact that 
it regarded ‘confusion as to an economic link’ as influencing the essential 
function of the trade mark. In Interflora, the ECJ concluded that “where the 
advertisement, while not suggesting the existence of an economic link, is vague to 
such an extent on the origin of the goods or services at issue that reasonably well-
informed and reasonably observant internet users are unable to determine, on the 
basis of the advertising link and the commercial message attached thereto, 
whether the advertiser is a third party vis-à-vis the proprietor of the trade mark or 
whether, on the contrary, it is economically linked to that proprietor, the 
conclusion must be that there is an adverse effect on that function of the trade 
mark.”788  
 As the Interflora case shows, likelihood of confusion arising where trade 
marks are not included in advertisements is irrelevant to whether the text of 
advertisements in itself is misleading. To give another example, where consumers’ 
input of the mark ‘Hermes’ triggers a bag manufacturer A’s advertisement as a 
result of A’s purchase of ‘Hermes’ as a keyword and the advertisement includes 
the text ‘up to 70% off for all bags’, this text in itself can be true. Consumers, 
however, could mistakenly believe that the company ‘Hermes’ controls the 
quality and brand image of A’s bags, on the ground that the text does not 
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dissociate the advertisement from ‘Hermes’ bags although other context and 
circumstances show a link between the ‘Hermes’ mark and bags on the 
advertisement. 
In assessing confusion in paid search marketing, the level of consumer 
care about its mechanics can be critical in that consumers who are well aware of 
the mechanics would not be easily confused as to controllers of product quality 
and brand image. The level should be determined, according to the nature of 
advertisers’ products and the type of consumers of these products. Unless 
advertisers’ products are relevant to paid search marketing or consumers are 
experts on paid search marketing, they would not necessarily understand the 
mechanics of paid search marketing. In the Hermes example, the fact that bags 
are very expensive and thus consumers pay a higher degree of attention about 
controllers of the quality and brand image of A’s bags would not influence 
consumer perception regarding the mechanics of paid search marketing.  
 
(3) Likelihood of Dilution 
 
 At stage I, advertisers’ use of famous marks could hardly cause dilution 
by blurring or tarnishment. Their selection, purchase, and internal use could not 
directly undermine the strong position of product quality or product brand image 
that famous marks identify because consumers of famous mark owners’ products 
are unable to connect famous marks with inconsistent or negative product quality 
or brand images. Only after internet users’ input of famous marks into search 
boxes can they realise that famous marks are used for products other than owners’ 
products. Thus, whether advertising text, which is created by advertisers and 
included in software programmes of search engines, has any mention of, for 
instance, products of poor quality is immaterial at stage I. 
At stage II, as is the case with confusion, internal use in software 
programmes, visible use in advertisements, and surrounding circumstances should 
be globally assessed in determining blurring and tarnishment. Where famous 
marks are used in advertisements, the use could generate blurring or tarnishment. 
Blurring could arise where advertisers use famous marks for their products of 
inconsistent quality, where their use gives consumers of owners’ products 
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impressions incongruous with famous marks’ images, or where famous marks are 
used as generic names. Tarnishment could occur where the use is made on 
advertisers’ products of poor quality or where the use generates negative images. 
These uses are likely to undermine the strong position of product quality or 
product brand image that famous marks identify by evoking inconsistent or 
negative associations in the minds of consumers and thus harm the information 
and differentiation functions of the famous marks. A strong association between 
trade marks or a delay in linking famous marks to owners’ products alone, 
however, cannot justify blurring and tarnishment.  
 In the case of famous marks used as keywords but not in advertisements, 
advertising text and internal use of famous marks cannot individually cause 
blurring or tarnishment. Advertising text alone does not cause dilution because it 
cannot satisfy the use requirement. Internal use alone cannot affect the pro-
competitive functions of famous marks since it is not made on products of 
inconsistent or poor quality and it does not convey any inconsistent or negative 
brand images. The mere fact that internal use triggers advertisements cannot 
generate dilution without considering the advertising text. This can only reinforce 
an association between famous marks and advertisements or delay a link between 
famous marks and proprietors’ products.  
 Internal use, however, can lead to blurring or tarnishment when 
combined with advertising text and surrounding context. Where internally used 
famous marks trigger advertisements about products of inconsistent or poor 
quality, or about incongruous or negative brand images, consumers could 
associate famous marks with this quality or images. Where, for example, the 
mark ‘Rolex’ used as a keyword triggers an advertisement for T-shirts of average 
quality or an advertisement that emphasises the cheap price of T-shirts, there is 
likely to be blurring. Dilution by tarnishment would also be likely where the 
NESCAFÉ mark for coffee selected as a keyword generates an advertisement for 
pornography or laundry bleaches. In these cases, the information and 
differentiation functions are likely to be harmed. 
 Dilution by blurring and tarnishment, unlike confusion, should be 
assessed from the standpoint of average consumers of owners’ products. In the 
above examples, the assessment should be made from the viewpoint of average 
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consumers of watches or coffee. Thus, the degree of consumer care should 
depend on the price and nature of watches or coffee and the types of their 
consumers. 
 
(4) Limits of Trade Mark Rights 
 
 Irrespective of whether or not advertisers use trade marks in their 
advertisements, the analysis of confusion or dilution should not determine 
whether or not the use is fair. Even if there is confusion or dilution, use can be fair. 
Fair use should depend on whether preventing third party use leads to anti-
competitive results and whether trade mark functions affected by third party use 
are not pro-competitive.  
 The information and differentiation functions do not cover, for example, 
descriptive words unless they are used unfairly since their protection would deter 
advertisers from conveying information on products and trade mark owners 
would have an unfair advantage as a result of protection. Thus, advertisers can 
claim a fair use defence for descriptive terms.  
Advertisers, however, cannot claim fair use on the ground that they use 
trade marked keywords to indicate the content of their websites. It is because 
there are no anti-competitive results in direct relation to the content of the 
websites. First, use of trade marks on advertisers’ websites is not prevented by the 
decision that use of trade marks in paid search marketing causes likelihood of 
confusion or dilution. Second, unlike domain names, keywords do not trigger 
advertisers’ websites, and thus a ban on confusing or dilutive use does not 
interfere with triggering the websites. Third, advertisers can still have many other 
words that can be used as keywords to describe the content of websites. Fourth, 
they can use trade marks that are descriptive terms. Fifth, the content of 
advertisers’ websites is not actual and direct context that trade mark liability 
should be based on, given the fact that consumers cannot perceive the content of 
advertisers’ websites until they visit the websites. Therefore, the acceptance of a 
fair use defence on the basis of the content of the websites would just result in 
harm to pro-competitive functions. 
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3) Liability of Search Engines 
 
(1) Use of Trade Marks 
 
Whether the recommendation and sale of trade marked keywords, the 
incorporation of keywords into software programmes to trigger advertisements,
789
 
or search engines’ trade mark policy790 constitutes ‘use of trade marks’ is an issue 
in determining search engines’ liability. The recommendation and sale of 
keywords occurs at stage I, and the incorporation of the keywords made at this 
stage is still maintained at stage II. On the other hand, search engines establish or 
change their trade mark policy regardless of these stages: they do it before, after, 
or in the middle of stages. The scope of ‘use of trade marks’ corresponds to use of 
trade marks that consumers at each stage can perceive. Without this consumer 
perception, use of trade marks amounts to only ‘a thought that cannot cause 
confusion or dilution.’   
At stage I, advertisers, who amount to consumers of keywords, can 
perceive the recommendation and sale of trade marked keywords and their 
internal use. They, however, would not perceive use of trade marks when reading 
search engines’ trade mark policy; the policy is merely general guidelines. 
Therefore, only the recommendation and sale of keywords and internal use 
constitute ‘use of trade marks’ within the meaning of trade mark liability at this 
stage. 
At stage II, consumers of owners’, advertisers’, or search engines’ 
products would perceive only search engines’ internal use of trade marks. 
Although this use is not visible to consumers, the title of paid search results such 
as ‘ads’ and ‘sponsored links’ and advertisements, triggered by trade marked 
keywords at the time when these keywords still remain in search boxes, imply 
that somehow search engines include trade marks in their programmes. More 
importantly, the fact that trade marks used as keywords also trigger 
advertisements that do not embrace these trade marks makes consumers sense 
search engines’ internal use of trade marks in their programmes. Consumers, 
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however, do not necessarily know that search engines recommend and sell trade 
marked keywords because the actual and direct context does not imply this: i) 
search engines do not directly indicate on SERPs that they sell trade marked 
keywords in paid search marketing; ii) organic results are not displayed as a result 
of the sale of keywords. Only consumers such as professionals about online 
marketing would immediately perceive the recommendation and sale. Moreover, 
consumers do not view a search engine’s trade mark policy as ‘use of trade marks’ 
since there is no use of proprietors’ trade marks in it. Many consumers do not 
even know whether such a policy exists. After all, in most cases, only search 
engines’ internal use of trade marks constitutes ‘use of trade marks’ within the 
meaning of trade mark liability at this stage. 
 
(2) Likelihood of Confusion 
 
 At stage I, there would be no likelihood of confusion. Advertisers, who 
recognise the mechanics of paid search marketing and create advertisements, are 
not likely to believe that trade mark owners control the quality and brand image 
of keywords. They could understand how paid search marketing functions by 
reading information on it and search engines’ trade mark policy before or when 
they select keywords. At the same time, they generate advertising text based on 
this understanding. Consumers of owners’ or advertisers’ products or of search 
engines’ services would also not be misled as to controllers of product quality and 
brand image, since they cannot even perceive search engines’ recommendation, 
sale, and internal use before they use the search engines’ services. Thus, search 
engines’ use could not cause consumer confusion at this stage. 
 At stage II, under the current practices of search engines in paid search 
marketing, the content of advertisements should not be taken into account in 
assessing search engines’ liability. First, search engines are not involved in the 
creation of advertising text; advertisers are responsible for it. They only establish 
trade mark policy regarding use of trade marks in paid search marketing. Second, 
considering natural results and bricks-and-mortar advertising, consumers would 
not misbelieve that search engines create the text of advertisements. Consumers 
recognise that search engines have nothing to do with the text of natural results 
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and that broadcasting or newspaper companies in TV or newspaper advertising do 
not generate the content of advertising. Thus, whether or not trade marks are used 
in advertisements does not matter in the assessment of search engines’ liability.  
Because of this, search engines’ invisible use and surrounding context 
could not cause confusion as to controllers of product quality and brand image. 
Consumers of search engine services could not mistakenly believe that trade mark 
owners such as the Rolex company control the quality and brand image of search 
engine services. An issue is whether consumers of advertisers’ products could be 
misled into thinking that trade mark owners control the quality and brand image 
of advertisers’ products because of search engines’ invisible use. Given that 
advertising text should not be considered in evaluating the liability of search 
engines, search engines’ internal use of trade marks does not connect trade 
marked keywords with the text of advertisements. Search engines’ use just links 
trade marks to ‘the appearance’ of advertisements. This link is much weaker than 
the connection between advertisers’ use of marks and their advertisements. 
Moreover, contexts such as remaining trade marks in search boxes, the title of 
paid results, and, arguably, the vague separation of paid results from natural 
results cannot make this link stronger enough to mislead consumers into thinking 
that trade mark owners take the ultimate responsibility for the quality and brand 
image of advertisers’ products. These circumstances could just support some 
degree of connection. Therefore, search engines are not liable for confusion. 
 
(3) Likelihood of Dilution 
 
 At stage I, search engines’ use is not likely to cause dilution by blurring 
and tarnishment. First, the recommendation and sale of famous marks as 
keywords is not similar to the sale of embroidered logos. At this stage, search 
engines do not sell the image files of famous marks that can be immediately used 
in online advertising text. In fact, they sell i) advertising space, ii) the ranking of 
advertisements in a list of paid results, and iii) a link between trade marked 
keywords and advertisements. Thus, subsequent use of famous marks, for 
example, on products of inconsistent or poor quality cannot result directly from 
the recommendation and sale. Second, at this stage, famous marks are not used on 
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these products and thus inconsistent or negative brand images are not created in 
the eyes of consumers of owners’ products. As a result of the sale of keywords, 
trade marks are just included in search engines’ programmes to trigger 
advertisements. Third, invisible use of trade marked keywords, before it triggers 
advertisements, cannot associate famous marks even with the appearance of 
advertisements. Therefore, search engines cannot be found liable for dilution at 
this stage. 
 At stage II, search engines’ invisible use of trade marks, in contrast to 
advertisers’ invisible use, cannot cause dilution since ‘the text’ of advertisements 
on SERPs cannot be ascribed to search engines. By triggering advertisements, 
search engines’ invisible use can make consumers of owners’ products associate 
famous marks with advertisements. The triggering effect of invisible use alone, 
however, is not able to cause consumers to associate famous marks with 
incongruous or negative product quality or brand images; it only denotes that 
advertisements are somewhat relevant to famous marks. Other circumstances also 
indicate the same. Therefore, search engines are not liable for dilution in paid 
search marketing. 
 
(4) Limits of Trade Mark Rights 
 
 Exceptions from trade mark liability would not be necessary since search 
engines are not liable for confusion or dilution. They, however, are worth 
discussing here because search engines could claim a functional use defence and 
commentators do argue for the introduction of safe harbours for search engines’ 
use of trade marked keywords.
791
 
 It is suggested here that search engines cannot claim functional use to 
defend their use of trade marked keywords. Trade marks used as keywords are not 
essential for the effective competition of search engines with trade mark owners. 
Trade marked keywords can expedite the retrieval of information from databases 
of search engines. This indexing function has nothing to do with competition 
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between companies in owners’ product markets. 
 I also argue that the introduction of a new safe harbour, which is only 
applicable to search engines’ use of trade marks, requires a more careful approach 
despite its efficiency in solving trade mark disputes. If this kind of safe harbour is 
included in trade mark law, search engines would be readily exempted from direct 
trade mark liability at an early stage of a clash without having to undergo the 
analysis of likelihood of confusion or dilution. From the perspective of the 
argument that there is no direct trade mark liability for search engines’ use of 
trade marked keywords, the safe harbour appears to be reasonable. Nevertheless, 
this is not the case. 
 First, a new type of paid search marketing or transformed paid search 
marketing can come into use. While, in current paid search marketing, search 
engines are not involved in the creation of advertising messages displayed on 
SERPs, the introduction of a new safe harbour would enable some search engines 
to participate in generating the text in return for higher payment from advertisers. 
Although this possibility cannot be ruled out, the safe harbour is not capable of 
predicting all possible forms of paid search marketing. Second, without 
persuasively explaining the reason why search engines are so special, this safe 
harbour would raise the issue of whether other intermediaries’ use of trade marks 
should also be exempted from trade mark liability. Third, the safe harbour is not 
based on new values that outweigh the purpose of trade mark protection. Thus, it 
would be better to deal with search engines’ use of trade marks on the ground of 
current rules rather than to introduce a new safe harbour for search engines. 
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Part III. Freedom of Expression 
 
Against trade mark owners’ argument for trade mark liability, advertisers 
and search engines make claims that their use of trade marks constitutes speech 
which is protected under freedom of expression and thus they are not responsible 
for trade mark infringement. In relation to this, Part III, as part of a virtuous cycle, 
seeks a balance between trade mark protection and free speech values. The 
general relationship between free speech and trade mark law is examined in 
chapter 6 and direct liability in paid search marketing from the standpoint of free 
speech in chapter 7.  
 
Chapter 6: Freedom of Expression and Trade Mark Law  
 
 This chapter first examines the scope of freedom of speech and, second, 
posits freedom of speech against the context of trade mark law. Having 
considered the definition and protectability of commercial speech and the rules 
for restricting commercial and non-commercial speech, it embeds the freedom of 
speech analysis against trade mark law.  
 
1. Scope of Free Speech and Standards for Limiting Speech 
 
1) Constitutional Law concerning Freedom of Speech 
 
 Although the USA, the EU, and Korea have constitutional or treaty 
provisions with regard to freedom of speech, their language and structure differ 
considerably. For example, the term ‘freedom of speech’792 is used in the US 
First Amendment and the Korean Constitution while the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) refers to 
‘freedom of expression.’793  
                                         
792
 In this thesis, speech is used as the same meaning of expression. 
793
 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is 
an international treaty under which the member States of the Council of Europe promise to secure 
fundamental civil and political rights, not only to their own citizens but also to everyone within 
their jurisdiction. It came into force in 1953. 
201 
 
In the USA, a number of free speech doctrines have been developed on 
the back of a straightforward provision. The First Amendment provides that 
“congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” It does not suggest principles about the 
restriction of freedom of speech; however, jurisprudence developed a variety of 
doctrines.
794
 The US Supreme Court balances freedom of speech against other 
significant rights or interests based on those doctrines rather than the First 
Amendment, all of which were devised to strengthen protection of freedom of 
speech.
795
  
Article 10 of the ECHR prescribes freedom of expression more explicitly. 
First, it defines the scope of freedom of expression that includes i) freedom to 
hold opinions, ii) freedom to impart information and ideas, and iii) freedom of 
listeners to receive information and ideas. On the other hand, it does “not prevent 
States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises.” Second, article 10(2) stipulates limitations: they should be 
‘prescribed by the law’, ‘serve the legitimate aim’, and be ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’. Third, article 10(2) enumerates diverse interests for which 
freedom can be regulated by law more extensively than the First Amendment and 
the Korean Constitution.  
 In Korea, freedom of speech is regulated together with freedom of the 
press and freedom of assembly and association in article 21(1) of the Korean 
Constitution.
796
 Limitations are provided in articles 21(2) and 21(4),
797
 as well 
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as article 37(2) which concerns the general principle of restricting the freedoms 
and rights of citizens. Article 21(2) bans prior restraints, and article 21(4) 
prescribes the boundaries that freedom of speech cannot transgress. Freedom of 
speech can be restricted under article 37(2) of the Constitution only if the 
restriction is imposed ‘by law’, it is ‘necessary for national security, the 
maintenance of law and order, or for public welfare’, and ‘no essential aspect of 
the freedom or right shall be violated’.798 
 From a comparative perspective, the First Amendment, the ECHR, and 
the Korean Constitution share commonalities. They do not provide a definition of 
‘speech,’ including commercial and non-commercial speech. Neither do they 
distinguish between commercial and non-commercial expression. Provisions 
about the restriction of expression in the ECHR and the Korean Constitution do 
not explicitly suggest that commercial speech should be treated differently from 
non-commercial speech.  
 Looking at the differences, the First Amendment does not include any 
standard for limiting free speech while both the ECHR and the Korean 
Constitution provide for limitation standards and the relationship between free 
speech and others’ reputation and rights. According to the ECHR, freedom of 
expression may be limited for the reputation or rights of others.
799
 The Korean 
Constitution stipulates that if speech violates the honour or rights of others, they 
may seek damages.
800
 It appears that lack of explicit provisions as to the 
restriction of free speech in the First Amendment leads to the US Supreme 
Court’s inconsistent decisions as to the level of the protection of commercial 
speech. 
 
2) Protectability of Commercial Speech under Freedom of Expression 
 
(1) Protection of Commercial Speech 
 
                                                                                                               
(4) Neither speech nor the press may violate the honor or rights of other persons nor undermine 
public morals or social ethics. Should speech or the press violate the honor or rights of other 
persons, claims may be made for the damage resulting therefrom.   
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 While there are issues concerning the appropriateness of protecting 
commercial speech under freedom of expression, courts include it under the broad 
speech umbrella. One issue is that it does not promote individual autonomy, self-
realisation, and self-fulfilment since it is not easy to establish that they are 
enhanced as a result of informed economic decision-making.
801
 Another is that it 
is not desirable for the values of a market economy to be safeguarded by freedom 
of expression.
802
 It is also submitted that, even if commercial expression 
doctrines usually draw on the information function of advertisements, commercial 
advertising does not always contain information.
803
 
 Nevertheless, the current common position of the US Supreme Court, the 
ECtHR, the ECJ, and the Constitutional Court of Korea is that commercial speech 
constitutes protectable speech. 
The US Supreme Court held in its first commercial speech case
804
 in 
1942 that the Constitution does not restrain government as respects purely 
commercial advertising; its main position continued until the 1970s.
805
 In 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, however, the US Supreme Court decided 
explicitly that commercial speech is not wholly outside the protection of the First 
Amendment
806
 and thenceforth it has not felt any more that it has to justify why 
commercial speech is constitutionally protected.
807
 The so-called ‘the 
commercial speech doctrine’ began to develop.808  
 In the EU, the ECtHR held in Markt Intern and Beermann that “the 
information of a commercial nature … cannot be excluded from the scope of 
Article 10(1) [of the ECHR] which does not apply solely to certain types of 
information or ideas or forms of expressions.”809 Since this decision, the question 
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of whether commercial speech is included in the freedom of expression has not 
been raised before the ECtHR.
810
  
In Germany v. European Parliament and E.U. Council, Advocate General 
Fennelly argued that commercial expression should also be protected under EU 
law,
811
 analysing the consistency of the Advertising Directive
812
 with the 
fundamental right of freedom of expression,
813
 whereas the ECJ did not address 
this issue since it annulled the Advertising Directive on the ground of lack of 
legal basis.
814
 In Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH, however, Advocate 
General Alber maintained that commercial speech is included in “freedom of 
expression, as embodied in Art.10 of the ECHR, as a general principle of law” 
whose observance the ECJ ensures,
815
 and the ECJ acknowledged the protection 
of commercial speech under free speech by mentioning the lesser degree of 
protection of commercial expression.
816
 
 The Constitutional Court of Korea also found that commercial speech is 
constitutionally protected. It recognised freedom of expression as an 
indispensable basic right for the existence and development of modern liberal 
democracy
817
 on the one hand and emphasised that freedom of speech is a means 
of self-fulfilment (an individual value) and self-government (a social value) on 
the other.
818
 On the basis of this rationale, the Court acknowledged that 
commercial speech is constitutionally protected under freedom of speech, 
deciding that advertisements, which spread ideas, knowledge, and information to 
a large number of unspecified people, are also under the protection of the freedom 
of speech and the press.
819
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(2) Rationale for Protection 
 
 Despite the universal recognition of the need to safeguard commercial 
expression, courts have adopted distinct rationales. In many cases, the US 
Supreme Court focused on consumer and societal interests based on ‘the 
informational function of advertising’:820  consumers and society in general 
benefit from ‘the free flow of commercial information.’ Commercial information 
could lead to “the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic 
necessities” for consumers.821 From a societal perspective, advertisements serve 
‘public interest’ in that i) even an individual advertisement, though purely 
commercial, may have a general public interest, ii) the free flow of commercial 
information is absolutely necessary for intelligent and well-informed numerous 
private economic choices, through which the allocation of resources will be made 
in a free enterprise economy, and iii) the free flow of commercial information is 
essential to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how a free enterprise 
system ought to be regulated or changed.
822
  
 The Court’s primary concern in protecting commercial speech, however, 
is sometimes broader. In Edenfield, a case about a ban on in-person solicitation 
by certified public accountants, the Court suggested that a commercial 
marketplace offers a forum in which “ideas and information flourish” and “the 
speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the 
information.”823 In Lorillard Tobacco, the Court stressed the interests of tobacco 
retailers and manufacturers, who constituted speakers of commercial speech, in 
delivering truthful information about their products to adult consumers, while 
evaluating whether regulations were more than necessary to further substantial 
societal interests in preventing underage tobacco use.
824
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 As regards the protection of freedom of commercial expression under 
article 10 of the ECHR, the ECtHR explained that it is because the expression 
delivers information of a commercial nature and article 10(1) does not limit types 
of information or ideas or forms of expression.
825
  
Meanwhile, Advocate General Fennelly maintained that commercial 
expression deserves protection under EU law because of “[individuals’] inherent 
entitlement as human beings freely to express and receive views on any topic, 
including the merits of the goods or services which they market or purchase.”826 
He reasoned that not only social function but also the necessity for the autonomy, 
dignity, and personal development of individuals enables a personal right to be 
regarded as fundamental.
827
 
 The Constitutional Court of Korea also supported that advertisements are 
under the protection of freedom of speech since they spread ideas, knowledge, 
and information to a large number of unspecified people.
828
 In the Outdoor 
Advertisements etc. Control Act case, the Court additionally argued that 
advertisements are covered by freedom of expression since ‘the right of the 
people to know’ is the right to garner information from all the sources that all can 
access generally without the limitation of the method of information gathering, 
and there is no reason to exclude advertisements from those information 
sources.
829
  
 
3) Reduced Protection of Commercial Speech 
 
(1) Protection of Commercial and Non-commercial Speech 
 
 Commentators and courts are split as to the level of protection that should 
be given to commercial speech. Some commentators maintain that commercial 
speech should be accorded the same level of constitutional protection under 
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freedom of speech since the exchange of commercial information is at least as 
significant as other types of speech.
830
 Others argue for a lower level of 
protection for commercial speech. This includes the different application of 
compelled disclosures, overbroad regulations, prior restraints,
831
 the tolerance of 
false or misleading speech, and standards for allowing truthful speech to be 
regulated to achieve other government interests.
832
 The less privileged status of 
commercial speech nonetheless does not mean that “noncommercial proposals to 
engage in illegal activity” have “greater protection than commercial proposals to 
do so.”833 
 Commercial expression is given lesser protection by the US Supreme 
Court. The predominant position of the Court is to distinguish between the 
protection of commercial speech and that of other types of speech.
834
 In Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy, the Court implied in a footnote that commercial speech, 
which enjoys First Amendment protection, can be discerned from other forms of 
speech, asserting that there exist “common sense differences between speech that 
does “no more than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties.”835 In 
Central Hudson Gas, the Court invalidated a ban on promotional advertising by 
the utility company on the basis of the dichotomy of commercial and non-
commercial speech, deciding that the Commission’s complete suppression of 
speech was “more extensive than necessary” to advance the public interest in 
energy conservation and hence violated the First Amendment.
836
 The Court 
mentioned “‘the commonsense distinction’ between speech proposing a 
commercial transaction which occurs in an area traditionally subject to 
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government regulation, and other varieties of speech,” adding that “the 
constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to 
other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”837 In Deborah Morse in 2007, the 
Court took the same position, holding that “First Amendment jurisprudence has 
identified some categories of expression that are less deserving of protection than 
others-fighting words, obscenity, and commercial speech, to name a few.”838  
 Not all US Supreme Court decisions, however, conferred lesser 
protection on all forms of commercial expression. In 44 Liquormart, the Court 
emphasised that “when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, 
nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of 
a fair bargaining process,” the same scrutiny as is applied to non-commercial 
expression is required.
839
 Moreover, in the recent case of Sorrell, the Court 
concluded that a regulation, which imposes burdens on protected expression 
based on the content of speech and the identity of speakers, should be subject to 
strict scrutiny even when the expression is commercial.
840
 
 On the other hand, the ECtHR does not categorise expression explicitly, 
but allows more readily ‘the necessity of a legitimate interference’ with 
expression in the case where it is classified as commercial expression.
841
 The 
ECtHR has consistently decided that ‘a margin of appreciation’ is essential in 
commercial matters, particularly in the area of unfair competition and 
advertising.
842
 Furthermore, the ECtHR treats entirely commercial expression 
differently from other types of commercial expression. In Hertel, the Court 
argued that the extent of the margin of appreciation needs to be lessened for 
expression which is not ‘given individual’s purely commercial expression’ but the 
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participation in a debate affecting general interests.
843
 
 Meanwhile, in Germany v. European Parliament and E.U. Council, 
although the ECJ did not address freedom of commercial expression as a legal 
basis for the case, Advocate General Fennelly expressed his view concerning the 
lesser protection of commercial speech. He argued that the “disparate treatment” 
approach, similar to that of the ECtHR, should be adopted in Community law, 
explaining that while ‘convincing evidence of a pressing social need’ is required 
for the limitation of non-commercial expression, the requirement of ‘necessary on 
reasonable grounds’ is needed for the restriction of commercial expression.844 
The same argument is developed in the opinion of Advocate General Alber in 
Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH.
845
 Moreover, the ECJ clarified the 
different degree of protection between commercial and non-commercial 
expression in this case, holding that “[r]eview is limited to an examination of the 
reasonableness and proportionality of the interference” for commercial 
expression.
846
 
 Since the Medical Service Act case, regarding the prohibition of medical 
advertisements, the Constitutional Court of Korea has explicitly accorded lesser 
protection to commercial speech. In that case, the Court distinguished commercial 
speech from political and civil expression of ideas or knowledge, and it adopted 
the test of ‘whether a restriction is within the necessary scope to fulfil the 
legislative purpose’ instead of ‘the least restriction’ test in applying the principle 
of proportionality to the restriction of commercial advertisements.
847
 In the 
Health Functional Food Act case, the Court also held that the necessity of the 
limitation of a false or puffery advertisement for health functional food is high.
848
 
 
(2) Rationale for the Lower Protection Level 
 
 Courts that support the disparate treatment in the protection of speech put 
forward various justifications. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the US 
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Supreme Court suggested two reasons: the greater ‘objectivity’ and ‘hardiness’ of 
commercial speech.
849
 The first reason is that advertisers know all the 
information about their products better than anyone and hence they can verify its 
truthfulness more easily. Second, because of its commercial profits, commercial 
speech is not likely to be “chilled” and “foregone entirely”.850 Another rationale 
asserted in other cases is that the purpose of the restriction of commercial speech 
is related to the preservation of a fair bargaining process or commercial harm.
851
 
That is, in general, commercial expression is regulated by the government for the 
protection of consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, 
or for the disclosure of beneficial information for consumers.
852
  
In the EU, the ECtHR held that the complex and fluctuating area of 
unfair competition and advertising necessitates a margin of appreciation in 
assessing the necessity of interference since it cannot re-examine all relevant facts 
and circumstances.
853
 
 Meanwhile, Advocate Generals Fennelly and Alber asserted in, 
respectively, Germany v. European Parliament and E.U. Council and in Herbert 
Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH that the disparate constitutional protection can 
be justified by the different manner in which commercial expression and other 
types of expression interact with general public interest; whereas political speech 
contributes to critical societal interests, commercial expression does not play a 
similarly important role.
854
 The ECJ also indirectly suggested the distance from 
public interest as a reason for lesser protection in Herbert Karner Industrie-
Auktionen GmbH, describing the freedom of commercial expression as one of the 
freedoms whose implementation is not conducive to “a discussion of public 
interest”.855  
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The Constitutional Court of Korea found the justification for the lesser 
protection of commercial speech in that it is different from political and civil 
expression of ideas or knowledge and that its effect on the development of 
personality and individuality is less critical.
856
 The Court also suggested that its 
restriction does not have crucial effects because it is propelled by business profits 
and has little risk that the only expression that suits the taste of a person with 
political power will be allowed.
857
  
 To sum up, court decisions as to why commercial speech does not 
deserve full protection fall under four categories. First, the rationale for protecting 
free speech makes commercial expression ‘less valued’ than other forms of 
speech; the public interest in protecting commercial expression is less significant 
and commercial expression contributes less to public discourse and personal 
development. Second, speakers of false commercial speech are ‘more 
blameworthy’; the speech is conveyed by speakers who know the truth better than 
anyone. Third, commercial speech has ‘high durability’ to withstand suppression; 
its commercial profits would not let it stifled by regulations. Fourth, ‘the nature of 
governmental interests’ justifies lesser protection; the interests consist in 
protecting consumers from commercial harm. 
 
4) Definition of Commercial Speech 
 
Commercial speech should be clearly defined in order to be distinguished 
from other types of constitutionally protected expression. In practice, however, it 
is not easy to distinguish the former from the latter because of the complexity of 
advertisements. As Justice Stevens argued in Central Hudson Gas,
858
 if the nature 
of commercial speech is determined according to subject matter, a labour leader’s 
exhortation to strike and an economist’s dissertation on the money supply can 
receive lesser protection than non-commercial speech. If an economic motivation 
is used as a standard, the work of Shakespeare, who may have had a pecuniary 
motive, can be commercial speech.  
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Because of the difficulty in the definition of commercial speech,
859
 for 
example, on the basis of the common characteristics shared by speakers or the 
content of commercial expression, at least one scholar defines it in connection 
with the principal rationale given for free speech. He maintains that commercial 
speech can be defined as “the set of communicative acts about commercial 
subjects that within a public communicative sphere convey information of 
relevance to democratic decision making but that do not themselves form part of 
public discourse.”860 
 Although this appears to be a tight knot to untangle, efforts to define 
commercial speech should not be abandoned.
861
 It is suggested that the focus 
should be placed more on the rationale for which commercial speech is 
constitutionally protected and the reasons why it is given a lower level of 
protection than non-commercial speech.
862
  
 The US Supreme Court has been exploring that route; however, it 
appears that the ECtHR and the Constitutional Court of Korea have not felt the 
same necessity. At first, the US Supreme Court defined commercial speech as 
speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”863 Then, in 
Bolger, the Court regarded this as ‘the core notion of commercial speech’ rather 
than a definition, adopting a different test for classification.
864
 The Court 
considered three factors in characterising informational pamphlets as commercial 
speech: i) their nature as advertisements, ii) the reference to a specific product, 
and iii) an economic motivation. It then concluded that “the combination of all 
these characteristics provide[d] strong support” for the decision that the 
pamphlets constituted commercial speech, adding in a footnote that all three 
characteristics are not required for speech to be commercial.
865
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Commercial speech was also described as “expression related solely to 
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience” in Central Hudson Gas.866 
Justice Stevens criticised this definition in the same case, asserting that the 
Court’s definition is “too broad” and “it is important that the commercial speech 
concept not be defined too broadly lest speech deserving of greater constitutional 
protection be inadvertently suppressed” because of less constitutional protection 
of commercial speech than other forms of speech.
867
  
In Nike, which was dismissed by the US Supreme Court on jurisdictional 
grounds,
868
 the Supreme Court of California suggested a more detailed test. It 
held that factors in categorising statements as commercial speech are i) the 
speaker, who is likely to be someone engaged in commerce or someone acting on 
behalf of a person so engaged, ii) the intended audience, who is likely to be actual 
or potential buyers or customers of the speaker’s goods or services, or persons 
acting for actual or potential buyers or customers, or persons (such as reporters or 
reviewers) likely to repeat the message to or otherwise influence actual or 
potential buyers or customers, and iii) the factual content of the message, which 
should be commercial in nature.
869
  
 Unlike the US Supreme Court, the ECtHR and the ECJ have not sought a 
consistent definition of commercial speech.
870
 The characteristics of commercial 
speech, however, can be found in the decisions of the ECtHR. Moreover, the 
European Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”), which played a role of 
a preliminary filter for applications for relief until the 1998 reorganisation and 
distinguished the level of protection conferred to commercial expression from 
that given to non-commercial expression,
871
 also described the nature of 
commercial speech in some cases. The ECtHR seemed to describe commercial 
speech as ‘the commercial context inciting the public to purchase a particular 
product’ by holding that “the commercial indubitably fell outside the regular 
commercial context in the sense of inciting the public to purchase a particular 
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product” in VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken. 872  The Commission also 
characterised commercial advertisements as “offering objects for sale” in Church 
of Scientology, holding that once advertisements, which concern religious objects, 
constitute “commercial advertisements offering objects for sale,” statements of 
religious content amount to “the manifestation of a desire to market goods for 
profit” rather than “the manifestation of a belief in practice” under article 9 of the 
ECHR.
873
 
 The Constitutional Court of Korea also has not provided the general 
definition of commercial speech. Rather, it decided the difference between 
different types of speech on a case by case basis. The Court, however, implied 
that the nature of commercial speech is ‘its  intention to sell products’ by 
deciding that an advertisement concerning the efficacy of food amounts to 
commercial expression for the sale of food and that commercial expression is 
protected by freedom of expression.
874
 The Court also asserted in the Health 
Functional Food Act case that commercial advertising is an activity for profit of 
which the main purpose is to promote products and boost sales.
875
 
 
5) Standards for Limiting Expression 
 
On the basis of the lesser protection of commercial expression, courts in 
each jurisdiction have developed different, but similar in terms of effect standards 
for limiting speech: commercial speech is accorded “a limited measure of 
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position.”876 
In Central Hudson Gas, the US Supreme Court articulated a four-step 
analysis: the Central Hudson test or an ‘intermediate scrutiny standard.’ 
According to this analysis, the regulation of commercial speech does not run 
afoul of free speech if i) commercial speech concerns lawful activity and is not 
misleading, ii) the asserted governmental interests are substantial, iii) the 
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regulation directly advances these interests asserted, and iv) it is not more 
extensive than is necessary to serve these interests.
877
 The last two parts of the 
analysis relate to the requirement that a regulatory technique should be in 
proportion to these interests.
878
 The Central Hudson test is distinguished from the 
Ward test
879
 for time, place, manner regulations and the O'Brien test
880
 for 
symbolic speech. The Central Hudson test applies to both content-neutral and 
content-based regulations, whereas the Ward test and the O'Brien test only to 
content-neutral regulations.
881
 The Central Hudson test has played a role as a 
dominant standard even though it has been sometimes faced with justices’ 
criticism.
882
 
A test for non-commercial speech is stricter than the Central Hudson test. 
It requires ‘compelling interests’ and ‘the least restrictive means to further these 
interests’ instead of ‘substantial interests’ and ‘not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve these interests.’883 On the other hand, it does not require that 
speech should be legal and non-misleading.
884
  
In contrast to the First Amendment, the ECHR has a restriction rule in 
article 10(2). In order for the limitation of expression to fall within the reach of 
article 10 of the ECHR, the ECtHR held it should i) be prescribed by law, ii) 
pursue one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in article 10(2) such as the 
prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, the protection 
of the reputation or rights of others, the protection of the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or the maintenance of the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary, and iii) be necessary in a democratic society for 
achieving such an aim or aims.
885
 Here, for non-commercial expression, the 
necessity in a democratic society is construed as meaning ‘the existence of 
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pressing social need.’886 
In the case of commercial speech, the necessity in a democratic society is 
interpreted differently. If the restriction of commercial expression is considered to 
be necessary ‘on reasonable grounds,’ it satisfies ‘the necessity in a democratic 
society.’ 887  Unlike the Central Hudson test, however, the ECtHR does not 
distinguish between false or misleading commercial speech and legal, non-
misleading commercial speech in applying the restriction rule. The ECJ adopted a 
similar test for commercial speech, asserting that “[w]hen the exercise of the 
freedom does not contribute to a discussion of public interest and, in addition, 
arises in a context in which the Member States have a certain amount of 
discretion, review is limited to an examination of the reasonableness and 
proportionality of the interference” and that “[t]his holds true for the commercial 
use of freedom of expression, particularly in a field as complex and fluctuating as 
advertising for the requirements for the interference with commercial speech.”888  
 In Korea, the limitation of speech should also satisfy fundamental rules 
not to contravene freedom of speech under article 21 of the Korean Constitution. 
It should not run afoul of the constitutional principles especially required for the 
restriction of freedom of expression such as the rule of clarity and the rule of 
preventing censorship. In particular, article 21(4) provides that “[n]either speech 
nor the press may violate the honour or rights of other persons nor undermine 
public morals or social ethics.” Moreover, it should not violate the constitutional 
basic rules for the limitation of basic rights: the rule of restriction by law, the rule 
of the necessity for national security, the maintenance of law and order, or public 
welfare, and the rule that no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be 
violated.
889
 The rule of the necessity (the principle of proportionality) consists of 
four parts. First, the legislative purpose of regulating law should be legitimate. 
Second, a means to limit freedom of expression should be necessary for the 
purpose. Third, it should be the least restrictive means. Finally, a balance of 
interests should be struck.
890
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 With regard to commercial speech, the Court applies the principle of 
proportionality at a lesser degree. It decided in the Medical Service Act case that 
in reviewing the restriction of commercial advertisements under the principle of 
proportionality, it is proper for the standard of ‘the least restriction’ to be 
modified into ‘whether the restriction is in the necessary scope to fulfil the 
legislative purpose.’891 As in the EU, the Constitutional Court of Korea does not 
distinguish the level of scrutiny for false or misleading commercial speech from 
that for legal and true commercial speech. 
 
6) Conclusion 
 
(1) Protection of Commercial Speech 
 
 This thesis suggests that commercial speech should be protected under 
freedom of expression because of its nature as speech, contribution to developing 
the audience’s faculties for critical thinking, relevance to public interest, and 
protection of speaker interests. First, as the ECtHR, Advocate General Fennelly, 
and the Constitutional Court of Korea asserted, commercial speech is a type of 
speech, and the First Amendment, the ECHR, and the Korean Constitution do not 
distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech. There is no reason 
for commercial speech to be excluded from the scope of speech under these laws. 
Second, both consumers, who are potential buyers, and other audiences, 
that are not potential buyers, could develop their abilities to think critically, which 
are necessary for the proper participation in public discourse. The protection of 
commercial speech could contribute to honing consumers’ critical thinking 
abilities
892
 because most commercial advertisements today do not just provide 
consumers with information on products in a simple way; they also convey other 
information, such as brand images and opinions, and they do so in various ways. 
Consumers, who want to rationally decide their preferences or purchase products, 
need to carefully judge the advantages and disadvantages of products based on 
these kinds of information imparted by advertisements. For other audiences, 
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commercial expression also relates to their critical thinking. They could develop 
their abilities to think critically as they try to understand advertising messages. 
For them, commercial expression is almost the same as non-commercial 
expression. 
Third, the information or opinions conveyed by commercial 
advertisements also concern public interest directly or indirectly. Even purely 
commercial expression can be linked to public interest. For example, as the 
Constitutional Court of Korea decided in the Medical Service Act case, 
commercial medical advertisements, if they are based on objective facts, can 
enhance public interest by helping consumers make reasonable choices and by 
promoting fair competition among medical persons since they include important 
information on medical services.
893
 This can also be shown by the fact that when 
the question of the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech is raised, 
one important factor for the constitutionality test is whether there are substantial 
societal interests.  
Fourth, there are also speaker interests in protecting commercial 
expression. Sellers’ effective ways of delivering information about their products 
to consumers are critical for competition with other sellers in product markets. By 
offering attractive information that can differentiate their products from others, 
they could sustain their business in highly competitive markets. By doing so, they 
could also polish up their communication skills which are needed to convey other 
forms of expression. The restriction of commercial speech would result in the 
interference with these speaker interests. Speaker interests, however, are not as 
significant as listener interests because commercial speech could include 
misleading expression because of speakers’ intention to earn profits.  
For the above reasons, commercial speech should be protected like other 
types of speech. Although disparate functions between commercial and non-
commercial expression can be the reason for the different level of protection, they 
cannot be the grounds for not protecting commercial expression.  
 
(2) Different Level of Protection 
 
                                         
893
 Judgment of 27 October 2005, Constitutional Court, 2003 Heon-Ga 3 
219 
 
 The recognition of the necessity to protect commercial speech does not 
automatically lead to the conclusion that commercial expression should be 
afforded the same level of protection with non-commercial speech. It is submitted 
here that commercial expression does not deserve full protection under free 
speech.  
‘Greater objectivity,’ however, cannot fully justify this. It can explain 
only why false or misleading commercial expression is afforded a lower level of 
protection than false or misleading non-commercial speech. Unless speech 
delivered to listeners is neither true nor legal, there is no reason to discriminate 
against speakers of commercial speech. 
Moreover, the lower degree of protection given to commercial expression 
should not be because the expression is capable of enduring suppression better 
than other types of speech. In many cases, a political or religious belief can make 
speakers tolerate suppression. More importantly, restraints should not be based on 
the positive side of expression, but on its negative side; it cannot be said that 
durability falls within the negative side. 
Societal interests in protecting consumers are also insufficient as a 
rationale for the different treatment of speech. Non-commercial expression is not 
less protected even when limitations are aimed for consumer protection. It should 
not be the purpose of regulations but the characteristics of commercial speech that 
can give an explanation for the different level of protection.  
 In terms of the rationale for the protection of non-commercial expression 
such as political speech, commercial speech is not as closely related to public 
discourse in a democratic society as political speech. This fact, however, just 
shows a difference between them. It cannot prove that commercial speech is of 
lower value. In the case of artistic expression, it is not accorded lower protection 
even though its primary function is different from that of political speech. 
Here it is suggested that the reason why commercial speech deserves 
only limited protection under free speech can be explained by the fact that it is 
likely to include some degree of misleading information. Since commercial 
speech is aimed to secure maximum profits, sellers readily use misleading 
expression if, they believe, it is necessary; some misleading speech is tolerable by 
listeners, but some are not. This nature of commercial speech results in a lower 
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level of protection.  
 
(3) Definition of Commercial Speech and Mixed Speech 
 
 In reality, an advertisement has both a commercial and a non-commercial 
nature. A business, recognising that commercial speech is given relatively less 
protection, seeks to render its advertisements non-commercial by adding non-
commercial messages. Moreover, modern advertisements tend to persuade 
consumers to choose brands not only by illustrating the uniqueness or excellence 
of products or producers but also by displaying brand images. Advertorials, 
advertisements in the form of an editorial, and editorials about branded products 
serve that purpose. Against this setting, the definition of commercial speech is of 
great importance in the scope of the protection of ‘mixed speech.’ The definition 
should encompass the rationales for protection of commercial speech and the 
disparity in protection between commercial and non-commercial speech. 
 First of all, commercial speech should possess the attribute of speech 
within the reach of free speech. According to dictionary definitions,
894
 while 
expression means “the process of making known one’s thoughts or feelings,” the 
meaning of speech is “the expression of or the ability to express thoughts and 
feelings by articulate sounds.” Speech within the meaning of free speech, 
however, is not just spoken or written language; it also covers communication 
through symbols and actions other than the use of language.
895
 The US Supreme 
Court held in Spence that a student’s act of hanging a US flag upside down and 
attaching a peace symbol to the flag was protected under freedom of speech.
896
 
The Court clarified that, in order for an act to constitute speech within the 
meaning of the First Amendment, it should be “sufficiently imbued with elements 
of communication.” It additionally stated that the combination of the nature of the 
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act and surrounding context and circumstances could lead to this result,
897
 while 
also stressing a speaker’s intent.898 Therefore, commercial speech should be 
‘communication’. 
 Secondly, the main justification for the protection of commercial speech 
is that it enables ‘the audience’ to improve the capacity of analytical thinking 
required for public discourse. While other types of speech can facilitate self-
development, self-fulfilment, and self-autonomy of both speakers and the 
audience, the constitutional value of commercial speech is primarily ascribed to 
the audience including consumers. Notwithstanding the interests of speakers in 
differentiating their products from others for the purpose of competition, the 
probability that the profit-oriented speakers use misleading information devalues 
speaker interests. In this regard, whether expression is commercial or not should 
be assessed in terms of the audience, not speakers.  
 Most importantly, commercial expression ought to be defined based on 
the rationale for its lesser protection: the high possibility of the existence of 
misleading information. Commercial speech should be limited to one that the 
audience is likely to perceive as including misleading information because of 
commercial profit. Readers would hardly believe that authors use misleading 
information in order to sell more books. Researchers would not include 
misleading information in their theses about economics. On the other hand, it is 
likely that advertisements which no more than propose commercial transactions 
employ potentially misleading expressions. The advertisements, which 
incorporate non-commercial nature in them along with commercial nature, could 
easily use misleading expressions where they ‘primarily’ propose commercial 
transactions of products. In this sense, commercial speech should be interpreted 
narrowly enough to exclude non-commercial speech, and at the same time, 
broadly enough to embrace diversified commercial advertisements. 
 On the basis of the above reasons, this thesis suggests that commercial 
expression should be defined as ‘communication which primarily proposes a 
commercial transaction from the standpoint of the audience.’  
 Under this definition, mixed speech, which has both commercial and 
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non-commercial content, can be categorised as commercial or non-commercial, 
depending on whether it primarily concerns the proposal of transaction of goods. 
Nevertheless, mixed speech should be presumed to be non-commercial until it is 
proved to be commercial.
899
 This is because relatively wider limitations are 
allowed for commercial speech in spite of the fact that free speech restriction is 
exceptional. Freedom of expression is a prerequisite for self-realization, self-
fulfilment, self-autonomy, or public discourse necessary for liberal democracy, 
and therefore its restriction should be exceptional. If mixed expression may be 
deemed commercial and thus given lesser protection,
900
 the restriction of speech 
cannot be exceptional; the presumption could cause a chilling effect on freedom 
of expression since a speaker has to prove that his expression is non-commercial. 
He will withdraw it rather than expend time and efforts in proving that it is non-
commercial. 
 Meanwhile, it cannot be said that mixed expression is always considered 
to be either commercial or non-commercial ‘as a whole.’ If commercial speech 
parts and non-commercial parts are ‘inextricably interwoven’ with each other in 
mixed speech, the speech will be categorised as commercial or non-commercial 
and a single test will apply to it. The US Supreme Court in cases regarding the 
solicitation of charitable funds decided that the same test should be used for a 
single speech where its component parts are inextricably intertwined.
901
 The 
Court asserted that an endeavour to “parcel out the speech,” applying one scrutiny 
to one expression and another scrutiny to another expression, would be both non-
natural and unrealistic.
902
 Nevertheless, unless it is impossible to disentangle 
commercial expression from non-commercial expression, for example, by law or 
the nature of things, different tests should be applied to different types of 
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expression.
903
 For instance, commercial advertisements during a commercial 
break can be differentiated from TV programmes, while product placements in 
TV programmes cannot be easily separated from programmes themselves.   
 
(4) Standards for the Restriction 
 
 Standards for the interference with free speech in the USA, the EU, and 
Korea are not exactly the same. First, the US standard requires compelling state 
interests for non-commercial speech, but other jurisdictions require legitimate 
interests for both commercial and non-commercial expression. Second, the US 
Central Hudson test demands that commercial speech should be legal and non-
misleading, while, in the EU and Korea, standards for commercial expression 
apply to not only lawful and non-confusing expression but also false or 
misleading speech. Third, whether a means to restrict speech is not more 
extensive than is necessary (for commercial speech) or the least restrictive means 
(for non-commercial speech) is one prong of the test in the USA and Korea, while 
the ECtHR does not require this part of the test. Finally, the Constitutional Court 
of Korea calls for the balance of interests and others do not.  
 Most differences, however, can be explained by other standards. The 
different strength of state interests in the US Supreme Court corresponds to the 
prong of ‘the necessity in a democratic society for achieving legitimate aims’ in 
the ECtHR and the principle of proportionality—the balance of interests in 
particular—in the Constitutional Court of Korea. According to the ECtHR, 
whether or not a means to limit expression is the least restrictive means appears to 
be included in the requirement of ‘the necessity in a democratic society for 
achieving legitimate aims.’ 
 On the other hand, whether commercial speech is legal and non-
misleading in the US Supreme Court is not in conformity with the tests in other 
jurisdictions. Pursuant to Central Hudson, the limitation of false or misleading 
commercial speech needs lesser strict scrutiny than that of true and legal 
commercial speech. The ECtHR, the ECJ, and the Constitutional Court of Korea, 
however, do not require such scrutiny for false or misleading expression. This 
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does not mean that EU and Korean standards accord to false or misleading 
commercial expression the same degree of protection as is given to true and legal 
commercial speech. The same analysis applies to both cases. 
This thesis submits that illegal, false, or misleading commercial 
expression as well as legal and non-misleading commercial speech should be 
limited under the same scrutiny, considering trade mark cases.  
First, likelihood of confusion plays a role as a gate requirement under the 
Central Hudson test, but the scope of ‘likelihood of confusion’ is not well 
defined.
904
 A broad interpretation could make commercial speech fall outside the 
reach of free speech. This runs counter to court decisions that commercial 
expression should be protected under freedom of expression. 
Second, the scope of likelihood of confusion needs to be examined on the 
basis of the scrutiny for restricting commercial speech, but this is not possible 
under the US test. On the contrary, the meaning of likelihood of confusion 
determines the application of the scrutiny. This seems like ‘putting the cart before 
the horse.’  
Third, the Central Hudson analysis cannot give directions as to why some 
misleading uses are permitted because of exceptions from trade mark liability 
such as fair use. According to the Central Hudson test, if commercial speech is 
misleading, it is no more under intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the test cannot 
explain why a fair use defence is necessary from the perspective of free speech. 
One possible interpretation would be that there is no actionable likelihood of 
confusion in the case of fair use and ‘misleading’ under the test is limited to 
actionable likelihood of confusion. This interpretation, however, makes a fair use 
defence unnecessary; the likelihood of confusion test would determine whether 
the standard for limiting commercial speech applies to a specific case or not, 
embracing the analysis of fair use. 
Finally, the difference in the degree of restriction between illegal, false, 
or misleading use and legal and non-misleading use can be adjusted by the direct 
furtherance of the state interests and the necessary scope of regulations. The 
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direct furtherance and the necessity will be more readily recognised in the case of 
illegal, false, or misleading use. 
Therefore, here it is supported that the standard for limiting commercial 
speech should integrate three parts: i) the asserted state interests should be 
substantial, ii) the regulation should directly advance the state interests asserted, 
and iii) the regulation should not be more extensive than is necessary to serve 
these interests.  
 
2. Restriction of Expression by Trade Mark Law 
 
1) Approaches as to the Relationship between Free Speech and Trade Mark 
Law 
 
 Trade mark protection clashes with freedom of expression in many cases. 
If commercial speech is treated the same as other types of speech under free 
speech and the scope of free speech expands, trade mark protection would shrink. 
Conversely, if courts, on the basis of the commercial/non-commercial divide, are 
more lenient to the regulation of commercial speech and thus the scope of trade 
mark protection is broadened, this could chill free speech. As Judge Kozinski 
affirmed in MCA Records that “if this were a sci-fi melodrama, it might be called 
Speech-Zilla meets Trademark Kong,”905 it is difficult to maintain a balance 
between trade mark rights and free speech values.  
If the Central Hudson test is adopted and all uses of trade marks are 
considered to be commercial speech, it seems that Speech-Zilla never encounters 
Trade-mark Kong in trade mark infringement cases;
906
 use of trade marks which 
is likely to confuse consumers cannot satisfy the first part of the Central Hudson 
standard.  
Trade mark law, however, still clashes with free speech even if courts 
adopt the Central Hudson test. First of all, it is not certain that all trade mark uses 
are categorised as commercial speech. Sellers use trade marks in their commercial 
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advertisements while authors include trade marks in their works or music. 
Protesters parody trade marks in order to emphasise their beliefs. 
Second, the scope of ‘likelihood of confusion’ and ‘misleading’ is very 
wide and indeterminate. Some types of confusion are perceived as tolerable by 
consumers, but others are not. Moreover, consumer care is not identical. 
Sophisticated consumers are not readily misled by the information that could 
confuse average consumers. Furthermore, whether ‘likelihood of confusion’ 
corresponds to ‘misleading’ is vague.  
Third, the expansion of trade mark protection beyond confusion-based 
liability such as dilution triggers a new round of conflict between trade mark 
rights and free speech. Because dilutive use of trade marks may not constitute 
misleading expressions, the regulation of the use is not totally outside freedom of 
commercial expression even under the Central Hudson test. 
In order to reconcile the conflict and find a balance between trade mark 
protection and free speech, courts, mostly in the USA, have adopted three distinct 
approaches: i) the ‘likelihood of confusion’ test, ii) the ‘alternative avenues’ test, 
and iii) the Rogers test.
907
 A nominative fair use doctrine was also devised by the 
US Ninth Circuit and it is contended that the nominative fair use analysis was 
created since the Rogers test applied solely to use of trade marks in titles of 
works.
908
 
The likelihood of confusion approach does not “pay special solicitude to” 
free speech defences,
909
 suggesting that balancing trade mark protection against 
freedom of expression has been achieved by a statutory framework.
910
 In Dr. 
Seuss Enterprises, the US Ninth Circuit emphasised that the issue in this case was 
likelihood of confusion in product markets rather than the protection of creative 
expressions and focused on the eight-factor Sleekcraft test.
911
 Furthermore, the 
Circuit regarded a parody defence as being included in the likelihood of 
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confusion test. According to the Circuit, the parody defence was only another 
way of claiming that there was no likelihood of confusion and it should not be 
given preferential treatment.
912
 
The second approach, the ‘alternative avenues’ test, accords more weight 
to trade mark protection, stressing that trade marks possess the nature of property 
rights. This standard stems from Lloyd v. Tanner,
913
 and the US Second Circuit 
adopted it in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders.
914
 It was also used by the Eighth 
Circuit in Mutual of Omaha
915
 Under this approach, free speech interests are 
outweighed by trade mark protection if there are “adequate alternative avenues of 
communication.”916  
 Many US Circuits use the Rogers test when trade marks are employed in 
the context of artistic expression. Since the Second Circuit introduced this test in 
Rogers,
917
 not only the Second Circuit itself but also other federal courts such as 
the Fifth,
918
 the Sixth,
919
 and the Ninth
920
 Circuits have adopted this test. In 
contrast to the previous two approaches, this one is premised on the idea that 
trade mark law should be narrowly interpreted in order not to come into conflict 
with free speech interests.
921
 At first, the Rogers test only applied to use of trade 
marks in the title of artistic works, but it expanded to become “generally 
applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic expression.”922 This 
test consists of two prongs: artistic relevance and explicitly misleading use. Use 
of a mark in an expressive work will not be banned as an infringement or a false 
designation under the Lanham Act “unless [it] has no artistic relevance to the 
underlying work whatsoever or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless [it] 
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explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.
923
 
 This thesis argues that these approaches do not sufficiently justify the 
balancing between trade mark protection and free speech values from the 
perspective of standards for limiting freedom of expression. The likelihood of 
confusion approach hardly delimits the scope of trade mark protection since free 
speech interests are interpreted as being already incorporated in the confusion test. 
It cannot explain whether the likelihood of confusion test satisfies the standard 
which has been forged by the Supreme Court. Neither can it elucidate the 
different treatment in protecting commercial and non-commercial speech. 
 The ‘alternative avenues’ approach has the same problem: neither strict 
nor intermediate scrutiny offers any rationale for this approach. Moreover, this 
method lacks persuasive power by equating trade mark rights with real property 
rights
924
 and ignoring the fact that property rights can be limited by other 
constitutional values. 
 The Rogers approach, despite its endeavour to find a proper balance, was 
not based on the standard for limiting free speech. The Rogers court sought to 
consider both trade mark concerns and free speech interests, holding that “the 
[Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic works only where the 
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in 
free expression.”925 This analysis appears to concern ‘the existence of compelling 
interests’ which is part of the strict scrutiny which applies to the restriction of 
non-commercial expression. The court, however, did not continue its discussion 
based on the strict scrutiny.  
Thus, it is needed to explore the general relationship between trade mark 
law and free speech in terms of standards for limiting commercial and non-
commercial expression. For this purpose, the nature of ‘use of trade marks’ as 
speech should be examined first. 
 
2) Use of Trade Marks and Speech 
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 Producers and retailers normally use trade marks to convey information 
on product quality and brand image to differentiate their products from other 
products and thus to build strong consumer preference for their products. 
Meanwhile, trade marks, particularly famous marks, are also employed in our 
daily conversation as signs expressing other meanings. For example, consumers 
use Tylenol to indicate analgesics and use ‘the Rolls Royce of its class’ to express 
supremacy in a class of products.
926
 In these uses, which do not constitute use as 
trade marks, trade marks possess communicative characteristics, and thus they are 
considered to be speech covered by free expression. Free speech values are 
“implicated in opposition to the trademark right.”927 There would be no objection 
against this argument. 
On the other hand, there is a split in court decisions on whether use as 
trade marks amounts to ‘expression’ for free speech purposes. Some US courts 
construed ‘use as trade marks’ as not constituting speech within the meaning of 
the First Amendment, stating that “[u]se of another’s trademark is entitled to First 
Amendment protection only when the use of that mark is part of a communicative 
message, not when it is used merely to identify the source of a product.”928 This 
interpretation is predicated on the “distinction between communicative messages 
and product labels or identifications;”929 that is, a communication does not 
include information as to the source or sponsorship of products. According to this, 
trade marks used solely to indicate source or sponsorship are completely 
irrelevant to free speech interests.
930
 It is even unnecessary to classify the use as 
commercial or non-commercial. Trade mark owners are free to claim their rights 
against third party users who rely on freedom of expression. 
 I suggest that there is no reason to exclude ‘use as trade marks’ from the 
scope of ‘speech.’ As the US Supreme Court asserted in Sorrell, “the creation and 
dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First 
Amendment” and factual information is “the beginning point for much of the 
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speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human 
affairs.” 931  Moreover, use as trade marks is located at the heart of the 
communication between sellers, consumers, and other competitors in the light of 
trade mark functions. Trade marks convey information as to product quality and 
brand image and play a core role in differentiating products bearing them from 
other products. This information is indispensable for reasonable consumer 
decisions and helps competitors to establish their marketing strategies. After all, 
the main and essential functions of trade marks concern the communication of 
significant information to their main audience, consumers and competitors. 
Therefore, ‘use as trade marks’ constitutes ‘speech’ for the purpose of free 
speech.
932
 
 Although use of trade marks including use as trade marks can constitute 
speech within the meaning of free speech, there are some uses of trade marks that 
cannot be regarded as ‘speech’ because of the lack of communicative elements. If 
trade marks are used invisibly and the use is not communicated to others, then the 
use in itself cannot amount to ‘speech.’ The invisible use of trade marks is similar 
to “an individual’s private thoughts about trade marks,”933 which cannot reach 
listeners. For example, trade marks, which are included as metatags in software 
programmes to trigger search results, do not constitute ‘expression.’ 
 
3) Use of Trade Marks and Commercial Speech 
 
Another issue, which arises in applying the standards for limiting free 
speech to trade mark law, is whether use of trade marks is classified as 
commercial or non-commercial. This does not only concern the definition of 
commercial speech; it also relates to the question of whether the categorisation 
relies solely on the nature of use of trade marks or on the contexts in which trade 
marks are used.  
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Given various uses of trade marks today, an answer to the latter question 
is crucial. Nowadays, trade marks are used both in the context of commercial and 
non-commercial expression. They are found in the middle of commercial 
advertisements, signboards about products, or the packaging of goods. Meanwhile, 
they are used as part of the titles of movies or books. Editorials and articles in 
various mass media include trade marks.  
Traditionally, use as trade marks itself can be interpreted as commercial 
speech since sellers employ trade marks to propose commercial transactions by 
differentiating their products from others based on the information that trade 
marks deliver. In this vein, some argue that use as trade marks is a form of 
commercial speech because its purpose is to attract consumers and hence it 
functions as part of the proposal of a commercial transaction.
934
  
 Trade marks, however, are often placed against different contexts as 
brand marketing strategies become more diversified. Some advertisements do not 
show the intent to propose commercial transactions, either explicitly or implicitly. 
They may deal with social issues or express corporate philosophies, displaying 
trade marks to identify a corporate itself. Trade marks used in these 
advertisements indicate the source of products, but it is very unlikely that 
advertisements constitute ‘commercial speech’ within the meaning of free speech 
because they do not directly or indirectly propose commercial transactions.
935
 
The commercial nature that ‘use as trade marks’ brings about is intertwined with, 
and outweighed by, the non-commercial characteristics of advertisements as a 
whole. In this sense, whether use of trade marks is commercial or not should 
depend on its contexts.  
 Likewise, use of trade marks, which does not constitute ‘use as trade 
marks,’ should also be categorised based on contexts. For example, if a company 
uses the expression ‘the Rolex of cars’ in its advertisement to promote its cars, the 
expression should be classified as commercial. Even if the mark ‘Rolex’ does not 
indicate the source of watches, only meaning ‘the best,’ its use in this context 
                                         
934
 Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging 
Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 158, 193 (1982) 
935
 Ramsey, supra note 904, at 396-397 (stating that “political groups use trademarks, such as 
“United We Stand America” or “MoveOn.org,” to identify the source of their activities and 
distinguish themselves from other organizations.”) 
232 
 
aims at the proposal of commercial transactions. On the other hand, if expressions 
like ‘the Rolex of cars’ are used in an editorial that does not concern the proposal 
of commercial transactions, the use must be within the category of non-
commercial expression.  
Classification based on contexts is more consistent with the usefulness of 
distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial speech: the type of 
‘standards for restricting free speech’ which applies to a specific expression. If 
the nature of use of trade marks alone determines which standard applies to an 
expression, non-commercial speech, including use as trade marks, could be 
restricted according to the standard for limiting commercial speech. This is in 
conflict with free speech. Thus, depending on the nature of speech as a whole, not 
the nature of use of trade marks, different speech restriction standards should 
apply. Where bans on use of trade marks could suppress non-commercial speech, 
the standard for limiting non-commercial speech should apply to this case 
regardless of whether trade marks included in this speech are characterised as 
commercial or non-commercial speech. 
 In the light of both contexts where trade marks are used and the 
definition of commercial speech that this thesis supports,
936
 use of trade marks is 
commercial if the use is made in expressions which constitute communication 
that primarily proposes commercial transactions of products from the standpoint 
of the audience. Whether or not trade marks are used to indicate source should 
not intervene in this assessment. For example, trade marks printed on the front of 
T-shirts would be characterised as commercial if retailers sell these T-shirts in 
ordinary product markets. This commercial nature does not concern whether trade 
marks are used to identify the source of T-shirts, to decorate T-shirts, or to poke 
fun at trade mark owners. On the other hand, where T-shirts bearing trade marks 
are displayed as artistic works in art galleries or sold to promote political 
campaigns, the use of trade marks would be regarded as non-commercial even if 
trade marks on their face appear to indicate who is responsible for product quality 
and brand image. This is because the audience would not think that the primary 
purpose of employing trade marks is the sale of T-shirts.  
There may be some cases where contexts are equivocal. If, for example, 
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trade marks are incorporated in editorials which appear to aim at advertising 
products, their real primary purposes are not readily detected. As was discussed 
before,
937
 use of trade marks and editorials should be presumed to be non-
commercial until they are proved to be commercial, considering comparably 
wider limitations allowed for commercial speech. 
  Moreover, certain use of trade marks can be separated from their 
contexts. This use occurs when protesters sell T-shirts emblazoned with trade 
marks for the sake of political issues but the information that trade marks deliver 
has nothing to do with those issues. This instance is very similar to the sale of 
housewares combined with teaching home economics in a dormitory in Fox.
938
 
As the US Supreme Court concluded that the sale of housewares was separable 
from teaching home economics and amounted to commercial expression,
939
 the 
use of trade marks on T-shirts can be disentangled from political protests.  
 
4) Purpose of Trade Mark Law and Societal Interests 
 
Since this thesis argues that use of trade marks may constitute 
commercial or non-commercial speech depending on contexts, both standards for 
limiting commercial and non-commercial expression are relevant to trade mark 
law. The prevention of use of trade marks in commercial contexts can survive an 
intermediate free speech test if i) the aim of the prevention by trade mark law is 
substantial, ii) the prevention directly advances this aim, and iii) it is not more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that aim. On the other hand, use of trade 
marks in non-commercial contexts can be prohibited under strict free speech 
scrutiny if i) there are compelling interests in prohibiting the use, ii) the 
prohibition directly furthers these interests, and iii) it is the least restrictive means. 
The first part of each test, the existence of substantial or compelling 
interests in preventing third party use, concerns none other than the purpose of 
trade mark law, and thus different understandings as to purpose could result in 
following opposing directions. Since this thesis considers the aim of trade mark 
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protection to be ‘fair and efficient competition by means of protecting pro-
competitive functions of trade marks,’ the analysis of the first prong boils down 
to the question of whether this aim is substantial, compelling, or insignificant. 
It is suggested here that the purpose of trade mark protection is 
substantial unless a core requirement for trade mark liability is interpreted too 
broadly. US courts which adopted the Central Hudson test have not doubted the 
existence of substantial societal interests in trade mark cases. The ECtHR, the 
ECJ, and the Constitutional Court of Korea also appear to admit the substantiality 
of the purpose of trade mark law in that they have not denied the constitutionality 
of bans on third party use.  
More importantly, fair competition is regarded as an important or 
substantial interest by the US Supreme Court and the ECtHR. In Turner 
Broadcasting System, the Court found that interests in removing restraints on fair 
competition are substantial even when individuals or entities participate in 
expressive activities under the protection of free speech.
940
 The ECtHR also 
stated in Hertel, a case about unfair competition law, that the aim of an order 
prohibiting “an act of unfair competition” which damaged “goodwill, credit, 
professional reputation, business or economic interests in general” was legitimate 
since the aim was “protection of the … rights of others” set out in article 10(2) of 
the ECHR.
941
 Thus, at least, the aim of trade mark protection that this thesis 
supports can be characterised as substantial. 
Furthermore, trade mark owners have free speech interests in using their 
trade marks. They should be free to deliver their information and ideas by 
employing their trade marks in their commercial or non-commercial speech. 
Although their interests in expressive use of trade marks could not be restricted 
by trade mark law, their free speech interests in use as trade marks could be 
adversely affected by court decisions which either deny their claims for trade 
mark infringement or accept third party users’ claims for a declaratory judgment 
of non-infringement. These free speech values are at least as substantial as other 
interests that the US Supreme Court has found substantial. 
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Bans on third party use, however, should be limited to cases where pro-
competitive trade mark functions are likely to be harmed. The furtherance of fair 
and efficient competition in the abstract itself cannot be substantial. It is ‘the 
elimination of real barriers in the way of free and efficient competition by 
protecting trade mark functions’ that is significant or substantial interests within 
the meaning of standards for limiting commercial speech. In this vein, a core 
requirement for trade mark liability should be narrowly tailored. 
As to whether or not bans on use of trade marks by trade mark law have 
compelling interests, courts do not reach a consensus. US courts adopting the 
Rogers balancing test appear to interpret the prevention of explicit or compelling 
likelihood of confusion as compelling interests. They did not directly discuss 
compelling interests in the application of the Rogers test, but they admitted in 
relation to trade marks used in non-commercial contexts that only explicit or 
compelling likelihood of confusion outweighs free speech interests.
942
 The 
decision of the Ninth Circuit in Nissan,
943
 on the other hand, can be viewed as 
finding no compelling interests. The Circuit concluded that there was no “broader 
public interest than in traditional trade mark law” and hence a restraint on the 
placing of links on nissan.com to websites with negative comments about Nissan 
Motor violated freedom of expression.
944
 
This thesis suggests that public interest in preventing third parties from 
using trade marks can be compelling if likelihood of harm to pro-competitive 
trade mark functions is so evident and clear as to show actual malice or calculated 
falsehood. The first reason for this argument is that if evident likelihood of harm 
to pro-competitive functions is not eliminated, it could cause serious market 
disorder. Consumers could hardly distinguish the products they wish to purchase 
from other products, especially in markets where a lot of competitors exist. Here, 
markets for lemons would appear. Trade mark owners would not feel any need to 
maintain product quality because of the inability of consumers to distinguish and 
severe information asymmetry. They, on the contrary, would deteriorate the 
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quality of products to earn more profits. Competitors would rather use other 
famous marks than invest time and efforts on the development of their own trade 
marks. Like trade mark owners, they would also worsen product quality. 
Producers, who could not link their own images to their own marks, would no 
more try to create product brand images that consumers want to enjoy. This 
market disorder would outweigh free speech values in protecting non-commercial 
speech. In this sense, as one party argued in Hertel,
945
 trade mark protection not 
only aims at the protection of rights of others but also at the prevention of 
economic disorder. 
Second, the removal of evident risks to pro-competitive trade mark 
functions would facilitate free speech of trade mark owners. Courts’ rejection of 
trade mark owners’ claims for trade mark infringement based on evident risks 
could ‘immediately’ hinder owners’ rights to use trade marks as such in their 
commercial or non-commercial expressions by making trade marks malfunction. 
The owners could not any more speak what they want to speak through their trade 
marks because the information and messages that these marks deliver could not 
be communicated correctly to listeners by reason of the existence of confusingly 
similar or identical trade marks. On the other hand, if these risks are eliminated, 
the owners would freely use their trade marks, enriching the information and 
brand images that trade marks are capable of conveying. This elimination would 
not impose any illegitimate burden on competitors’ free speech since only use of 
trade marks that could cause evident dangers is prevented. Thus, it can be 
submitted that the restriction of free speech by trade mark law also aims to protect 
free speech rights of trade mark owners. 
 Third, the US Supreme Court has found in some instances that false non-
commercial speech can be restricted on the ground of its content under certain 
conditions.
946
 The Court has traditionally permitted content-based restrictions 
only for a few categories of speech such as incitement, obscenity, defamation, 
speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, fraud, 
true threats, and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the 
Government has the power to prevent, but falsity alone has not become part of 
                                         
945
 Hertel, (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 534 at 569 
946
 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964) 
237 
 
these categories.
947
 Nevertheless, the content-based regulation of false non-
commercial speech was allowed by the Court on the condition of actual malice: 
“a knowing or reckless falsehood.”948 In Garrison, a case about the District 
Attorney of Orleans Parish’s statement disparaging judges’ judicial conduct, the 
Court reasoned that calculated falsehood is “at odds with the premises of 
democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, 
or political change is to be effected.”949 Likewise, if third party use of trade 
marks is made with the high degree of awareness of probable confusion, this 
calculated likelihood of confusion could “[fall] into that class of utterances which 
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”950   
 In sum, restraints on use of trade marks by trade mark law can be 
substantial or compelling depending on the degree of harm to pro-competitive 
trade mark functions. If harm is likely, bans on use of trade marks would be 
substantial. If likelihood of harm is explicit, bans would be compelling. Without 
this likelihood of harm, however, bans could impinge on free speech values. 
 
5) Trade Mark Protection and Direct Furtherance of Societal Interests  
 
 The second part of standards for limiting free speech asks whether 
restraints on free speech directly advance the asserted interests. This part can be 
understood as meaning that there should be real harm and regulations should 
lessen it in a direct and material fashion.
951
 “Mere speculation or conjecture” 
cannot satisfy this step.
952
 Neither can “ineffective and remote” regulations.953 
There should be a direct causal link between the harm that needs to be prevented 
and the means chosen for the furtherance of the interests.
954
 
 In trade mark cases, this prong requires real harm to pro-competitive 
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trade mark functions and direct elimination of the harm to a material degree by 
the prevention of use of trade marks. Trade mark liability can survive this step. 
Insofar as liability is interpreted as arising only when pro-competitive trade mark 
functions are likely to be harmed, this harm is neither speculative nor conjectural. 
It is real. ‘Likelihood’ does not mean ‘mere possibility.’ Moreover, many factors 
such as the similarity between trade marks at issue are analysed in assessing 
likelihood of harm to pro-competitive trade mark functions.  
 Moreover, bans on third party use constitute the direct means to advance 
the purpose of trade mark law. Unlike political speech in general, confusing or 
dilutive use of trade marks could not facilitate in markets of ideas a debate that 
would lead to true information. Before reaching the true information that trade 
marks convey, market disorder would arise. On the other hand, bans on third 
party use can effectively eliminate likelihood of harm to pro-competitive trade 
mark functions. 
 
6) Remedies for Trade Mark Protection and Less Speech-Restrictive Means 
 
 As a final step to assess the relationship between trade mark law and free 
speech, a remedy for trade mark infringement that use of trade marks in 
commercial contexts causes should be ‘not more extensive than is necessary.’ 
Where trade mark liability stems from unauthorised use of trade marks in non-
commercial contexts, a remedy has to be the least restrictive means to achieve 
compelling interests that trade mark law intends to protect. 
 The meaning of ‘not more extensive than is necessary’ is perceived by 
the US Supreme Court as ‘narrowly tailored,’ ‘a reasonable fit between 
governmental interests and means,’ and ‘proportional to the interest served.’955 A 
remedy such as compensation and the prevention of unauthorised use can be 
regarded as a means which is proportional to the purpose of trade mark law in 
that there are not many less restrictive or non-speech-related means for this 
purpose. 
 The introduction of sponsorship or non-sponsorship disclosures into trade 
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mark law, however, is an issue. There are sceptical opinions about the effect of 
these disclosures on the prevention of likelihood of confusion. A study shows that 
disclosures are ineffective when the main advertising message is misleading; they 
can cause consumer confusion as to their meanings.
956
 There are also opposite 
arguments. The US Supreme Court asserted in Zauderer that “disclosure 
requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat 
prohibitions on speech.”957  Some US courts recommended disclosures as a 
remedy to “dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”958 
Trade marks used in domain names that “on their face dispel any confusion as to 
sponsorship or endorsement” such as “independent-lexus-broker.com” and “we-
are-definitely-not-lexus.com” could eliminate harm to trade mark functions.959 
This thesis supports the introduction of disclaimers into trade mark law. 
Where trade marks are used in non-commercial contexts, disclaimers that 
dissociate third party users from trade mark owners would be less speech-
restrictive means than bans on use; because of disclaimers, bans on trade mark 
use cannot be the least restrictive means. In Westchester Media, the US Fifth 
Circuit also regarded disclaimers as a remedy with free speech values and argued 
for the accommodation of disclaimers as a trade mark remedy particularly when 
allegedly infringing use of trade marks is “not solely a commercial appropriation 
of another’s mark.”960 This is also consistent with the position of the EU 
Directive on electronic commerce.
961
 
The EU Directive on electronic commerce, which seeks harmony with 
freedom of expression,
962
 lays down the rule about transparency, taking into 
account consumer protection and fair trading. It is provided in recital 9 in the 
preamble to the Directive that “directives covering the supply of information 
society services must ensure that this activity may be engaged in freely in the 
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light of [Article 10(1) of the ECHR], subject only to the restrictions laid down in 
paragraph 2 of that Article and in Article 46(1) of the Treaty.” Together with this 
recital, the Directive stipulates in recital 29 that commercial communications 
must satisfy transparency requirements for the benefit of consumer protection and 
fair trading. Considering these recitals, articles 6(a) and 6(b) of the Directive 
require that both a commercial communication, which is part of, or constitutes, an 
information society service and the natural or legal person on whose behalf the 
commercial communication is made should be clearly identifiable.  
 
7) Conclusion 
 
 Use as trade marks, as well as other uses of trade marks, constitutes 
speech within the meaning of free speech if it possesses a communicative element. 
This means that not only third parties but also trade mark owners are entitled to 
free speech protection. Moreover, any use is characterised as commercial or non-
commercial, depending on the nature of contexts where trade marks are employed. 
Even where trade marks are used to identify the source of products, the use can be 
non-commercial according to its context.  
 The analysis of the relationship between trade mark law and freedom of 
expression based on the application of speech restriction standards to trade mark 
protection shows that unauthorised use of trade marks can be prevented by trade 
mark law without damaging free speech values if a core requirement for trade 
mark liability is narrowly interpreted. In particular, where trade marks are used in 
non-commercial contexts, likelihood of harm to pro-competitive trade mark 
functions should be evident and clear enough to display actual malice or 
calculated falsehood. In relation to this, requirements for trade mark liability in 
terms of free speech will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 Finally, sponsorship or non-sponsorship disclosures as a trade mark 
remedy should be included in trade mark law. Current remedies cannot survive 
the last step of the standard for limiting non-commercial speech: the least 
restrictive means. Even though there are doubts as to the effectiveness of 
disclosures, making disclosures more operative protects free speech values better 
than abandoning use of disclosures because of their limits.  
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Chapter 7: Freedom of Expression and Direct Liability in Paid Search 
Marketing  
 
 This chapter first analyses requirements for and exceptions from trade 
mark liability, based on the relationship between trade mark protection and free 
speech discussed in chapter 6. Then, it explores the direct liability of advertisers 
and search engine providers for use of trade marks in paid search marketing from 
the perspective of free speech.  
 
1. Free Speech Restrictions and Trade Mark Liability 
 
1) Use in Commerce and Commercial Speech 
 
 Scholars, who agree on the need to balance trade mark protection against 
free speech values, have different opinions about how to interpret ‘use in 
commerce.’963 Those who argue for the trade mark use theory limit its meaning 
to ‘use as trade marks’964 while others contend that the fair use doctrine should 
be developed instead of the trade mark use doctrine.
965
 
 The thesis argues that confusion and dilution provisions should be 
narrowly construed in order for trade mark protection not to conflict with free 
speech interests. This, however, does not mean that all requirements should be 
interpreted as narrowly as possible. Rather, it implies that a core requirement such 
as likelihood of confusion or dilution should correspond to the protection of pro-
competitive trade mark functions through which trade mark protection aims to 
promote fair and efficient competition. That is, trade mark liability should arise 
only when harm to pro-competitive trade mark functions is likely, or, in the case 
of use of trade marks in non-commercial contexts, only when likelihood of harm 
is evident.  
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In the same vein, it is supported here that ‘use’ should not be construed as 
only meaning ‘use as trade marks.’ First, ‘use in commerce’ is not the only 
requirement that can determine the balance between trade mark protection and 
freedom of expression. Calibrating the scope of likelihood of confusion can 
prevent a chill on speech. A fair use defence is also capable of protecting free 
speech values. 
The second reason is that a too narrow interpretation of the concept of 
‘use’ could lead to a detrimental effect on free speech of ‘trade mark owners’ by 
allowing use of trade marks that can cause likelihood of confusion or dilution. 
Trade mark owners’ free speech interests in using trade marks to convey 
information as to product quality and brand image and to differentiate their 
products from other products cannot be outweighed by other speakers’ free 
speech interests in using these trade marks. Use as one’s own trade mark should 
only be allowed to trade mark owners under freedom of speech considerations. 
Thus, trade mark cases are not only about trade mark protection against freedom 
of expression; they are also about the owners’ freedom of expression against users’ 
freedom of expression. As the US Supreme Court asserted in Eldred, a case about 
the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA), not 
all speech has the same values: “The First Amendment securely protects the 
freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily 
when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”966 I submit here 
that an exemption from trade mark liability by introducing the trade mark use 
doctrine could not secure trade mark owners’ own speech. 
Third, it cannot be said that there is no case where bans on use of trade 
marks, even if the use does not constitute use as trade marks, can directly advance 
the purpose of trade mark law to a material degree. The development of both 
online technology and brand marketing makes it possible for third parties to 
confuse consumers as to controllers of product quality and brand image without 
using trade marks as such by disentangling use of trade marks from their 
information and differentiation functions. Paid search marketing is a 
representative example. 
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As regards use ‘in commerce’ or ‘in the course of trade’, some authors967 
or courts
968
 argue that trade mark rights are protected only against commercial 
speech. According to them, the ‘use in commerce’ requirement protects freedom 
of speech “by confining the infringement cause of action to commercial 
transactions, and generally, to commercial speech.”969  
Actionable use of trade marks, however, should not be limited to 
commercial speech even though it appears to be commercial speech because of 
the requirement of ‘in relation to goods or services.’ For commercial use of trade 
marks to be identical with commercial speech, either commercial use has to be 
narrowly interpreted or commercial speech should have a broad meaning. Neither, 
however, is acceptable. If the concept of ‘commerce’ under trade mark law is 
interpreted as narrowly as commercial speech, use of trade marks in recent 
advertisements, which do not relate primarily to the proposal of commercial 
transactions, cannot amount to ‘use in commerce.’ They are entirely free from 
trade mark liability. This result is not compatible with the purpose of trade mark 
law since those third party uses could harm pro-competitive trade mark functions. 
On the other hand, commercial speech cannot be broadly defined. The concept of 
commercial speech should be narrowly tailored, considering, for example, the 
rationale for the lesser degree of protection given to commercial speech.  
Moreover, there are many cases where use of trade marks on products 
does not aim at proposing commercial transactions, but at conveying opinions or 
information which are not about the source or sponsorship of products:
970
 some 
may be used in political contexts; others in artistic contexts. The ECJ also 
construes the notion of ‘use in commerce’ as broader than commercial speech, 
deciding that use in commerce occurs “in the context of commercial activity with 
a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter.”971 
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2) Likelihood of Confusion 
 
(1) Use of Trade Marks as Commercial Speech 
 
In contrast to the ‘use in commerce’ requirement, likelihood of confusion, 
a core requirement for trade mark infringement, should not be interpreted broadly 
in order for trade mark protection not to conflict with free speech interests. Only 
where likelihood of confusion constitutes real harm to pro-competitive trade mark 
functions, such likelihood of confusion should be prevented. In this sense, 
likelihood of confusion as to controllers of product quality and brand image 
provides a substantial justification for trade mark liability in that it significantly 
endangers what trade mark law intends to protect; owners’ trade marks cannot 
convey information any more as to who is responsible for product quality and 
brand image. As a result, they cannot serve to differentiate the owners’ products 
from other products. This would lead to unfairness, material inefficiency, and 
anti-competitiveness in product markets. Removing this likely confusion by 
means of bans on unauthorised use could restore fair and efficient competition. 
On the other hand, other types of confusion such as possible confusion as 
to source and likely confusion as to some kind of relationship between products 
and trade marks would not put ‘pro-competitive trade mark functions’ at risk. For 
example, where there is a meagre possibility that a trade mark owner could be the 
controller of the quality and brand image of a user’s products since a trade mark 
is used on products which are far different from the owner’s, there would be no 
real danger to pro-competitive trade mark functions.
972
 Average reasonable 
consumers would not determine their preferences based solely on this insufficient 
information. A possibility of a license could also not be regarded as actionable 
likelihood of confusion unless consumers mistakenly believe that trade mark 
owners control the quality and brand image of users’ products because of the 
license.  
Initial interest confusion should be understood in the same vein. If 
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unauthorised use causes any meaningful risk to pro-competitive trade mark 
functions in owners’ product markets, the elimination of initial interest confusion 
should be perceived as possessing substantial public interest. Thus, insofar as the 
use generates likelihood of consumer confusion as to controllers of product 
quality or product brand image, there are significant societal interests in 
preventing the use regardless of whether the danger arises prior to the purchase of 
products or whether the danger dissipates at the time of the purchase. The 
dissipation does not mean that the danger never occurred. On the other hand, 
unless the use creates such likely confusion, the fact that the use diverts consumer 
attention cannot justify the prevention of the use. This prevention could only 
result in a chill on speakers’ use of trade marks. 
 
(2) Use of Trade Marks as Non-commercial Speech 
 
Where trade marks are used in non-commercial contexts and thus the use 
constitutes non-commercial speech, likelihood of confusion should be interpreted 
more strictly than in use of trade marks as commercial speech. It is because the 
first step of the standard for limiting non-commercial expression requires that 
societal interests in the regulation of speech should be compelling. Just as falsity 
in non-commercial speech can be restricted only where there exists actual malice 
or calculated falsehood, likelihood of confusion caused by use of trade marks in 
non-commercial contexts can be regulated where it is so evident as to be 
perceived as calculated. This explicit or compelling likelihood of confusion could 
cause immediate adverse effects on pro-competitive trade mark functions and 
hence on fair and efficient competition. This would also be of great concern to 
free speech rights of trade mark owners in that the confusing use would seriously 
prevent the owners from speaking what they want to speak through use of their 
trade marks.  
This standard is similar to the second prong of the Rogers balancing test 
which was adopted by US courts in Rogers for trade marks used in titles of 
works
973
 and expanded to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic 
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expression.
974
 According to the US Second Circuit in Rogers, use of trade marks 
in literary titles is not prevented by trade mark law “unless the title has no artistic 
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, 
unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.”975 
In other cases adopting the Rogers test, US courts used the expression 
‘particularly compelling’ instead of ‘explicit.’ For example, the Second Circuit in 
Twin Peaks Productions and the Fifth Circuit in Westchester Media stated that 
likelihood of confusion must be “particularly compelling” to outweigh free 
speech values.
976
   
The Rogers balancing test, however, does not exactly correspond to the 
standard for limiting non-commercial speech. It is not based on the clear 
distinction between commercial and non-commercial expression. The Second 
Circuit regarded titles as possessing both artistic and commercial elements 
intertwined inextricably with each other,
977
 but it did not assess whether titles are 
classified as commercial or non-commercial. It argued for more protection of 
titles as speech not because titles are non-commercial speech but because they 
have expressive elements.
978
 The Ninth Circuit even interpreted the Rogers test 
as requiring explicit likelihood of confusion once titles have just more than zero 
relevance to artistic works.
979
 This construction produces almost the same 
consequences that arise when an expression is categorised as non-commercial on 
the ground that it inseparably includes a tiny amount of non-commercial speech.  
 
3) Likelihood of Dilution 
 
(1) Use of Trade Marks as Commercial Speech 
 
                                                                                                               
speech ideal, the balance will presumptively favor defendant artists and allow them to prevail in 
confusion-based infringement claims,” and that this would apply “regardless of whether the 
trademark is used in the title or content of a work, or of the medium in which the trademark is 
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 Dilution-based trade mark liability is more likely to conflict with free 
speech rights. Likelihood of confusion is generated by unauthorised use of trade 
marks in competing product markets or in non-competing but related product 
markets. Dilution, however, can also be caused by use of trade marks in entirely 
unrelated product markets. Thus, whereas trade mark protection based on 
confusion is normally in tension with freedom of expression in relevant product 
markets, dilution-based protection is potentially at odds with free speech interests 
even in irrelevant product markets.
980
 
 Under the Central Hudson test for commercial speech which excludes 
false or misleading expression from free speech protection, dilution-based 
liability endangers free speech values much more than confusion-based liability. 
Confusing use of trade marks could constitute ‘misleading speech,’ and hence 
bans on this use would not conflict with freedom of expression. On the other hand, 
bans on diluting use of trade marks should survive other prongs of the test in 
order not to infringe on free speech rights of users since the diluting use, which 
does not require a showing of confusion, may not amount to misleading 
speech.
981
  
In particular, the danger to free speech values that anti-dilution protection 
could cause would be high when confusion-based trade mark protection is 
interpreted as having the dual goals of protecting trade mark owners’ goodwill 
and preventing consumer confusion. Anti-dilution protection, whose aim is 
regarded as solely the protection of trade mark owners’ goodwill, would not pass 
the second prong of the Central Hudson test: whether societal interests are 
substantial. The Second Circuit made this point in MCA Records, stating that 
“dilution law protects only the distinctiveness of the mark, which is inherently 
less weighty than the dual interest of protecting trademark owners and avoiding 
harm to consumers that is at the heart of every trademark claim.”982 
Despite the high possibility of conflicts, however, anti-dilution protection 
is not inherently inconsistent with freedom of expression. This thesis suggests 
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that the purpose of anti-dilution protection is the same as that of confusion-based 
protection: the furtherance of fair and efficient competition by way of protecting 
pro-competitive trade mark functions in product markets. Based on this 
suggestion, anti-dilution regulation can overcome the standard for limiting free 
speech. In other words, the aim of anti-dilution regulation is substantial so far as 
likelihood of dilution is construed as occurring only when the pro-competitive 
functions of owners’ trade marks are likely to be harmed. The reason why this 
regulation does not pass the standard is not that the aim of dilution-based 
protection can never be substantial. It is because the aim is interpreted as solely 
the protection of trade mark owners and as a result likelihood of dilution is 
broadly accepted. 
Thus, likelihood of dilution should be limited to cases where pro-
competitive trade mark functions are likely to be harmed. As this thesis suggested 
in chapter 5, this harm is likely to arise when third party use of famous marks 
could lead consumers to associate famous marks with inconsistent or negative 
product quality or brand images; blurring concerns association of famous marks 
with inconsistent product quality or brand images, and tarnishment relates to 
association of famous marks with negative product quality or brand images. 
On the other hand, the mere fact that third party use makes consumers 
associate famous marks with other products cannot be deemed to be blurring 
unless the association leads to the probability of harming the functions of the 
marks in owners’ product markets. Although this association makes it difficult for 
famous mark owners to enter users’ product markets, the association would not 
adversely affect the functions of the famous marks in many cases. Consumers 
would not experience difficulty in connecting the famous trade marks with the 
owners’ products in specific product markets since products remind consumers of 
the famous marks.
983
 The famous marks still could convey information as to the 
strong position of product quality and brand image and serve to differentiate 
products bearing the marks from other products based on this information. A 
mere delay in consumers’ associating the famous marks with the owners’ 
products caused by third party use in distant product markets would not influence 
consumer preference in owners’ product markets. Moreover, parodic use of 
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famous marks in distant product markets may reinforce the functions of the 
famous marks by facilitating an association between the marks and owners’ 
products.
984
  
Unlike blurring and tarnishment, unfair advantage, a third type of 
actionable dilution in EU trade mark law, can hardly coexist with free speech 
values. According to the interpretation of the ECJ, use of famous marks can 
constitute unfair advantage if made “without paying any financial compensation” 
to the owners of famous marks;
985
 in determining unfair advantage, the impact on 
the functions of famous marks in owners’ product markets is not taken into 
account. Compensation, however, cannot be a substantial societal interest that 
justifies the suppression of free speech. Moreover, the existence of unfair 
advantage cannot be established based on whether the functions of famous marks 
in owners’ product markets are likely to be harmed since ‘unfair advantage,’ as 
the expression itself shows, relates to third party users’ product markets. 
Therefore, unfair advantage should be excluded from protection under dilution. 
 
(2) Use of Trade Marks as Non-commercial Speech 
 
 When trade marks are employed in non-commercial contexts, ‘likelihood 
of dilution’ should be interpreted more strictly for anti-dilution regulation to have 
compelling interests. Just as actual malice or calculated falsehood can justify the 
restriction of falsity in non-commercial speech and explicit or compelling 
likelihood of confusion is required for use of trade marks as non-commercial 
speech, likelihood of dilution caused by use of trade marks in non-commercial 
contexts can be regulated where it is evident or compelling enough to show actual 
malice or calculated falsehood. If, for example, famous marks are obviously used 
as generic terms in movies, or if famous marks for quality products carrying 
brand images of ‘luxury’ and ‘prestige’ are used in artistic works to evidently 
denote ‘poor quality,’ these uses could cause ‘likelihood of dilution.’ On the other 
hand, where famous marks are used only to reveal ‘the truth’ that could harm the 
strong position of the quality or brand image of owners’ products, it could not be 
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easy to find actual malice or calculated falsehood in use of famous marks. 
 This more stringent interpretation, however, is not possible in the USA 
and Korea. The Lanham Act and the Korean Unfair Competition Act exclude 
non-commercial use from dilution-based liability in order to incorporate free 
speech values and limitations in anti-dilution regulations. The Lanham Act 
provides in section 43(c)(3)(C) that “any noncommercial use of a mark” “shall 
not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment.” It is also 
stipulated in article 2(1)(iii) of the Korean Unfair Competition Act that actionable 
dilution should be without due cause as prescribed by Presidential Decree 
including non-commercial use.  
Both laws appear to be predicated on the assumption that all bans on 
dilutive use of trade marks as non-commercial speech cannot possess compelling 
societal interests. Under this assumption, third parties are free to use famous trade 
marks in non-commercial contexts unless the use causes likelihood of confusion, 
whether or not the use puts the functions of the marks at high risk.  
Moreover, they seem to be based on a more relaxed interpretation of 
likelihood of dilution: courts could find dilution likely even where there is no 
evidence of likely harm to the distinctiveness or reputation of famous marks. 
Without non-commercial speech exceptions, this broad understanding of dilution 
would inevitably run counter to strongly protected freedom of non-commercial 
expression. Thus, it appears to be inevitable to introduce a safe harbour for non-
commercial speech to avoid conflicts with free speech. 
Non-commercial speech exclusions, however, give too much weight to 
free speech of third party users. By deliberately repeating use of famous marks as 
generic terms in movies or by maliciously emphasising ‘poor quality’ of high-end 
branded products in artistic works, third parties can cause the malfunction of the 
famous marks that outweighs third parties’ freedom of non-commercial speech. 
Consumers would begin to regard the famous marks as product names. They 
would change their preference for the branded products as they mistakenly 
believe that the famous marks cannot convey the same images any more. 
Nonetheless, it is dubious how much these uses of trade marks in non-commercial 
contexts could contribute to public discourse. Third parties can reveal the truth 
without actual malice or calculated falsehood. Quite contrarily, trade mark 
251 
 
owners’ free speech would be chilled in that they cannot speak what they want to 
convey through use of their trade marks.  
Insofar as likelihood of dilution caused by use of trade marks as non-
commercial speech is more narrowly interpreted, non-commercial speech 
exceptions are unnecessary. Where likelihood of dilution is explicit, third party 
use of famous marks should be prevented. Thus, it is suggested that the Lanham 
Act and the Korean Unfair Competition Act need to be amended. 
 
4) Fair Use Defence 
 
(1) Scope of a Fair Use Defence 
 
 A ‘fair use clause’ is often called one of the built-in limitations986 for 
freedom of expression or the internalisation of free speech into trade mark law. 
Third party users counterclaim fair use to defend free speech values against both 
confusion and dilution claims. Even when trade mark owners prove likelihood of 
confusion or dilution, users can be free from trade mark liability by claiming fair 
use. Furthermore, third party users are able to protect free speech interests much 
more effectively by claiming fair use rather than denying likelihood of confusion 
and dilution. Facts about free speech can have more dominant effects on the 
assessment of the presence of fair use than on the evaluation of the absence of 
confusion or dilution. The facts that suffice to support a fair use defence concern 
a few factors of the confusion or dilution test that can be overwhelmed by other 
factors.  
A too strict interpretation of fair use could result in insufficient protection 
of third party users’ free speech interests. In Adam Opel AG, Autec affixed the 
Opel logo to the radiator grills of its remote-controlled scale models of the Opel 
Astra V8 Coupé with its trade mark ‘Cartronic’ appearing on the front page of 
user instructions and on the front of remote control transmitters.
987
 The ECJ 
rejected the applicability of article 6(1)(b) to this case, on the ground that use of 
the trade mark Opel for scale models was “merely an element in the faithful 
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reproduction of the original vehicles” and not an indication of a characteristic of 
the models.
988
 Nevertheless, given that the Opel logo on scale models delivers 
information that they were models of the Opel vehicles and that Autec made use 
of its own trade mark, ‘other characteristics of goods or services’ within the 
meaning of article 6(1)(b) should have been interpreted more broadly. The narrow 
interpretation of fair use in this case made Autec unlikely to communicate 
information about scale models of the Opel cars easily. The lack of a broad fair 
use defence in Europe made the ECJ focus on the harm to proprietors’ interests in 
order to find that there is no infringement.
989
 
I suggest that the scope of fair use should correspond to standards for 
limiting free speech. In particular, it should relate to societal interests—likelihood 
of harm to pro-competitive trade mark functions. Unlike likelihood of confusion 
or dilution that shows likely harm, however, a fair use defence indicates that the 
protection of trade marks could cause anti-competitive results and that affected 
trade mark functions do not fall within the scope of pro-competitive functions. 
Where, for instance, auto brokers make use of the trade mark ‘Lexus’ in their 
domain names ‘buyorleaselexus.com’ and ‘buy-a-lexus.com’990 both to describe 
their business of brokering Lexus cars and to indicate Lexus automobiles in a way 
that does not cause likelihood of confusion or dilution, preventing the use of the 
trade mark ‘Lexus’ could cause anti-competitive results. At the same time, the 
prevention would chill brokers’ free speech. Thus, there is no substantial societal 
interest in preventing the use of ‘Lexus.’ In this case, brokers can raise a fair use 
defence against Toyota’s trade mark infringement claim.  
On the other hand, if advertising text including those domain names also 
has the expression ‘official dealers’ in front of domain names, a ban on the use of 
the mark ‘Lexus’ in this advertising would not create anti-competitive results 
because auto brokers can use the mark in domain names in other contexts. Thus, 
this use cannot be fair. This use, on the contrary, could harm the pro-competitive 
functions of the mark ‘Lexus’ by causing consumer confusion as to the controller 
of the quality and brand image of the car brokering service. Therefore, there exist 
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substantial societal interests in protecting trade marks. The fact that brokers’ use 
of the Lexus mark in domain names constitutes fair use cannot justify brokers’ 
use in this context. Neither can indirect contexts such as a disclaimer on the 
websites which disavows the sponsorship of Toyota. In this situation, auto brokers 
would hardly succeed in their fair use defence.  
 
(2) Fair Use and Requirements for Liability 
 
A fair use defence should be distinguished from ‘use as trade marks.’ 
Unlike the trade mark use doctrine, it can sift out speech worthy of protection 
under freedom of expression from speech unworthy of protection. Unauthorised 
use of trade marks, which does not constitute ‘use as trade marks,’ could harm 
pro-competitive trade mark functions, and thus there can be substantial or 
compelling societal interests in preventing this use. The trade mark use theory 
always protects this unauthorised use while a fair use doctrine does not. In this 
sense, the trade mark use doctrine should not be introduced in trade mark law for 
the proper protection of free speech. Neither should provisions about fair use be 
used as a statutory ground for the trade mark use theory.  
Many courts, however, rely on the use requirement more easily than on a 
fair use defence in order to protect free speech. In Hölterhoff, the ECJ found no 
liability for unauthorised use, based on article 5(1) of the Trade Mark Directive 
rather than article 6(1)(b) about fair use, concluding that article 5(1) does not 
apply to the case “where a third party, in the course of commercial negotiations, 
reveals the origin of goods which he has produced himself and uses the sign in 
question solely to denote the particular characteristics of the goods he is offering 
for sale so that there can be no question of the trade mark used being perceived as 
a sign indicative of the undertaking of origin.”991 The Court did not rely on 
article 6(1)(b)
992
 even though Advocate General Jacobs mentioned both articles 
5(1) and 6(1).
993
 If this approach, which is almost the same as that of the trade 
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mark use theory, is generally followed, many unfair expressions could also be 
exempted from trade mark liability under the name of free speech. 
A fair use defence plays a role in protecting free speech values more 
properly when a fair use test is separated from confusion or dilution tests. 
Combining these tests can cause the de facto shift of the burden to prove likely 
confusion or dilution from trade mark owners to third party users. This shift of 
the burden requiring money and efforts, in turn, could cause a chill on the free 
speech of the users who cannot afford litigation. The significance of the burden 
can be found in the decision of the US Ninth Circuit which includes ‘no 
likelihood of confusion’ as the third prong of a nominative fair use test. In Toyota, 
the Ninth Circuit decided that if a defendant claiming nominative fair use shows 
that it used a trade mark to refer to trade marked products, then the burden of 
proving a likelihood of confusion reverts to a plaintiff.
994
  
 
5) Conclusion 
 
 For the harmonious coexistence of trade mark protection with freedom of 
expression, a strict interpretation of ‘likelihood of confusion or dilution’ is 
necessary. Where trade marks are used in commercial contexts and hence societal 
interests in preventing unauthorised use need to be substantial, likelihood of 
confusion or dilution should be interpreted as arising only when pro-competitive 
trade mark functions are likely to be harmed. Where use of trade marks 
constitutes non-commercial speech the restriction of which requires compelling 
governmental interests, likelihood of confusion or dilution should be sufficiently 
evident to show actual malice or calculated falsehood. Moreover, since free 
speech can be protected efficiently by claiming a fair use defence, a too strict 
application of a fair use defence should be avoided.  
 The need for harmony, however, does not ensure that confusing or 
diluting use of trade marks should be limited to ‘use as trade marks’ or that trade 
mark law should only apply to use of trade marks as ‘commercial speech.’ 
Moreover, risks in the direct contexts where trade marks are used should not be 
ignored because of free speech interests in indirectly related contexts. To interpret 
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otherwise would tilt the balance in favour of third party users’ free speech at the 
sacrifice of what trade mark law aims at. It could also damage trade mark owners’ 
rights to speak and consumers’ rights to listen in that unauthorised use could 
distort the information that trade marks provide. Most importantly, non-
commercial speech exclusions from dilution-based liability provided for in the 
Lanham Act and the Korean Unfair Competition Act give too much weight to free 
speech interests of third party users.  
   
2. Direct Liability in Paid Search Marketing 
 
1) Free Speech on the Internet 
 
 A basic issue in the analysis of the direct trade mark liability of 
advertisers and search engines from the perspective of free speech is whether free 
speech in an online world is the same as that in an offline world. There may be an 
argument that information or ideas on the Internet should be protected more 
strongly under free speech than those in bricks-and-mortar businesses because of 
the contribution of the Internet to freedom of speech. Conversely, others may 
argue that speech on the Internet should be restricted more than offline speech on 
the ground of the risk that the Internet poses in our society. This thesis does not 
support both arguments. It is submitted here that free speech interests both in 
online and offline worlds should be identical.  
 The Internet both facilitates and hampers free speech. The advent and 
development of the Internet, one of the most efficient and significant modes of 
communication, has made the information age more democratic.
995
 The Internet 
offers more equal opportunities for communication than any other media
996
 by 
providing a wealth of instantaneously available information, knowledge, and 
ideas, by enabling both speakers and listeners to access channels at considerably 
lower costs, and by opening the possibility that anyone can be speakers as well as 
listeners.  
The benefits of the Internet also function as threats to our society. It is 
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hardly possible to control the flood of information. Widespread internet use and 
the anonymous nature of the Internet make it difficult to find deliberate speakers 
with whom people can share opinions and discuss issues.
997
 Faster 
communication of information leads to the reduction of time necessary for 
developing careful thoughts.
998
 Since people do not have to consider the 
profitability of their expressions owing to low cost access to the Internet, they 
need not turn their attention to their expressions as much as they do when using 
other conventional mass media.
999
 Speech on the Internet is not under control of 
professional editors compared to that in other media.
1000
 In the same vein, 
authors argue that “the Internet will not provide a new public forum for general 
political debate, but rather will lead to further fragmentation or balkanization of 
speech.”1001 Given both the negative and positive contribution of the Internet to 
free speech, using the Internet itself cannot be any ground for the lower or higher 
level of free speech protection. 
Moreover, the Internet itself does not create a new type of speech which 
requires weaker or stronger protection. Speech can be categorised as either 
commercial speech, which is accorded a low degree of protection, or fully 
protected non-commercial speech. Commercial expression on the Internet can 
only be characterised as commercial. Commercial speech cannot change into non-
commercial just because it is made in an online world. The Internet is only a new 
kind of media through which people communicate with each other. As the 
Constitutional Court of Korea recently found that the real name verification 
system required for users of online bulletin boards was unconstitutional,
1002
 there 
is no reason that online speech is treated differently from offline speech. The 
Court decided in this case that the Korean Act on Promotion of Information and 
Communication Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc., which 
compelled online information service providers with more than 100,000 visitors 
per day to take necessary measures to verify real names of internet bulletin board 
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users, infringed constitutionally protected freedom of expression.
1003
 It reasoned 
that the real name verification system was not the least restrictive means to 
develop a healthy internet culture that the system aimed at, adding that there was 
no evidence that it reduced harm to this aim to such a degree as to justify the prior 
restraint of free speech while it seriously restricted free speech of both the users 
and the providers.
1004
   
From the perspective of free speech, expressions in an online world can 
be neither absolutely free from regulation nor restricted more than those in an 
offline world. Thus, expressions of advertisers and search engines in an online 
world should be protected under free speech only as much as those in an offline 
world: the same standards for limiting speech apply to their expressions in both 
worlds. 
 
2) Speech and Speakers in Paid Search Marketing 
 
 For advertisers or search engines to claim free speech protection to 
defend their unauthorised use of trade marks in paid search marketing, bans on 
their use should limit ‘speech’ within the meaning of free speech. If trade mark 
protection does not restrict any ‘speech,’ free speech cannot be invoked as a 
ground to justify their use. Therefore, it is necessary to assess whether 
expressions of advertisers and search engines constitute ‘speech.’ 
 Paid search marketing consists of various expressions. Search engines 
recommend keywords to advertisers. Search engines sell keywords and 
advertisers select and purchase them. As a result, keywords are incorporated into 
search engines’ software programmes. Advertisers generate advertisements which 
are saved in the software programmes and triggered in response to internet users’ 
entry of keywords. Search engines display search engine results on their websites 
‘in their formats.’ 
 The recommendation, sale, and purchase of keywords, and 
advertisements displayed on SERPs evidently amount to speech within the 
meaning of freedom of expression since they deliver information and ideas to 
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listeners. On the other hand, whether invisible use of keywords and 
advertisements in the programmes constitutes ‘speech’ is not certain.  
 Some may maintain that invisible use of trade marked keywords is 
‘speech’ since it communicates information about the relationship between the 
keywords and advertisements.
1005
 Keywords and advertisements included in 
software programmes, however, cannot convey any information or ideas to 
listeners until they are shown to them. Only after online users input keywords into 
search boxes, the keywords in the programmes, which do not appear on SERPs, 
trigger advertisements and hence advertisements deliver information or ideas to 
consumers. In this sense, it is not invisibly used keywords themselves that impart 
information on the relationship to online users. The information is delivered by 
the fact that advertisements appear in response to internet users’ entry of 
keywords. The internal use, which lacks a communicative element, cannot be 
speech. It is only inextricably intertwined with advertisements displayed on 
SERPs and SERPs as a whole, both of which constitute ‘expression’ protected 
under free speech. This is also true where trade marks are used as keywords. 
Therefore, this thesis submits that not all uses of trade marks constitute ‘speech.’ 
SERPs can be characterised as ‘speech’ in that not only the structure, 
design, and word of SERPs but also SERPs as a whole deliver information, 
knowledge, or ideas to the audience. In particular, the title of ‘sponsored links’ or 
‘ads’, the location of paid search results, keywords remained in search boxes, and 
trade marks or logos of search engines convey clear-cut messages that the order 
of the display in search results equals the relevance to keywords that internet 
users enter in search engines.  
 As speakers cannot claim free speech rights based on other speakers’ 
speech, advertisers or search engines cannot maintain that they are not liable for 
their unauthorised use of trade marks because the prevention of the use 
unjustifiably restricts other advertisers’ or search engines’ speech. Thus, it is 
necessary to analyse ‘to whom each speech belongs’ in paid search marketing 
where more than one speakers convey their information, knowledge, or ideas. 
 The recommendation of keywords via suggestion tools and the sale of 
keywords to advertisers are search engines’ speech, whereas the purchase of 
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keywords from search engines is advertisers’. Meanwhile, since internal use of 
keywords does not constitute ‘speech,’ its speaker is immaterial. It is only the 
effect of the sale and purchase contract between search engines and advertisers. 
 SERPs also consist of various expressions of many speakers. Each 
advertiser conveys its information, knowledge, or ideas in its own advertisement. 
Even when advertisers use trade marks without permission, the use is not trade 
mark owners’ speech, but advertisers’ speech. SERPs as a whole, on the other 
hand, can be categorised as search engines’ expression. Regulating the format of 
SERPs or requiring search engines to display disclaimers on SERPs constitutes 
the restriction of search engines’ free speech. The order of the display of search 
results in accordance with each search engine’s ranking policy also relates to the 
search engine’s speech. 
In sum, advertisers or search engines can claim their free speech rights in 
order to justify their use of trade marks. They, however, cannot maintain their free 
speech interests in their invisible use of trade marks since the invisible use does 
not constitute ‘speech’. They can only insist that societal interests in banning 
invisible use are outweighed by free speech interests in protecting their 
expressions such as advertisements on SERPs or SERPs as a whole. Moreover, 
advertisers cannot argue for free speech interests in designing SERPs in order to 
defend advertisers’ use of trade marks as keywords since SERPs as a whole 
belong to search engines. Search engines cannot also assert free speech values in 
advertisements displayed on SERPs to justify their use of trade marks as 
keywords unless they are engaged in the creation of the advertisements.  
 
3) Commercial or Non-commercial Speech 
 
 This thesis argues that use of trade marks should be characterised as 
commercial or non-commercial depending on its contexts and that the 
requirements for trade mark liability should be interpreted differently according 
to the characteristics of use of trade marks as speech. Hence, it is not only 
practically useful but also critical to categorise various expressions in paid search 
marketing as commercial or non-commercial speech. 
It is evident that the sale, selection, and purchase of keywords are 
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classified as commercial. They are the offer and acceptance of commercial 
transactions. A US district court also stated in Buying for the Home that the 
purchase of trade marked keywords was “a commercial transaction that occurred 
in commerce, trading on the value of Plaintiff's mark.”1006 The recommendation 
of keywords can also be characterised as commercial because it is made for the 
purpose of offering to sell keywords.  
On the other hand, there can be arguments as to whether the 
incorporation of keywords into software programmes is commercial or non-
commercial. Some contend that the invisible use is commercial.
1007
 The invisible 
use, however, cannot be considered ‘speech’ since it lacks communication. It is 
only interlocked with advertisements on SERPs and SERPs as a whole. 
 Search results under the title of ‘sponsored links’ or ‘ads’ can be either 
commercial or non-commercial. Considering the fact that search engines charge 
advertisers for paid search marketing, most paid search results are possibly about 
the proposal of commercial transactions and hence commercial. Nevertheless, 
there still remains the possibility that search results concern political opinions or 
artistic works. Political organizations could use paid search marketing to 
publicise their platforms. Authors could buy keywords to introduce their works. 
Paid search marketing could also be used by operators of gripe or parody sites. 
 As regards the classification of ‘SERPs as a whole,’ it may be argued that 
paid results as a whole, unlike organic results, constitute commercial speech
1008
 
because search engines receive money from advertisers for keywords. 
Nevertheless, internet users cannot readily find that advertisers pay search 
engines for keywords. The title ‘ads’ does not sufficiently show that advertisers 
pay search engines. More importantly, as the US Supreme Court stated in New 
York Times,
1009
 the fact that search engines are paid for displaying 
advertisements is immaterial. Paid search results as a whole would not be 
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perceived by the audience as search engines’ proposal of commercial transactions. 
Moreover, unless it is assumed that average consumers of all kinds of products 
are internet-savvy, the audience could not tell the difference between organic 
search results and paid search results with ease.
1010
 For these reasons, SERPs as a 
whole which belong to search engines should be categorised as non-commercial 
speech.  
 To sum up, advertisers’ selection and purchase of keywords as well as 
search engines’ recommendation and sale of keywords are classified as 
commercial speech, whereas search engines’ SERPs as a whole are characterised 
as non-commercial. Advertisements which appear on SERPs can be commercial 
or non-commercial speech, depending on their nature.  
Accordingly, as this thesis argues that use of trade marks can be 
categorised into commercial or non-commercial speech depending on its contexts, 
whether ‘use of trade marks’ in paid search marketing constitutes commercial or 
non-commercial speech hinges on its direct contexts. Advertisers’ selection and 
purchase of trade marks as keywords, advertisers’ use of trade marks in 
commercial advertisements, and search engines’ recommendation and sale of 
trade marks as keywords constitute commercial speech. Advertisers’ use of trade 
marks in non-commercial advertisements and search engines’ use of trade marks 
on SERPs other than in advertisements amount to non-commercial speech. 
Invisible use of trade marks as keywords, which does not constitute ‘speech,’ can 
be characterised as neither commercial nor non-commercial. Standards for 
limiting speech, however, can also apply to the invisible use since its restriction 
may result in the suppression of advertisers’ advertisements or search engines’ 
SERPs as a whole because of its tight link to them.  
Thus, evident or compelling likelihood of confusion or dilution, which I 
suggest is required for the prevention of ‘unauthorised use of trade marks as non-
commercial speech,’ is necessary for trade mark owners to prevent advertisers 
from using trade marks in non-commercial advertisements. It is also needed to 
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inhibit advertisers’ invisible use of trade marks as keywords, which triggers non-
commercial advertisements, and search engines’ invisible use, which causes the 
display of SERPs as a whole.  
 
4) Free Speech and Direct Trade Mark Liability 
 
(1) Advertisers 
 
a) Likelihood of Confusion 
 
This thesis argues that where trade marks are used in commercial 
contexts, the confusion-based liability of advertisers occurs only when pro-
competitive trade mark functions are likely to be harmed; this likely harm does 
exist when consumers are confused as to controllers of product quality and brand 
image since pro-competitive trade mark functions only relates to the position of 
product quality and brand image.   
At the stage of the sale and purchase of trade marks as keywords (“stage 
I”), selection, purchase, and invisible use do not make consumers, who are 
advertisers at this stage, confused as to controllers of product quality and brand 
image. Advertisers would hardly believe that trade mark owners are responsible 
for the quality of keywords. They would be well aware of the mechanics of paid 
search marketing and the meaning of buying trade marked keywords since they 
would read search engines’ guidelines and trade mark policies before or when 
they purchase the keywords. Consumers of owners’ or advertisers’ products 
would not even know the selection, purchase, and invisible use at stage I. From 
the perspective of free speech, there are no substantial societal interests in 
banning the selection, purchase, and invisible use of trade marks as keywords at 
this stage.  
At the stage of search engine users’ entry of trade marked keywords into 
search engine boxes (“stage II”), however, unauthorised use of trade marks in 
commercial advertisements may generate likelihood of confusion as to who 
controls product quality and brand image, and hence there can be substantial 
governmental interests in preventing the use. The fact that consumer confusion 
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dissipates after consumers visit advertisers’ websites cannot offset these 
substantial interests. Advertisements still carry the risk that justifies the 
suppression of commercial expression. If, for instance, advertisers’ use of trade 
marks is permitted on the ground of disclaimers written on the front pages of their 
websites, it would enable advertisers to use every possible expression in 
advertisements that is likely to confuse consumers. 
Even where commercial advertisements displayed on SERPs do not 
include trade marks, their misleading expressions, in combination with the 
triggering effect of trade marked keywords and other circumstances, can create 
consumer confusion. In this case, the standard for limiting commercial speech 
should also apply to bans on invisible use of trade marks as keywords because the 
prevention of the invisible use would restrict free commercial speech of 
advertisers: if the use is prevented, trade marks used as keywords could not 
trigger such advertisements as are directly related to them. Thus, consumer 
confusion required for bans on invisible use should be about controllers of 
product quality and brand image. Mere diversion of consumer attention to 
advertisers’ websites cannot amount to substantial societal interests in preventing 
the invisible use.  
 On the other hand, where trade marks are used in non-commercial 
advertisements such as political campaign advertisements and advertisements for 
gripe or parody websites, there should be explicit or compelling likelihood of 
confusion for advertisers to be liable for trade mark infringement. Where non-
commercial advertisements include trade marks but do not have expressions 
which could evidently cause consumer confusion as to controllers of product 
quality or product brand image, it should be concluded that advertisers are not 
liable.  
 This is also the case where trade marks are used only as keywords in 
software programmes. Trade mark infringement could arise when the text of non-
commercial advertisements together with the invisible use could evidently 
mislead consumers into thinking that proprietors are controllers of the quality and 
brand image of users’ products. Without evident likelihood of confusion, societal 
interests in preventing the internal use of trade marks cannot prevail over free 
speech values that underlie advertisers’ paid search marketing. 
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b) Likelihood of Dilution 
 
This thesis suggests that the prevention of diluting use of trade marks is 
justifiable by the standard for restricting commercial speech when the use is 
likely to harm the pro-competitive functions of famous marks in owners’ product 
markets.  
At stage I, advertisers’ selection, purchase, and invisible use of trade 
marks as keywords are not likely to blur or tarnish famous marks to a degree that 
adversely affects the pro-competitive functions. It is because consumers of 
owners’ products are unable to connect famous marks with inconsistent or 
negative product quality or brand images until trade marked keywords trigger 
advertisements. For instance, perfume sellers’ selection, purchase, and invisible 
use of the keyword ‘perfumebay’ alone cannot harm the pro-competitive 
functions of the trade mark ‘eBay’ since consumers of eBay’s service cannot link 
the keyword to sellers’ advertisements before the advertisements are displayed on 
a SERP. Similarly, where advertisements saved in programmes include both the 
‘perfumebay’ mark and tarnishing expressions, they cannot harm the pro-
competitive functions of ‘eBay’ until the keyword ‘perfumebay’ triggers the 
advertisements.  
On the other hand, at stage II, advertisers’ unauthorised use of trade 
marks in their commercial advertisements on SERPs can cause likelihood of 
blurring or tarnishment, depending on the text of the advertisements. Even where 
the advertisements do not contain famous marks, the combination of their text, 
the linking effect of keywords, and other context and circumstances can generate 
likelihood of dilution. Bans on use of trade marks based solely on the existence of 
unfair advantage, however, should not be admitted; these bans could only cause 
the suppression of free speech without substantial interests. 
Where advertisers include famous marks in the text of non-commercial 
advertisements displayed on SERPs, they should be responsible for trade mark 
dilution only if likelihood of dilution is evident. Even where advertisers do not 
use trade marks in the text, the advertisements triggered by trade marked 
keywords can cause compelling likelihood of dilution. According to the Lanham 
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Act and the Korean Unfair Competition Act, advertisers are exempted from 
dilution-based liability only because use of trade marks constitutes non-
commercial speech. These provisions, however, are not consistent with the 
standard for limiting non-commercial expression. They tilt a balance in favour of 
advertisers’ free speech at the sacrifice of compelling interests in preventing use 
of trade marks. Both laws need to be amended. 
  
c) Fair Use Defence 
 
Advertisers can protect their free speech values effectively by claiming a 
fair use defence. For instance, advertisers can claim that their visible or invisible 
use of trade marks is intended to describe advertisers’ products or to indicate the 
source of owners’ products.  
Advertisers, however, cannot defend their free speech values by 
maintaining that their use is necessary for search engines to provide users with 
relevant information; that is, free speech of search engines cannot be the ground 
for free speech of advertisers. Nor can they argue that invisible use of trade marks 
as keywords aims at describing the content of their websites; advertisers’ free 
speech interests in describing the content of the websites are not affected by the 
prevention of the internal use. 
 
(2) Search Engines 
 
a) Likelihood of Confusion 
 
 At stage I, search engines’ recommendation and sale of trade marks as 
keywords, which constitutes commercial speech, cannot be inhibited since the 
recommendation and sale would not cause consumer confusion that is likely to 
harm pro-competitive trade mark functions in owners’ product markets. 
Advertisers, who amount to consumers of trade marked keywords, would not 
misperceive trade mark owners as controllers of the quality and brand image of 
keywords. Nor could average consumers in owners’ or advertisers’ product 
markets mistakenly believe that trade mark owners control the quality and brand 
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image of advertisers’ products on the ground of the recommendation and sale. 
Average consumers who input keywords in search boxes could not perceive that 
trade marked keywords are suggested or sold. Therefore, there are no substantial 
societal interests to suppress the recommendation and sale of trade marks as 
keywords. 
 At stage II, the restriction of search engines’ internal use of trade marked 
keywords would adversely affect the display of SERPs as a whole which I 
classify as non-commercial speech. Given the facts that almost all words can be 
trade marks and that there are a lot of non-infringing uses of trade marks, the 
restriction could hamper the proper function of paid search result services by 
limiting the link between keywords and paid search results. Thus, the standard for 
restricting non-commercial speech, which requires compelling likelihood of 
confusion, should apply to this prevention. 
 SERPs as a whole, which are connected with internal use of trade marks 
as keywords, strongly show that internally used trade marks are linked with 
advertisers’ advertisements. First, trade marked keywords trigger advertisements. 
Second, trade marked keywords that internet users entered into search engines 
still remain in search boxes. Third, some SERPs indicate that the results are ‘ads 
related to’ the keywords. Fourth, advertisements are displayed in a colour, 
typeface, and font size similar to those of organic search results except, for 
example, light-coloured rectangular backgrounds. Fifth, there is no mention of the 
facts that advertisers pay search engines for the purchase of the keywords and that 
the order of paid search results does not correspond to their significance or their 
relevance to the keywords.  
 Despite showing the close connection of keywords with advertisements, 
SERPs as a whole and invisible use do not generate evident consumer confusion. 
Search engines do not use any expression that could ‘clearly’ mislead consumers 
as to controllers of product quality or product brand image in SERPs. Particularly, 
they do not use the expression ‘sponsored by trade mark owners’ as the title of 
paid search results despite the fact that they use expressions such as ‘Sponsored 
Results’ and ‘Sponsored Links’ which only have the meagre possibility of 
misleading consumers. This degree of confusion cannot survive the first prong of 
the standard for restricting non-commercial speech: there should be compelling 
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societal interests in preventing speech.  
 The text of advertisements ‘created by advertisers’ should not be taken 
into account in assessing whether search engines’ use of trade marks causes 
likelihood of confusion. Search engines’ speech cannot be suppressed because of 
the harm that advertisers’ expressions generate. If search engines participate in 
the creation of the text of advertisements, the text could be factored in the 
assessment. Under current practices, however, search engines are not involved in 
creating advertisers’ speech; they just connect trade marked keywords with 
advertisers’ expressions. 
 
b) Likelihood of Dilution 
 
 At stage I, it would be unlikely that search engines’ recommendation and 
sale of famous marks as keywords causes blurring or tarnishment that would 
amount to harm to pro-competitive functions of the marks. The recommendation 
and sale only concerns trade marks ‘as keywords.’ Search engines do not suggest 
and sell image files of famous marks that can be used in advertisements. Actually, 
they only suggest and sell a link between trade marked keywords and 
advertisements, space for advertisements, and the ranking of advertisements. In 
contrast to the sale of embroidered patches with a hockey team’s symbol through 
sporting goods stores, search engines cannot expect that their recommendation 
and sale would lead immediately to advertisers’ use of the famous marks or 
misleading expressions in advertisements. Moreover, consumers of owners’ 
products cannot perceive whether use of famous marks is made on products of 
inconsistent or poor quality and creates any inconsistent or negative brand images 
before advertisements are triggered. 
 At stage II, search engines’ SERPs as a whole, even together with the 
triggering effect of internally used trade marks, can hardly cause any ‘evident’ 
likelihood of dilution which can pose compelling risks to pro-competitive 
functions. As is the case in the evaluation of likelihood of confusion, search 
engines neither include any expression that could evidently blur or tarnish famous 
marks in their SERPs nor design SERPs in a way that could cause evident 
likelihood of dilution. From the perspective of the non-commercial speech 
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restriction test, the reason for allowing search engines’ invisible use is not that it 
constitutes non-commercial speech. The reason is also not just that SERPs 
amount to non-commercial speech. It is because bans on the invisible use could 
cause the restriction of SERPs, which are characterised as non-commercial 
speech, and there are no compelling societal interests in these bans: there is no 
compelling likelihood of harm to pro-competitive trade mark functions. In this 
sense, a non-commercial use defence to dilution-based liability in trade mark law 
or unfair competition law should be removed. 
 The fact that advertisements on SERPs generate compelling likelihood of 
dilution should not influence the assessment of search engines’ dilution-based 
liability. The risks arising from advertisers’ expressions cannot outweigh search 
engines’ free speech values. If search engines’ use of trade marks were directly 
connected to the risks by, for example, making invisibly used trade marks 
automatically appear in the advertisements, search engines could also be 
responsible for these risks. This, however, is not a current practice in paid search 
marketing. 
 
c) Fair Use Defence 
 
 If search engines’ use of trade marks is found to cause evident likelihood 
of confusion or dilution, search engines cannot claim fair use based on advertisers’ 
speech. Just as search engines are not responsible for risks that advertisers’ 
speech poses to trade mark functions, they cannot be exempted from direct 
liability because of advertisers’ fair use of trade marks in advertisements. They 
cannot also claim that their invisible use of trade marks is necessary to describe 
‘the content of advertisers’ websites.’ Advertisers’ use of disclaimers either in 
advertisements or on their websites is not capable of dispelling search engines’ 
liability. 
 
(3) Remedy 
 
 Where use of trade marks is classified as non-commercial speech, a 
means to further compelling societal interests in suppressing use of trade marks 
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should be the least restrictive.  This thesis suggests that disclaimers can be the 
least restrictive means because they are less restrictive than bans on use of trade 
marks. Disclaimers included in advertisements can remedy likelihood of 
confusion or dilution arising from advertisers’ use of trade marks if they are used 
in a way to clearly dissociate advertisers’ products from trade mark owners. 
Disclaimers at the top of paid search results can also remove confusion or dilution 
that search engines’ SERPs as a whole may generate. Thus, disclaimers should be 
introduced into trade mark law and unfair competition law as a remedy.   
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Part IV. Conclusion  
 
 Given the peculiarities of use of trade marks in paid search marketing, 
courts cannot determine trade mark liability in this context based solely on their 
jurisprudence on metatags, pop-up advertising, and banner advertising cases. 
Likewise, the analogy of paid search marketing to product placement, the sale of 
embroidered logos, and newspaper advertising are no more than references in 
determining liability of advertisers and search engines. This jurisprudence and 
analogy amount to just piecemeal approaches that cannot sufficiently cope with 
the development of paid search marketing. Rather, the liability needs to be 
analysed through ‘a virtuous cycle in the application of trade mark law’, which 
can reach a balance between interested parties and between trade mark protection 
and free speech values.
1011
  
Searching for the balance is the first step in the virtuous cycle. As a 
stimulus, I suggest that ‘fair and efficient competition’ should be the ultimate 
purpose of trade mark law.
1012
 This concept takes into account trade mark 
proprietors, competitors, third party users, consumers, and marketplaces. 
‘Efficiency’ and ‘fairness’ founded on ‘competition’ balance and counterbalance 
the interests of relevant parties. Properly applied, the concept covers the two 
fundamental principles by avoiding the inherent contradictions between them: the 
prevention of consumer confusion and the protection of goodwill. It does not rely 
on the search cost theory. It also liberates trade mark law from the discussion 
about trade mark functions by focusing on competition and brand image 
protection as balancing and counterbalancing tools in delineating the scope of 
protection. Trade mark functions remain determinative, but a competition and 
image protection perspective allows us to identify protectable functions with 
clarity and precision. Normally courts fail to distinguish between protectable and 
non-protectable functions. 
It is suggested that not all functions deserve protection.
1013
 Fair and 
efficient competition can be achieved ‘by way of protecting pro-competitive trade 
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mark functions’: the intra-trade mark information function and the inter-trade 
mark differentiation function. The information function means the function of 
concisely conveying to consumers information as to the position of product 
quality and brand image. The differentiation function is the function of enabling 
producers to differentiate their products from those of others and at the same time 
consumers to distinguish between products, to form a preference for certain trade 
marked products, and to make purchasing decisions, based on the information 
imparted by trade marks. Trade marks fulfil these functions in owners’ markets 
and competing product markets.   
In relation to these fundamental concepts of trade mark law, use of trade 
marks in paid search marketing has posed a question about currently accepted 
fundamentals of trade mark protection, causing global tensions between trade 
mark proprietors, advertisers, search engines, and consumers. Courts in different 
jurisdictions have not adopted a similar position because of different factual 
contexts, distinct appreciations of similar facts, and most importantly different 
legal interpretations of requirements for and exceptions from trade mark 
liability.
1014
 In the USA where the Supreme Court has not yet delivered its 
opinion, federal courts have taken diverse positions in applying the Lanham Act 
to paid search marketing cases. There are also diverging legal interpretations 
among scholars in connection with use of trade marks in paid search marketing.  
As regards legal interpretation, I submit that it should be based on the 
protection of pro-competitive trade mark functions because only pro-competitive 
functions are considered protectable under trade mark law; that is, only where 
third party use is likely to harm the information and differentiation functions of 
owners’ trade marks in owners’ product markets, users could be liable.1015 I also 
suggest that trade mark liability in double identity cases could arise only where 
the information and differentiation functions of owners’ marks are likely to be 
harmed.
1016
 Aiming at competition in product markets on the one hand and 
encompassing brand image protection on the other, the protection of pro-
competitive functions produces balancing and counterbalancing dynamics in the 
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legal interpretation. 
First, ‘use of trade marks’ should be construed as meaning use of trade 
marks in a manner that can be perceived by consumers. If it is narrowly 
interpreted as ‘use as trade marks,’ this could tip the balance in favour of third 
party users. The use requirement can neither distinguish between fair and unfair 
use nor decide likelihood of harm to pro-competitive trade mark functions until 
the absence or presence of likelihood of confusion or dilution is obvious.  
Second, likelihood of confusion should be interpreted as arising where 
consumers are misled into thinking that trade mark owners control the quality and 
brand image of users’ products. In relation to this, ‘likelihood of expansion’ 
should not be factored in the assessment of likelihood of confusion because 
consumers would not mistakenly believe that owners control the quality and 
brand image of users’ products without the misconception that owners already 
entered users’ markets. Whether or not a likelihood of confusion exists at the time 
of purchase is immaterial. Moreover, in the context of paid search marketing, the 
degree of consumer care should be decided differently, depending on whether the 
focus is on the similarity between trade marks or the mechanics of paid search 
marketing.  
Third, likelihood of dilution should be construed as occurring when third 
party use of famous marks could damage the strong position of product quality or 
product brand image that the marks indicate. There is a likelihood of blurring 
when use of famous marks could make consumers of owners’ products associate 
famous marks with inconsistent but not negative product quality or images. 
Tarnishment is likely to arise when the use could lead consumers to associate 
famous marks with negative quality or images. On the other hand, more mental 
time or additional cognitive efforts in linking trade marks to owners’ products 
alone cannot justify trade mark liability. In the same vein, the taking of unfair 
advantage, a third type of dilution that constitutes infringing use in EU trade mark 
law, should not be accepted as such because its existence does not depend on 
harm to the information and differentiation functions of famous marks. In 
determining blurring and tarnishment, which could arise in owners’ product 
markets, consumer care should depend on the price and nature of owners’ 
products and the type of consumers of owners’ products.  
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  Fourth, fair use and functional use defences should not be accepted where 
banning third party use is not likely to cause anti-competitive results. They, on 
the other hand, should not collapse into the analysis of confusion or dilution, and 
the absence of confusion or dilution should not be a condition for them. Whereas 
the confusion and dilution tests are intended to prove likelihood of harm to pro-
competitive functions, fair use and functional use defences aim to demonstrate 
that third party use is essential for fair and efficient competition in product 
markets despite its effects on trade mark functions: the use adversely affects only 
trade mark functions which are beyond the reach of pro-competitive functions.  
These interpretations are supplemented by the next step in the virtuous 
cycle: the additional consideration of a balance between trade mark protection 
and free speech. Use of trade marks, which constitutes speech within the meaning 
of free speech if it possesses a communicative nature, can be classified as 
commercial or non-commercial expression according to whether the use is made 
in commercial or non-commercial contexts. Thus, depending on contexts, the 
standard for limiting commercial or non-commercial speech applies to use of 
trade marks. In the case of internal use which in itself cannot constitute speech 
because of its lack of communicative nature, the application of the standard 
depends on the type of an expression that the restriction of the internal use could 
influence. Given that trade mark law aims to foster fair and efficient competition 
by way of protecting pro-competitive trade mark functions and that trade mark 
owners also have free speech interests in preventing third party use, bans on 
unauthorised use by trade mark law are in conformity with the standards for the 
restriction of speech if ‘core’ requirements for trade mark liability are narrowly 
interpreted.  
Where trade marks are used in commercial contexts, the interpretation of 
likelihood of confusion and dilution should be the same as that suggested based 
on protectable trade mark functions. Confusion as to controllers of product 
quality and brand image offers a substantial justification for trade mark liability. 
Insofar as likelihood of dilution is construed as existing only when third party use 
of famous marks could cause consumers to associate famous marks with 
inconsistent or negative quality or images, societal interests in anti-dilution 
protection are substantial.  
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On the other hand, where third parties use trade marks in non-commercial 
contexts, likelihood of confusion or dilution should be evident enough to show 
actual malice or calculated falsehood.
1017
 Under this strict interpretation, a non-
commercial use exception provided for in the Lanham Act and the Korean Unfair 
Competition Act is unnecessary. Rather, these laws need to be revised for a better 
balance between trade mark protection and free speech. Moreover, sponsorship or 
non-sponsorship disclosures are necessary as a remedy to survive the last part of 
the standard for limiting non-commercial expression: the least restrictive means. 
Unlike confusion and dilution, the use requirement, which this thesis 
does not regard as a core requirement, does not have to be construed strictly 
because of free speech. In particular, use ‘in commerce’ or ‘in the course of trade’ 
need not be limited to commercial speech to constitute infringing use. Use in 
commerce should not be construed strictly as excluding use in contexts that do 
not relate primarily to the proposal of commercial transactions. It is because this 
use could harm pro-competitive trade mark functions. In contrast, commercial 
speech should be defined narrowly, considering the rationale for the lesser degree 
of protection accorded to commercial speech: high possibility of the existence of 
misleading information. 
As regards the consistent evaluation of facts in paid search marketing, 
this thesis suggests that courts should take into account only actual context and 
circumstances directly relevant to use of trade marks as keywords because those 
that consumers cannot perceive as relevant are unable to influence consumer 
perception or consumer association and thus the pro-competitive trade mark 
functions. Hence, the content of advertisers’ websites should not be considered 
since consumers cannot perceive it until they visit the websites. Unlike the 
content, the sale and purchase of trade marked keywords can be recognised by 
advertisers who amount to consumers of keywords, while it cannot be recognised 
by internet users. Internal use can be detected by both advertisers and internet 
users. Given these considerations, actual and direct context and circumstances are 
broadly broken into two stages: the stage of the sale and purchase of trade marked 
keywords (“stage I”) and the stage when consumers input trade marks as search 
terms (“stage II”). 
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Considering the interpretation based both on the protection of pro-
competitive trade mark functions and speech restriction standards, and the actual 
and direct context and circumstances of paid search marketing, advertisers can be 
liable for their use of trade marks even when trade marks are not included in their 
advertisements.
1018
  
At stage I, advertisers’ selection, purchase, and internal use of trade 
marked keywords constitute ‘use of trade marks’ because advertisers, who 
amount to consumers of keywords, can perceive these uses. These uses, however, 
cannot lead consumers of keywords, owners’ products, or advertisers’ products to 
be confused as to controllers of product quality and brand image. They cannot 
also cause likelihood of blurring or tarnishment because consumers of famous 
mark owners’ products cannot associate famous marks with inconsistent or 
negative quality or images. In terms of free speech restriction standards, there are 
no substantial societal interests in preventing them at this stage. 
At stage II, advertisers’ use of trade marks in advertising text and their 
selection and internal use of trade marks as keywords constitute ‘use of trade 
marks.’ The purchase, however, should not be considered to be ‘use of trade 
marks’ at this stage because of its imperceptibility by consumers of owners’ or 
advertisers’ products. Where trade marks are included in commercial 
advertisements, confusion or dilution would be likely without considering the 
triggering effect of trade marked keywords if consumers of advertisers’ products 
are likely to be confused as to controllers of product quality and brand image, or 
if consumers of owners’ products are likely to associate owners’ famous marks 
with inconsistent or negative product quality or brand images. Where trade marks 
are not included in commercial advertisements, the combination of the triggering 
effect, surrounding context and circumstances, and advertising messages can 
cause likelihood of confusion or dilution. In the light of free speech, where 
advertisements are non-commercial, there should be evident or compelling 
likelihood of confusion or dilution for liability. Despite the existence of likelihood 
of confusion or dilution, advertisers can claim fair use or free speech defences. 
They, however, cannot use a fair use defence on the ground that they use trade 
marks as keywords to describe the content of their websites. Moreover, they 
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should not be exempted from dilution-based liability just because they use trade 
marks as non-commercial speech. 
In contrast to advertisers, search engines are not responsible for their use 
‘under current practices,’ whether or not trade marks are included in advertising 
text.
1019
 
At stage I, search engines’ recommendation, sale of keywords, and 
internal use constitute ‘use of trade marks’ within the meaning of trade mark 
liability. Like advertisers’ use at this stage, search engines’ use does not cause any 
likelihood of confusion or dilution. There are also no societal interests in 
preventing these uses. 
At stage II, only search engines’ internal use of trade marks can 
constitute use of trade marks in most cases. Advertising text including use of 
trade marks should not be taken into account in assessing search engines’ liability 
under the current practices in which search engines do not create the text. 
Because of this, the triggering effect of invisible use and other context and 
circumstances cannot cause consumer confusion as to controllers of product 
quality and brand image. Nor can it cause consumer association of famous marks 
with inconsistent or negative product quality or brand images.  
 In the light of free speech values, it is more obvious that search engines 
are not liable for their internal use. Since the restriction of search engines’ internal 
use could adversely affect the display of SERPs as a whole which constitutes 
non-commercial expression, the standard for limiting non-commercial speech 
should apply to this restriction. Thus, there should be evident or compelling 
likelihood of confusion or dilution. Nevertheless, there is no such confusion or 
dilution found in paid search marketing. 
 And finally, the virtuous cycle returns to the starting point. Trade mark 
protection in the context of paid search marketing, which is based on the 
protection of pro-competitive trade mark functions and speech restriction 
standards, could promote fair and efficient competition in product markets. At the 
same time, it could reach a balance between trade mark proprietors, advertisers, 
search engines, and consumers and between trade mark protection and free 
speech values.  
                                         
1019
 See Supra Chapters 5.4.3) and 7.2.4)(2) 
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 In this thesis, I suggested that fair and efficient competition is core in 
finding a balance between interested parties and between trade mark protection 
and free speech values and that the balance can be reached through ‘a virtuous 
cycle in the application of trade mark law.’ I also tested my suggestions against 
use of trade marks in paid search marketing which possesses unique peculiarities 
and has globally challenged the basics of trade mark law. Since the direct liability 
of advertisers and search engines is determined on the basis of the legal 
interpretation drawn from both the protection of pro-competitive trade mark 
functions and standards for restricting free speech, it could advance fair and 
efficient competition and maintain the balance in the context of paid search 
marketing. Then again, searching for a balance in different contexts will 
commence the transformation of the virtuous cycle into a virtuous spiral. As a 
result, fair and efficient competition could be promoted in all product markets.  
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